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COURT FILE NUMBER	2001-05482
COURT	COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
	IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF JMB CRUSHING SYSTEMS INC. and 2161889 ALBERTA LTD.
APPLICANTS	JMB CRUSHING SYSTEMS INC. AND 2161889 ALBERTA LTD.
DOCUMENT	**BENCH BRIEF OF THE APPLICANTS**
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	**Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP** 1600, 421 – 7th Avenue SW Calgary, AB T2P 4K9 Attn: **Tom Cumming/Caireen E. Hanert/Alex Matthews** Phone: 403.298.1938/403.298.1992/403.298.1018 Fax: 403.263.9193 File No.: A163514

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Applicants JMB Crushing Systems Inc. ("**JMB**") and 2161889 Alberta Ltd. ("**216**", and with JMB, the "**Applicants**") obtained protection from their creditors pursuant to the *Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 (as amended, the "**CCAA**") by order of the Honourable Justice K.M. Eidsvik granted on May 1, 2020, and amended and restated on May 11, 2020 (as amended, the "**Initial Order**"). Pursuant to the Initial Order, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. was appointed as monitor of the Applicants (the "**Monitor**"), a sale and investment solicitation process (the "**SISP**") was approved, and Sequeira Partners was appointed as sale advisor for the SISP (the "**Sale Advisor**").

2. Mantle Materials Group, Ltd. ("**Mantle**") submitted a bid in the SISP, which bid was accepted by the Sale Advisor, resulting in the transaction (the "**Transaction**") set out in an amended and restated asset purchase agreement dated September 28, 2020 (as amended, the "**APA**"). The APA is the subject of the application brought by the Monitor concurrently with an Application for a sale approval and vesting order and a reverse vesting order (noted below), among other relief.

3. This Bench Brief is submitted on behalf of the Applicants in support of applications for the following:

(a) An Order (the "**SAVO**") approving the sale of the Acquired Assets to and vesting right, title and interest in Mantle free and clear of any charges, security, liens, encumbrances, claims or liabilities other than certain permitted encumbrances and certain liabilities assumed as part of the Transaction;

(b) An Order (the "**Assignment Order**") pursuant to section 11.3 of the CCAA assigning Restricted Agreements that cannot be assigned without the consent of the counterparty are assigned on the condition that cure costs equivalent to the monetary arrears are paid;

(c) An Order (the "**Reverse Vesting Order**"), pursuant to which:

(i) all of JMB's assets other than the Acquired Assets are vested in 216, but subject to any remaining charges, security, liens, encumbrances, claims or liabilities;

(ii) all of JMB`s liabilities are vested in, transferred to and deemed to be assumed by 216, including the remaining unassumed indebtedness owing to ATB and Fiera;

(iii) JMB ceases to be liable to any of its creditors other than ATB and Fiera; and

(iv) PMSI Creditors are directed, within a reasonable period of time and upon confirmation by the Monitor of the validity and priority of their PMSIs, to take possession of their collateral and, to the extent they required under applicable law, to account to the estate of JMB and 216 for any proceeds of disposition in excess of their indebtedness;

(d) An order (the "**Sanction Order**") sanctioning the plan of compromise and arrangement (the "**Plan**") submitted by JMB and Mantle under section 6 of the CCAA and section 288 of the British Columbia *Business Corporations Act*, SBC 2002, c 57, as amended (the "**BC BCA**"), which accomplishes the following:

(i) A portion of the indebtedness owed by JMB to ATB and to Fiera is assumed by Mantle;

(ii) JMB remains liable for the remaining un-assumed indebtedness owing to ATB and to Fiera, notwithstanding 216`s deemed assumption thereof;

(iii) All Class A Common Shares of CARC in JMB are transferred to RLF Holdings, and all Class B Common Shares and any other shares or securities in JMB are redeemed for no consideration and cancelled;

(iv) The articles of JMB are amended to terminate the classes of Class B Common Shares, Class C Common Shares as well as any other class of securities of JMB; and

(v) JMB exits from the CCAA; and

(e) An Order extending the stay of proceedings to October 30, 2020 or such later date as this Honourable Court may order; and

(f) Such further and other relief as counsel may request and this Honourable Court may deem just

(collectively, the "**Orders**").

4. The purpose of this Bench Brief is to outline for the Court the legislation and jurisprudence that is relevant to the relief being sought by the Applicants and the Monitor.

FACTS

5. The facts are set out in the Affidavit of Byron Levkulich sworn September 30, 2020 (the "**Levkulich Affidavit**"). All capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined are as defined in the Levkulich Affidavit.

6. The SISP has been administered by the Sale Advisor under the supervision and control of the Monitor. Because Resource Land Fund anticipated that it would submit a bid in the SISP for certain core assets of JMB and 216, during the course of the SISP, none of the representatives of Resource Land Fund were consulted with respect to its progress or in connection with any bids submitted in the SISP. The Monitor and the Sale Advisor did work with the Chief Restructuring Adviser of JMB and certain operational employees of JMB in order to respond to information and due diligence requests by potential bidders.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 15

7. In order to submit its bid in the SISP, Resource Land Fund incorporated RLF Canada Holdings Limited ("**RLF Holdings**") under the laws of the State of Colorado and Mantle under the BC BCA. RLF Holdings is the sole shareholder of Mantle.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 16

8. On July 20, 2020, Mantle submitted a Phase 2 Bid (as defined in the SISP) to the Sale Advisor and Monitor, pursuant to which Mantle proposed to purchase certain core assets of JMB

and 216 and to assume certain liabilities of JMB. The Monitor negotiated the terms of the bid with Mantle but was unable to form a consensus with ATB and Fiera in respect of the bid without an agreement as to allocation of the costs of the CCAA proceedings. It was not until the end of August 2020 that the negotiations over the terms and provisions of an asset purchase agreement commenced, and the final form of the APA was only settled on September 28, 2020.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 17

9. Under the APA, Mantle agreed to acquire the following assets (the "**Acquired Assets**"):

(a) 16 aggregate pits and the associated surface material leases, royalty agreements and permits, the equipment and other operating assets against which Fiera has first ranking security, certain customer contracts, office equipment and JMB's leased operations yard in the Town of Bonnyville, shares in Atlas Aggregates, and the business of JMB associated with these assets; and

(b) Inventory located on the acquired pits and in JMB's leased yard in the Town of Bonnyville, reserves of aggregate located in and under the lands subject to the surface material leases and royalty agreements, and in and under a parcel of real property owned by JMB under which there are reserves of aggregate.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 18

10. Mantle is also offering employment to a number of former employees of JMB in the short term, with the intention of increasing that number once it is fully operating in the spring of 2021.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 19

11. Mantle appears to have been the only bidder in the SISP either for the going concern or for a substantial portion of the core assets of JMB and 216. This reflects a deep pessimism by industry participants and capital providers with respect to Alberta's economic prospects in the medium term, in part as a result of the sustained down turn in the oil and gas industry and amongst the businesses that served that industry, and in the balance of the economy as a result of the measures taken to limit the spread of COVID 19.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 20

12. The current economic climate only permits Resource Land Fund to provide a limited amount of capital to fund Mantle's acquisition and post-closing working capital requirements. Resource Land Fund will fund RLF Holdings to advance the cash portion of the purchase price to Mantle. Fiera and ATB have financed the remainder of the purchase price by permitting Mantle to assume a portion of the indebtedness owed to Fiera and a portion of the indebtedness owed to ATB. A portion of Resource Land Fund's advances to RLF Holdings and Mantle must fund Mantle's working capital requirements since the business will, with the onset of winter, enter a slow season, and in the current economic climate it is not realistic to expect that institutional lenders will provide fresh capital.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 21

13. A critical component of the Transaction is preserving the paid up capital (the "**PUC**") associated with CARC's Class A Common Shares in JMB. Normally, when corporation sells its assets, the PUC associated with the shares issued by the corporation cannot be conveyed to the purchaser. The PUC associated with the Class A Common Shares is approximately $40 million, and if it could be utilized by Mantle, would permit capital gains to be distributed to RLF Holdings as non-taxable returns on capital. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary for Mantle to utilize the JMB corporate entity, and to accomplish that, all of the assets and liabilities of JMB that are not being purchased and assumed by Mantle under the APA must be removed from JMB so that JMB is a clean entity which Mantle can eventually amalgamate with.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 22

14. While the PUC could be utilized through a plan of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA proposed to all of JMB's secured and unsecured creditors, in these circumstances this is impractical. While ATB is likely to be repaid in part through JMB's collections during the CCAA of its accounts receivable, only part of the unpaid indebtedness will be assumed by Mantle and therefore a significant amount will remain unpaid. Fiera is to receive no cash proceeds and Mantle is only assuming a portion of JMB's indebtedness to Fiera. In addition, the other sales pursuant to the SISP will realize only limited amounts for the estate. Because the secured creditors are not being paid in full, there are no funds available for the unsecured creditors. Resource Land Fund,

ATB and Fiera are not willing to fund even a nominal amount for distributions to the unsecured creditors of JMB in these circumstances.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 23

15. The viability of the Transaction depends in large part on JMB's PUC, which is a non-transferable tax attribute, being available to Mantle. However, it is not practical to compromise amounts owed to the Applicants' secured and unsecured creditors through a plan of compromise and arrangement. Accordingly, the Applicants and Mantle negotiated the Plan to incorporate the concept of a "reverse vesting order" as described below.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 24

16. The viability of the Transaction is also dependent on conserving cash so that there is sufficient working capital to allow the acquired business to survive. This means that only an extremely limited amount is available to be paid on account of the purchase price, including to cure arrears owing to counterparties under surface material leases, royalty agreements and other contracts that are included in the Acquired Assets where the Plan Applicants need to avail themselves of section 11.3 of the CCAA in order to affect an assignment of such contracts.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 25

17. In order to accomplish the foregoing, the transaction is conditional upon all of the Orders being obtained.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

18. The CCAA is remedial legislation and is to be given a liberal interpretation to facilitate its objectives. The requirements of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising CCAA authority. Appropriateness under the CCAA is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the CCAA. The question to be asked is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the CCAA.

Re Stelco Inc., 2005 CarswellOnt 1188 (ONCA) at para 32
[Tab 1]

19. The CCAA is designed to enable insolvent companies to restructure. The Court has the authority to approve the transfer of assets and liabilities to a related company where the transfer is effected in order to permit internal reorganization that is fair to the interests of affected stakeholders and there is no prejudice to the Applicants' major creditors.

Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, 2009 CarswellOnt 7169 (SC) at paras 32, 36, 38-39 [Tab 2]

20. The CCAA is not a "comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". Rather, it permits a CCAA court broad discretion, provided that such discretion is exercised in furtherance of the CCAA's purposes. Courts should rely first on an interpretation of the applicable CCAA provision(s) before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a CCAA proceeding. When an order is sought that does realistically advance the CCAA's purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a CCAA court.

Century Services Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 65 [Tab 3]

21. Overall, the CCAA provides the Court with a wide scope of jurisdiction, but if a specific provision contained in the CCAA addresses the matter before the Court, it must be followed.

A. THE TRANSACTION SHOULD BE APPROVED

22. The Transaction is described in detail in the Levkulich Affidavit and in the Monitor's Seventh Report. The Applicants respectfully submit that the Transaction should be approved, as it is in the best interest of the stakeholders.

23. It is well established that the Court has the jurisdiction to approve a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a debtor company in a CCAA proceeding in the absence of plan of arrangement where the sale is in the best interests of the stakeholders generally.

Re Nortel Networks Corporation, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 (SC) at paras 35-41 and 48 [Tab 4]

24. Pursuant to section 36 of the CCAA, this Court has the jurisdiction to approve a sale or disposition of assets outside of the ordinary course of business. Section 36(3) sets out the

following list of non-exhaustive factors for the Court to consider in determining whether to approve a debtor's sale or disposition of assets outside the ordinary course:

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable;

(b) whether the monitor approved that process;

(c) whether the monitor filed with the Court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effect of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

CCAA, s. 36(3) [Tab 5]

Re Nelson Education Ltd., 2015 ONSC 5557 at para 38 [Tab 6]

25. Also relevant when reviewing a sale or disposition of assets in a CCAA proceeding are the factors set out in *Royal Bank v Soundair Corp.*, which include considering whether sufficient effort was made to obtain the best price, the interests of all parties have been considered, the efficacy and integrity of the sales process and whether the process was fair.

Royal Bank v Soundair Corp., 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (ONCA) at para 16 [Tab 7]

Re Nelson Education Ltd., supra at paras 37-38 [Tab 6]

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. v 1905393 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ABCA 433 at paras 10-13 [Tab 8]

26. A Court should also give effect to the business judgment rule, which affords deference to the exercise of the commercial and business judgment of the debtor company in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient.

Re Bloom Lake, 2015 QCCS 1920 at para 28 [Tab 9]

27. The Applicants submit the Transaction satisfies the criteria in section 36(3) of the CCAA and the *Soundair* principles. The SISP was administered by the Sale Advisor under the supervision and control of the Monitor, and the SISP was approved by the Court in the Initial Order. Further, as it was anticipated Resource Land Fund would submit a bid in the SISP, during the course of the SISP, it was not consulted with respect to its progress or in connection to any bids. Thus, the Applicants believe the SISP was efficiently conducted and was fair and reasonable. The Monitor also approved the SISP leading to the Transaction.

Levkulich Affidavit at paras 13, 15

28. The Transaction will result in a going concern sale of the Applicants' business, allowing the business to continue for the benefit of a broad range of stakeholders, including creditors, employees, customers, suppliers and other business partners.

Levkulich Affidavit at paras 18-19

Seventh Report of the Monitor ("**Seventh Report**"), paras 30, 57

29. That the Transaction will result in a going concern sale is significant. Mantle was the only bidder in the SISP for the going concern or for a substantial portion of the core assets of the Applicants, which reflects a deep pessimism by industry participants and capital providers with respect to Alberta's economic prospects. This is in part due to the sustained down turn in the oil and gas industry and amongst businesses that served that industry, and in the balance of the economy due to COVID-19.

Levkulich Affidavit para 20

30. The Transaction results in Mantle purchasing the Acquired Assets. A critical component of the Transaction is preserving the PUC associated with CARC's Class A Common Shares in JMB. As the PUC is approximately $40 million, if it could be utilized by Mantle, it would permit capital gains to be distributed to RLF Holdings as non-taxable returns on capital. To achieve this, Mantle must acquire the JMB corporate entity because PUC is associated with the Class A Shares held by CARC. The PUC cannot be utilized unless the assets and liabilities that are excluded from the Transaction and would otherwise remain in JMB are removed from JMB. If not, before using

the PUC, those liabilities would have to be paid or otherwise addressed. However, if the unassumed liabilities and unsold assets are stripped out of JMB, RLF Holdings can make tax efficient use of capital. After a period of time, it is contemplated that Mantle will amalgamate with JMB so that returns of capital can be made directly.

Levkulich Affidavit at para 22

31. The Applicants assert that the Mantle offer and the Transaction represent the highest and best offer received for the Applicants' assets and business. As a result of the Transaction and Reverse Vesting Order, Mantle is able to acquire the core assets of JMB, there is a prospect of ATB and Fiera being repaid a much greater proportion of the indebtedness owing to them than in receivership or bankruptcy, Mantle or RLF Holdings are able to make use of the PUC associated with JMB's Class A Shares, some former JMB employees are initially retained, with more employees being directly and indirectly retained later, and contractual counterparties, suppliers and customers will benefit from dealing with a financially viable business.

Levkulich Affidavit at para 27

Seventh Report, paras 30, 38(d), 43

32. There appears to be no viable alternative to the Transaction, as there were no viable going concern offers for JMB and 216's assets. Thus, the Transaction appears to be the best option available for preserving the business and some level of employment for JMB's former employees and some benefit for the counterparties of the agreements of JMB and 216 that are included in the Acquired Assets. The Applicants submit the Transaction maximizes the benefit available to the Applicants' stakeholders in these difficult economic circumstances.

Levkulich Affidavit at paras 29-30, 35

Seventh Report, paras 38(d)(h)(i)

B. THE REVERSE VESTING ORDER

33. The Transaction is conditional upon the granting of the Reverse Vesting Order. The Applicants assert that the Transaction, which includes the Reverse Vesting Order, is the only viable going concern option available, and thus, is the best transaction in the circumstances. The Reverse Vesting Order will permit the acquisition by Mantle of JMB's regulatory permits, to the extent that

they are not easily transferable, and the PUC associated with the Class A Shares. At the same time, the claims of creditors of JMB will continue to have whatever rights they currently have in connection with the Remaining JMB Liabilities because they will have recourse against the Remaining JMB Assets.

34. Moreover, the APA and Reverse Vesting Order satisfy the requirements for an asset sale under section 36 of the CCAA. The Transaction represents the best opportunity to realize value from the Applicants' assets and is the only viable going-concern transaction available to the Applicants.

The Nature of the Reverse Vesting Order Sought

35. The Reverse Vesting Order will, if granted, vest in 216 all of the right, title and interest of JMB in the Remaining JMB Assets and Remaining JMB Liabilities, and all of the right title and interest of JMB in the Fiera Eastside Equipment.

Levkulich Affidavit at para 47

36. The vesting and transferring of the Remaining JMB Liabilities to 216 is important, as it will mean the Transaction can proceed, preserving JMB as a going concern, while at the same time leaving the Remaining JMB Assets and Remaining JMB Liabilities unaffected. The Reverse Vesting Order contemplates:

(a) the Remaining ATB Debt and Remaining Fiera Debt remaining in full force and effect in accordance with the Plan;

(b) the Fiera security continuing to attach to the Remaining JMB Assets vested in 216, and any property or assets subsequently acquired by JMB;

(c) the ATB security continuing to attach to the Remaining JMB Assets vested in 216, but not attaching to any property or assets subsequently acquired by JMB; and

(d) the Remaining JMB Liabilities, including their amount and secured status, not being affected or altered.

Levkulich Affidavit at para 48

37. The Reverse Vesting Order also:

(a) Authorizes and directs each PMSI Creditor to take possession and control of the collateral subject to its PMSI and dispose of it;

(b) Does not affect a JMB Claim, which claims will continue in full force and effect;

(c) Includes protection for JMB Creditors to ensure they are not negatively impacted by the Remaining JMB Assets and Remaining JMB Liabilities, and ensures the *pro rata* entitlement of creditors of JMB and 216 as against the Remaining JMB Assets and Remaining 216 Assets is not altered; and

(d) Protects Fiera's prior ranking security in the Fiera Eastside Equipment.

Levkulich Affidavit at paras 50-53

38. Given the Reverse Vesting Order preserves the ATB and Fiera security interests, the Remaining JMB Assets, together with the property of 216, will be available to provide partial recourse to the remaining creditors of the Applicants in respect of the Remaining JMB Liabilities and such other outstanding liabilities existing at the time of closing of the Transaction.

The Reverse Vesting Order is Appropriate in the Circumstances

39. Where it is not practical to compromise amounts owed to secured and unsecured creditors through a plan of compromise and arrangement, but the viability of a transaction depended on the debtor company's non-transferable regulatory licences or tax attributes being available to the purchaser, Courts have utilized "reverse vesting orders". Under a reverse vesting order, all of the assets and liabilities of the debtor company that are not being purchased by the purchaser are vested in and transferred to another corporation. The "cleansed" debtor company then ceases to be an applicant in the CCAA proceedings, and generally the purchaser acquires its shares. An example of the type of industry where this technique has been employed is the federally regulated cannabis industry, where regulatory licences to grow, process and sell cannabis cannot be transferred in any circumstances.

Approval and Vesting Order of Justice Hainey dated April 21, 2020 in the Matter of *Wayland Group Corp. et al*, Ontario

Superior Court of Justice File No. CV-19-00632079-CL
[Tab 10]

40. The Transaction contemplates Mantle taking the Applicants' assets free and clear of certain encumbrances. Section 36(3) of the CCAA expressly empowers this Court to "authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction." Further, the Transaction mirrors other transactions approved by CCAA courts that involved the transfers of assets and encumbrances into a "newco". For example, in the CCAA proceedings of *Plasco*, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved the transfer of substantially all of the debtors' assets into an acquisition corporation and its liabilities into a "newco". The Court found the transaction furthered "the purposes of the CCAA…an orderly wind-up of the applicants' business and a maximization of recoveries for creditors and other stakeholders." Similar orders were granted in the *Stornoway* CCAA proceedings and the *Wayland* CCAA proceedings.

Endorsement of Justice Wilton-Siegel in the matter of *Plasco Energy et al*, dated July 17, 2015 [Tab 11]

Approval and Vesting Order of Justice Gouin in the matter of *Stornoway Diamonds Inc. et al*, dated October 7, 2019, Quebec Superior Court File No. 500-11-057094-191 [Tab 12]

Approval and Vesting Order of Justice Hainey dated April 21, 2020 in the Matter of *Wayland Group Corp. et al*, *supra* [Tab 10]

41. In the *Wayland* CCAA proceedings, the right, title and interest in certain assets, contracts and liabilities of Maricann Inc. were transferred to Residual Co., with the Claims and Encumbrances remaining attached to the Excluded Assets (as capitalized terms as defined in the Order). All then became obligations of Residual Co. Maricann Inc.'s shares were then acquired by the Purchaser free and clear of certain encumbrances.

42. The circumstances facing the debtors in *Plasco*, *Stornoway*, and *Wayland* are like those facing the Applicants. In each case, the debtors conducted a SISP process that generated only a single viable transaction option. In each case, the debtors faced significant funding challenges requiring an expeditious and cost-effective transaction, and the transaction was the only option to generate some value for secured creditors, who would otherwise have faced an even greater shortfall in a liquidation.

43. In this case, there will be no harm to the Applicants' stakeholders, no prejudice to the Applicants' major creditors, and the Reverse Vesting Order will maximize value for all stakeholders. Given the economics of the business of the Applicants, ATB, Fiera and the Monitor determined the Reverse Vesting Order is the only realistic way of preserving the tax attributes of JMB, including the PUC, which is critical to the business being acquired by Mantle being economically viable.

Levkulich Affidavit at paras 55-56

44. The transfer of the Remaining JMB Assets and Remaining JMB Liabilities out of JMB and into 216 preserves as much of JMB's business as possible for Mantle, the going concern value for the Applicants' primary stakeholders, as well as some employment and economic activity in the depressed rural areas of Alberta.

Levkulich Affidavit at para 56

C. THE ASSIGNMENT ORDER SHOULD BE GRANTED

Assignment of Restricted Agreements

45. Section 11.3(1) of the CCAA authorizes the Court, on application by a debtor company and on notice to every party to an agreement and the monitor, to make an order assigning the rights and obligations of the company under an agreement to any person who is specified by the Court and agrees to the assignment. Courts have exercised this jurisdiction to order the assignment of a debtor company's contractual rights and obligations notwithstanding restrictions on assignment contained in such contracts.

CCAA, s 11.3 [Tab 5]

Re Dundee Oil and Gas Limited, 2018 ONSC 3678 at paras 20-22 and 38 [Tab 13]

46. Section 11.3(1) of the CCAA is subject to the exceptions set forth in section 11.3(2) of the CCAA in respect of rights and obligations that are not assignable by reason of their nature or that arise under: (a) an agreement entered into on or after the day on which the CCAA proceedings in respect of the debtor company were commenced; (b) an eligible financial contract; or (c) a collective agreement.

CCAA, s 11.3(2) [Tab 5]

47. Section 11.3(3) of the CCAA sets out the factors for a Court to consider in determining whether to order the assignment of a debtor company's rights and obligations under an agreement: (a) whether the monitor approved the proposed assignment; (b) whether the person to whom the rights and obligations are to be assigned would be able to perform the obligations; and (c) whether it would be appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to that person.

CCAA, s 11.3(3) [Tab 5]

Re Dundee Oil and Gas Limited, supra at para 22 [Tab 13]

48. The Court's authority under section 11.3(1) of the CCAA is also subject to the Court being satisfied that that all monetary defaults in relation to the agreement, other than those arising by reason only of the company's insolvency, the commencement of the company's CCAA proceedings or the company's failure to perform a non-monetary obligation, will be remedied on or before the day fixed by the Court pursuant to section 11.3(4) of the CCAA.

CCAA, s 11.3(4) [Tab 5]

49. In this case, the APA requires Mantle to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain all consents and approvals required in respect of the Restricted Agreements, and Mantle has made and continues to make efforts to obtain those consents and approvals. However, given the expedited timeframe and the Closing Date, it will not be possible for consents relating to the Restricted Agreements to be obtained in the time available.

Levkulich Affidavit, paras 41 - 42

50. The APA contemplates that where a Counterparty is unwilling to provide consent to the assignment of a Restricted Agreement or is unwilling to provide such consent on terms acceptable to Mantle, acting reasonably, and consent is required in order to assign the Restricted Agreement, the JMB Applicants are required to apply to the Court for the assignment to Mantle, provided that Mantle pays the Cure Costs associated with the Restricted Agreement. An estimate of the Cure Costs that are payable under Restricted Agreements is included in the confidential appendix to the Seventh Report, as those amounts have not been verified and remain commercially sensitive.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 41

51. The Restricted Agreements are set out in Schedule "A" to the proposed Assignment Order. None fall within the exceptions listed in section 11.3(2).

Levkulich Affidavit, para 44

52. In compliance with section 11.3(4), the proposed Assignment Order provides for the payment by Mantle of all monetary defaults in relation to the Restricted Agreements existing prior to the Closing, other than those arising by reason only of the insolvency of the JMB Applicants, the commencement of these CCAA proceedings or the failure to perform a non-monetary obligation under any Restricted Agreement.

53. In addition, the Applicants respectfully submit that the criteria set out in section 11.3(3) have been met:

(a) The Monitor has approved the proposed assignment of the Restricted Agreements and supports the granting of the Assignment Order;

(b) Mantle will be able to perform the obligations under the Restricted Agreements and has set aside sufficient funds for working capital to build the business over the next few months; and

(c) It is appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to Mantle.

Seventh Report, paras 40, 65(d)

54. With respect to (b) and (c) above, and as noted in the Levkulich Affidavit, the current economic climate only permits Resource Land Fund to provide a limited amount of capital to fund Mantle's acquisition and post-closing working capital requirements. Resource Land Fund will fund RLF Holdings to advance the cash portion of the purchase price to Mantle. Fiera and ATB have financed the remainder of the purchase price by permitting Mantle to assume a portion of the indebtedness owed to Fiera and a portion of the indebtedness owed to ATB. A portion of Resource Land Fund's advances to RLF Holdings and Mantle must fund Mantle's working capital requirements since the business will, with the onset of winter, enter a slow season, and in the current economic climate it is not realistic to expect that institutional lenders will provide fresh capital.

55. To the extent that there are additional Restricted Agreements not listed on Schedule "A" to the proposed Assignment Order, it provides: (a) a mechanism for the provision of notice of the assignment to Mantle of any such Additional Restricted Agreements to the counterparties thereto; (b) a right for such counterparties to object to such assignment; and (c) absent any objection, the assignment to Mantle of any such Additional Restricted Agreements subject to the satisfaction of any applicable Cure Costs.

56. For the reasons discussed above, the Applicants respectfully submit that the assignment of the Restricted Agreements to Mantle is in the best interests of the Applicants and their stakeholders, and is required for the completion of the Transaction. Accordingly, the granting of the Assignment Order is appropriate in the circumstances.

Declaratory Relief with respect to Unrestricted Agreements

57. As set out in the proposed Assignment Order, the Applicants are seeking a declaration that the transfer and vesting of the Unrestricted Agreements, listed in Schedule "C" to the proposed Assignment Order, in Mantle is free and clear of any liabilities or monetary claims owing to or accruing in favour of the counterparties to the Unrestricted Agreements that arose prior to May 1, 2020, the Filing Date of these CCAA Proceedings.

58. This type of declaratory relief is standard language in the template approval and vesting order, and is a critical part of the framework in which insolvencies are handled by the courts. The vesting provisions are an important part of the overall social policy underlying the CCAA, which is aimed at enabling financially distressed companies to avoid bankruptcy, foreclosure, or seizure of assets while preserving jobs and a company's value as a functioning business. Without such vesting provisions, assets sold, including contracts, would continue to be encumbered by claims, thereby simply transferring the burden of satisfying those claims to the new owner of the assets and giving an unsecured claimant what amounts to a priority to payment.

59. However, there are certain situations where Parliament has specifically legislated exceptions to this general rule. This includes section 11.3 of the CCAA, which came into force as part of the 2009 amendments to the CCAA. The intent of Parliament in enacting such provision (and the corresponding provision under section 84.1 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*

(Canada)) was to provide courts with the statutory authority to order the transfer of agreements that require counterparty consent to be assigned, notwithstanding that such consent had not been obtained, in order to protect the value of the debtor company's estate and enable the transfer of such agreements to a third party purchaser:

> Prior to the coming into force of s. 84.1 in 2009, a trustee in bankruptcy could not assign (sell) a contract to a third party where the counter-party to that contract opposed the assignment. As a result, a bankrupt estate was vulnerable to losing the benefit of a valuable contract to the detriment of the estate and often to the detriment of third parties.
>
> The estate of a bankrupt may include various forms of property. Sometimes the most valuable property in an estate will be the contractual rights possessed by the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy. Those rights may be embodied in, for example, a franchise agreement, a purchase agreement, a license agreement, a lease, a supply agreement or an auto dealership agreement.
>
> The clear intent of Parliament in enacting s. 84.1 of the BIA was to address this vulnerability; it made a policy decision that a court ought to have the discretion to authorize a trustee to assign (sell) the rights and obligations of a bankrupt under such an agreement notwithstanding the objections of the counter-party.

Ford Credit Canada Ltd. v Welcome Ford Sales Ltd., 2011 ABCA 158 at paras 36-39 [Tab 14]

60. Section 11.3 of the CCAA grants the Court "an extraordinary power" that "permits the court to require counterparties to an executory contract to accept future performance from somebody they never agreed to deal with" and "requir[e] a contract counterpart to be locked into an involuntary assignment post-insolvency". The Court in Dundee also noted that "[a] counterpart to an executory contract that is subject to involuntary assignment under section 11.3 of the CCAA has managed to find itself contractually bound to an insolvent debtor notwithstanding whatever contractual safeguards were negotiated to avoid that outcome."

Re Dundee Oil and Gas Limited, supra at paras 27, 30 and 38 [Tab 13]

61. Where the counterparty provides consent to an assignment of its contract to a third party purchaser, there is no need to invoke section 11.3 of the CCAA, and the parties may negotiate their own terms to obtain such consent for assignment (including whether any payments to cure monetary defaults or of other amounts may be required).

62. However, where a counterparty has not negotiated protections into its agreement to require consent to assign, the provisions of section 11.3 do not apply. If Parliament had intended for this provision to require payment in full of all pre-filing arrears as a condition to assignment of any contract during an insolvency proceeding, section 11.3 would not have the express limitations that have been set out. Ultimately, section 11.3 of the CCAA provides a framework by which the Court may exercise its discretion to interfere with consensual contractual relationships (over the objections of a counterparty) for the purpose of maximizing stakeholder value. The trade-off for permitting this extraordinary interference in private contractual relations is the requirement that monetary defaults be cured.

63. The practical effect of section 11.3 is to elevate what would be an ordinary unsecured creditor for the amount of contractual arrears to a preferred creditor with priority over all other creditors, including senior secured lenders. The Applicants respectfully submit that an interpretation of section 11.3 of the CCAA that would apply it to all contracts – including those without a consent provision – would be antithetical to its express purpose and would have the effect of elevating all contract counterparties to preferred creditors, to the detriment of the estate and its other stakeholders.

64. Priority to payment is always grounded in statute, such as the various provincial *Personal Property Security Acts*, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, and the CCAA. Accordingly, the Applicants respectfully submit that priority cannot be granted without such authority, and here, there is no express authority to provide for what amounts to a priority to payment for the counterparties to the Unrestricted Agreements.

D. THE PLAN SHOULD BE SANCTIONED

65. Section 6 of the CCAA provides that a plan of compromise or arrangement is binding on a debtor company and all of its creditors if the following two conditions are met: (i) a majority of the creditors present and voting at a meeting of creditors approve the plan; and (ii) the plan has been sanctioned by the Court.

CCAA, s 6 [Tab 5]

Approval of Affected Creditors

66. The purpose of the Plan is to ensure those stakeholders with an economic interest in JMB will derive a greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan and the continuation of the business as a going concern than from a bankruptcy or liquidation.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 58

67. The only effect of the Plan is that it arranges the indebtedness owing by JMB to ATB and Fiera, cancels the Class B Common Shares, and transfers the Class A Common Shares from CARC to RLF Holdings. Under the requested Reverse Vesting Order, the PMSI Creditors, who are the only other first ranking secured creditors, are permitted and directed to take possession and dispose of the collateral subject to the PMSIs, and unsecured creditors will continue to have whatever claims they currently have against the Remaining JMB Assets, and the proportion of their claims will not be altered.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 59

68. Fiera and ATB, the primary first ranking secured creditors of JMB, are not being paid in full, and the other creditors are not receiving anything for their claims arising before the Filing Date. As a result, JMB's shareholders are not entitled to any distributions within the CCAA proceedings, and would have no entitlement under any bankruptcy, receivership or other liquidation proceedings. Consequently, the shareholders have no economic interest being impacted by the Plan, even though their Class B Common Shares are being cancelled. Thus, they do not have a right to vote on the Plan.

Levkulich Affidavit, para 60

69. As the Affected Creditors and the Monitor endorse the Plan, the Applicants submit the creditor approval condition has been met.

The Plan meets the Plan Sanction Test

70. Pursuant to section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has the authority to make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances, including permitting a debtor company to undergo a plan of arrangement to facilitate a successful restructuring.

CCAA, s 11 [Tab 5]

Re Target Canada Co., 2015 ONSC 303 at para 72 [Tab 15]

71. In sanctioning a plan, the Court is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all stakeholders. The Court is to look forward and determine whether the plan represents a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge. The Court is also to consider whether the proposed plan brings more value to creditors in the bankruptcy or liquidation.

HSBC Bank Canada v Bear Mountain Master Partnership, 2010 BCSC 1563 at para 24 [Tab 16]

72. When considering whether a plan is fair and reasonable, the Court is called upon to weigh the equities or balance the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought under the CCAA. However, the Court does not require perfection, nor will the Court second guess the business decision reached by the creditors as a body.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp, 2000 ABQB 442 at para 97 [Tab 17]

73. It is well-established that the general requirements for court approval of a CCAA plan are as follows:

(a) There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

(b) All material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(c) The CCAA plan must be fair and reasonable.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., supra at para 60 [Tab 17]

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v Royal Trust Co., 1993 CarswellOnt 182 at para 17 (ONSC) [Tab 18]

74. Both the first and second requirements of the test refer to procedural compliance with the provisions of the CCAA and the various Orders granted during the course of the CCAA Proceeding.

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v Royal Trust Co., *supra* at para 19 [Tab 18]

75. With respect to the first part of the test (strict compliance with all statutory requirements), the following factors may be considered by the Court:

(a) whether the applicant falls within the definition of a "debtor company" pursuant to section 2 of the CCAA;

(b) whether the applicant has total claims against it exceeding $5 million;

(c) whether the notice calling the meeting of the Affected Creditors was sent in accordance with any orders of the Court;

(d) whether the creditors were properly classified;

(e) whether the meeting was properly constituted and the voting was properly carried out; and

(f) whether the Plan was approved by the required majorities.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., *supra* at para 62 [Tab 17]

76. The Applicants have complied with the procedural requirements of the CCAA and all of the Orders of the Court granted in this CCAA proceeding. In particular:

(a) In granting the Initial Order, this Court determined each Applicant constituted a "debtor company" under the CCAA and the Applicants' liabilities exceeded the $5 million threshold under the CCAA;

(b) No unsecured creditor or shareholder of JMB is affected by the Plan, have an economic stake in the Plan, and thus, should not be entitled to vote on the Plan; and

(c) The Affected Creditors have agreed to the Plan.

Levkulich Affidavit at paras 61, 63

77. In addition, the Plan complies with the statutory requirements set out in sections 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA, which collectively provide that the Court may not sanction a plan unless it contains certain provisions concerning Crown claims, employee claims, and pension claims.

78. The Plan does not affect provincial and federal government claims of the type described in section 6(3) or employee-related payments of the kind described in section 6(5). Such claims will not be compromised under the Plan. Further, in accordance with section 6(8) of the CCAA, the Plan does not provide for the payment of equity claims.

79. As such, the Applicants submit that the statutory requirements in order for the Plan to be sanctioned under section 6 of the CCAA have been satisfied.

80. In considering whether any unauthorized steps have been taken by the debtor company, the Court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the various parties involved.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., *supra* at para 64 [Tab 17]

81. Throughout the course of these CCAA Proceedings, the Applicants have acted in good faith and with due diligence. The Applicants have complied with the requirements of the CCAA and the Orders of this Court. The Applicants have regularly filed affidavits addressing key developments of this restructuring and the Monitor has provided regular reports in respect of same, none of which have identified any conduct or action by the Applicants that is not authorized by the CCAA.

82. The Applicants are not aware of any basis for asserting that they have proceeded in a manner that is not authorized by the CCAA.

83. The final element of the test requires the Court to consider whether the Plan represents a fair and reasonable balancing of interests, in light of: (i) the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from sanctioning or refusing to sanction the Plan; (ii) the other commercial alternatives available; and (iii) the context of the CCAA proceedings.

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v Royal Trust Co., *supra* at paras 28-31 [Tab 18]

84. In reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan, the Court does not and should not require perfection.

> The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., supra at para 3 [Tab 17]

85. The Court's discretion should be informed by the objectives of the CCAA, namely to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, employees and in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., supra at paras 95, 97 [Tab 17]

86. An important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the degree to which it is supported by the creditors and the relevant stakeholders of the debtor company. This support, which reflects the business judgment of the participants that their interests are treated equitably under the Plan, creates an inference that the arrangement is fair and reasonable to those who may be affected by it. The Court should be reluctant to interfere with the business decisions of creditors reached as a body.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., supra at para 97 [Tab 17]

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v Royal Trust Co., supra at para 37 [Tab 18]

87. As noted above, the Plan is put forward in the expectation that persons with an economic interest in JMB will derive a greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan and the continuation of the business as a going concern than from a bankruptcy, receivership or liquidation of the Applicants.

88. The Affected Creditors and the Monitor approve the Plan. The Applicants' Class B shareholders have not been asked for their approval, as they have no economic interest being

affected by the Plan and their shares will be cancelled. As the shareholders have no economic interest being impacted by the Plan, the Court has the power to cancel their shares and deny them the right to vote on the Plan. The Court's power to cancel existing shares of a debtor company derives, in part, from section 42 of the CCAA, which provides:

> The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

CCAA, s 42 [Tab 5]

89. Section 288 of the BCBCA permits a company to propose any arrangement with shareholders and creditors that includes a compromise between the company and its shareholders, as well as an alteration of the company's articles. Section 291 of the BCBCA gives the Court certain powers as part of a reorganization. In particular, pursuant to section 291(2), the Court may "make any incidental, consequential and supplemental orders necessary to ensure that the arrangement is fully and effectively carried out."

Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57, ss. 288, 291, 294 [Tab 19]

90. Courts have repeatedly held that section 42 of the CCAA, in conjunction with the applicable corporate legislation, permit the Court to approve a plan of arrangement that contemplates altering the share capital of a corporation.

Re Canadian Airlines Corp., *supra* at paras 142-145 [Tab 17]

91. The cancellation of the existing shares of a debtor company in conjunction with a CCAA restructuring plan is appropriate where the shares have no present value and it is unlikely they will have value in the reasonably foreseeable future, absent the reorganization. The rationale for permitting the cancellation of existing shares is the fact that the company is insolvent and the shareholders are not entitled to any recovery on liquidation. Shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in insolvencies.

> The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below

> under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.
>
> *Re Canadian Airlines Corp., supra* at paras 76-77 [Tab 14]

92. As a result of the fact that the company is insolvent and its shares have no value, shareholders have no economic interest in the CCAA proceedings and thus, no entitlement to participate in the approval of a plan of arrangement.

> In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the .reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders contrary to the CCAA. […]
>
> Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against any altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. […] CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company…
>
> …the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided the plan does so in a fair manner.
>
> *Re Canadian Airlines Corp., supra* at paras 79, 143, 145 [Tab 17]

93. It is respectfully submitted the Plan is fair and reasonable pursuant to the CCAA and ought to be sanctioned because:

(a) Considered as whole, the stakeholders of the Applicants, including their senior secured creditors ATB and Fiera and their remaining employees, will derive a greater benefit from the Business being continued by Mantle upon implementation of the Plan than they would upon liquidation of the Applicants;

(b) The Monitor recommends sanctioning the Plan;

(c) The Affected Creditors agree to the Plan; and

(d) The Plan preserves the Business of JMB as a going concern.

94. In light of the foregoing, the Applicants submit the Plan is fair, equitable and reasonable in the circumstances and the Sanction Order should be granted.

E. THE STAY PERIOD SHOULD BE EXTENDED

95. The Stay of Proceedings currently expires on October 2, 2020. The Applicants are seeking an extension of the Stay Period until and including October 30, 2020.

96. Section 11.02(2) of the CCAA provides the Court discretion to make an Order extending the stay of proceedings granted in an initial order. In order to make an order pursuant to section 11.02(2), the Court must be satisfied that: (a) circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and (b) the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

CCAA, s 11.02(2) [Tab 5]

97. The extension of the Stay Period to October 30, 2020 is necessary in order to maintain continued stability for the Applicants and their business while the Transaction is closed. In addition, following the implementation of the Transaction, the Applicants will need to address various post-closing matters and pending applications, including an application currently scheduled for October 22, 2020 (appeals of two lien determination claims), and the completion of the CCAA Proceedings.

Levkulich Affidavit, paras 67, 68

98. The Applicants have acted and continue to act in good faith and with diligence throughout these CCAA Proceedings.

Levkulich Affidavit, paras 66, 69, 71

II. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

99. The Applicants request the Orders sought be granted, as proceeding with the Plan is fair and reasonable in the circumstances and represents the best option to maximize recovery for the secured creditors, while ensuring JMB remains a going concern.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 2020.

GOWLING WLG (CANADA) LLP

Per: _____

Tom Cumming/Caireen E. Hanert
Counsel for the Applicants

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TAB 1

2005 CarswellOnt 1188
Ontario Court of Appeal

Stelco Inc., Re

2005 CarswellOnt 1188, [2005] O.J. No. 1171, 138 A.C.W.S. (3d) 222, 196 O.A.C. 142, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., c. C-36, as amended

And In the Matter of a proposed plan of compromise or arrangement with respect to **Stelco** Inc. and the other Applicants listed in Schedule "A"

Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

Goudge, Feldman, Blair JJ.A.

Heard: March 18,
2005
Judgment: March 31,
2005
Docket: CA M32289

Proceedings: reversed ***Stelco** Inc., Re* ((**2005**)), **2005** CarswellOnt 742, [**2005**] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])); reversed ***Stelco** Inc., Re* ((**2005**)), **2005** CarswellOnt 743, [**2005**] O.J. No. 730, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 310 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])); additional reasons to ***Stelco** Inc., Re* ((**2005**)), **2005** CarswellOnt 742, [**2005**] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 ((Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]))

Counsel: Jeffrey S. Leon, Richard B. Swan for Appellants, Michael Woollcombe, Roland Keiper
Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Robert A. Centa for Respondent, United Steelworkers of America
Murray Gold, Andrew J. Hatnay for Respondent, Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of **Stelco** Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd., Welland Pipe Ltd.
Michael C.P. McCreary, Carrie L. Clynick for USWA Locals 5328, 8782
John R. Varley for Active Salaried Employee Representative
Michael Barrack for **Stelco** Inc.
Peter Griffin for Board of Directors of **Stelco** Inc.
K. Mahar for Monitor
David R. Byers (Agent) for CIT Business Credit, DIP Lender

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Business associations
III Specific matters of corporate organization
III.1 Directors and officers
III.1.b Appointment
III.1.b.i General principles

Headnote

Business associations --- Specific corporate organization matters — Directors and officers — Appointment — General principles
Corporation entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — K and W were involved with companies who made capital proposal regarding corporation — Companies held approximately 20 per cent of corporation's shares — K and W, allegedly with support of over 30 per cent of shareholders, requested to fill two vacant directors' positions of corporation, and be appointed to review committee — K and W claimed that their interest as shareholders would not be represented in proceedings — K and W appointed directors by board, and made members of review committee — Employees' motion for removal of K and W as directors was granted and appointments were voided — Trial judge found possibility existed that K and W would not have best interests of corporation at heart, and might favour certain shareholders — Trial judge found interference with business judgment of board was **appropriate**, as issue touched on constitution of corporation — Trial judge found reasonable apprehension of bias existed, although no evidence of actual bias had been shown — K and W appealed — Appeal allowed — K and W reinstated to board — Court's discretion under s. 11 of Act does not give authority to remove directors, which is not part of restructuring process — Trial judge erred in not deferring to corporation's business judgment — Trial judge erred in adopting principle of reasonable apprehension of bias.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues
Corporation entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — K and W were involved with companies who made capital proposal regarding corporation — Companies held approximately 20 per cent of corporation's shares — K and W, allegedly with support of over 30 per cent of shareholders, requested to fill two vacant directors' positions of corporation and be appointed to review committee — K and W claimed that their interest as shareholders would not be represented in proceedings — K and W appointed directors by board, and made members of review committee — Employees' motion for removal of K and W as directors was granted and appointments were voided — Trial judge found possibility existed that K and W would not have best interests of corporation at heart, and might favour certain shareholders — Trial judge found interference with business judgment of board was **appropriate**, as issue touched on constitution of corporation — Trial judge found reasonable apprehension of bias existed, although no evidence of actual bias had been shown — K and W appealed — Appeal allowed — K and W reinstated to board — Court's discretion under s. 11 of Act does not give authority to remove directors, which is not part of restructuring process — Trial judge erred in not deferring to corporation's business judgment — Trial judge erred in adopting principle of reasonable apprehension of bias.

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Cases considered by *Blair J.A.*:

Alberta-Pacific Terminals Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99, 1991 CarswellBC 494 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Inc., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1742, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194, 147 O.A.C. 291 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 115, 39 C.B.R. (4th) 5, 169 O.A.C. 89, 63 O.R. (3d) 78 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 704, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75, 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd. (1975), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 1, 20 C.B.R. (N.S.) 240, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 5 N.R. 515, 1975 CarswellMan 3, 1975 CarswellMan 85 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp. (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 187 N.R. 241, 86 O.A.C. 245, 25 O.R. (3d) 480 (note), 24 B.L.R. (2d) 161, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, 1995 CarswellOnt 1393, 1995 CarswellOnt 1179 (S.C.C.) — considered

Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1991), 1 B.L.R. (2d) 225, 3 O.R. (3d) 289, 45 O.A.C. 320, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

> (iii) by concluding that Clearwater and Equilibrium, the shareholders with whom the appellants are associated, were focussed solely on a short-term investment horizon, without any evidence to that effect, and therefore concluding that there was a tangible risk that the appellants would not be neutral and act in the best interests of **Stelco** and all stakeholders in carrying out their duties as directors.

28 The respondents' arguments are rooted in fairness and process. They say, first, that the appointment of the appellants as directors has poisoned the atmosphere of the CCAA proceedings and, secondly, that it threatens to undermine the even-handedness and integrity of the capital raising process, thus jeopardizing the ability of the court at the end of the day to approve any compromise or arrangement emerging from that process. The respondents contend that Farley J. had jurisdiction to ensure the integrity of the CCAA process, including the capital raising process **Stelco** had asked him to approve, and that this court should not interfere with his decision that it was necessary to remove Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper from the Board in order to ensure the integrity of that process. A judge exercising a supervisory function during a CCAA proceeding is owed considerable deference: *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 8.

29 The crux of the respondents' concern is well-articulated in the following excerpt from paragraph 72 of the factum of the Retired Salaried Beneficiaries:

> The appointments of Keiper and Woollcombe violated every tenet of fairness in the restructuring process that is supposed to lead to a plan of arrangement. One stakeholder group — particular investment funds that have acquired **Stelco** shares during the CCAA itself — have been provided with privileged access to the capital raising process, and voting seats on the Corporation's Board of Directors and Restructuring Committee. No other stakeholder has been treated in remotely the same way. To the contrary, the salaried retirees have been completely excluded from the capital raising process and have no say whatsoever in the Corporation's decision-making process.

30 The respondents submit that fairness, and the perception of fairness, underpin the CCAA process, and depend upon effective judicial supervision: see *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2004), 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para.15-16. The motion judge reasonably decided to remove the appellants as directors in the circumstances, they say, and this court should not interfere.

Jurisdiction

31 The motion judge concluded that he had the power to rescind the appointments of the two directors on the basis of his "inherent jurisdiction" and "the discretion given to the court pursuant to the *CCAA*". He was not asked to, nor did he attempt to rest his jurisdiction on other statutory powers imported into the CCAA.

32 The CCAA is remedial legislation and is to be given a liberal interpretation to facilitate its objectives: *Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Re*, [2000] O.J. No. 786 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 11. See also, *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.), at p. 320; *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). Courts have adopted this approach in the past to rely on inherent jurisdiction, or alternatively on the broad jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA, as the source of judicial power in a CCAA proceeding to "fill in the gaps" or to "put flesh on the bones" of that Act: see *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); and *Westar Mining Ltd., Re* (1992), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6 (B.C. S.C.).

33 It is not necessary, for purposes of this appeal, to determine whether inherent jurisdiction is excluded for all supervisory purposes under the CCAA, by reason of the existence of the statutory discretionary regime provided in that Act. In my opinion, however, the better view is that in carrying out his or her supervisory functions under the legislation, the judge is not exercising inherent jurisdiction but rather the statutory discretion provided by s. 11 of the CCAA and supplemented by other statutory powers that may be imported into the exercise of the s. 11 discretion from other statutes through s. 20 of the

TAB 2

2009 CarswellOnt 7169
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 7169, 183 A.C.W.S. (3d) 325

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: November 12, 2009
Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous
Whether proposal subject to s. 36 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — C Inc. owned various businesses including newspaper publisher, N Co. — In 2005, as part of income trust spin off, Limited Partnership (LP) was formed to acquire certain C Inc. businesses — N Co. was excluded from spin off — Despite spin off, C Inc. and LP entered agreements to share certain services (shared services agreements) — In 2007, LP became wholly owned indirect subsidiary of C Inc. — In 2009, N Co. and certain other C Inc. entities (applicants) were granted protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Act) — LP did not seek protection but negotiated forbearance agreement with its lenders — Both applicants' recapitalization transaction as well as LP's forbearance agreement contemplated restructuring that involved disentanglement of shared services and transfer of N Co. to LP — Applicants and LP entered into Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement (TRA), which addressed such restructuring — Applicants brought motion for order approving TRA — Motion granted — Transfer of N Co. was not subject to requirements of s. 36 of Act — Section 36 applied to N Co. despite fact that it was general partnership and was therefore not "debtor company" as defined by Act — However, s. 36 was inapplicable in specific circumstances of case at bar — Businesses of N Co. and applicants were highly integrated and this business structure

predated applicants' insolvency — TRA was internal **reorganization** transaction designed to realign shared services and assets — TRA provided framework for applicants and LP entities to restructure their inter-entity arrangements for benefit of their respective stakeholders — It would be commercially unreasonable to require third party sale of N Co. under s. 36 of Act before permitting realignment of shared services agreements.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"
C Inc. owned various businesses including newspaper publisher, N Co. — In 2005, as part of income trust spin off, Limited Partnership (LP) was formed to acquire certain C Inc. businesses — N Co. was excluded from spin off — Despite spin off, C Inc. and LP entered agreements to share certain services (shared services agreements) — In 2007, LP became wholly owned indirect subsidiary of C Inc. — In 2009, N Co. and certain other C Inc. entities (applicants) were granted protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Act) — LP did not seek protection but negotiated forbearance agreement with its lenders — Both applicants' recapitalization transaction as well as LP's forbearance agreement contemplated restructuring that involved disentanglement of shared services and transfer of N Co. to LP — Applicants and LP entered into Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement (TRA), which addressed such restructuring — Applicants brought motion for order approving TRA — Motion granted — Proposed transfer of N Co. facilitated restructuring and was fair — Recapitalization transaction was designed to restructure C Inc. into viable industry participant — This preserved value for stakeholders and maintained employment for as many of applicants' employees as possible — TRA was entered into after extensive negotiation and consultation among applicants, LP and their respective financial, legal advisers and restructuring advisers — There was no prejudice to applicants' major creditors of the CMI entities — Monitor supported TRA as being in best interests of broad range of stakeholders — In absence of TRA, it was likely that N Co. would be required to shut down and lay off most or all its employees — Under TRA, all N Co. employees would be offered employment and it pension obligations and liabilities would be assumed — No third party expressed any interest in acquiring N Co.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Millgate Financial Corp. v. BCED Holdings Ltd. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5547, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 278 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Pacific Mobile Corp., Re (1985), 1985 CarswellQue 106, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 290, 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) 32, 16 D.L.R. (4th) 319, 57 N.R. 63, 1985 CarswellQue 30 (S.C.C.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 204 O.A.C. 216, 78 O.R. (3d) 254, 2005 CarswellOnt 6283, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 288 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Bulk Sales Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.14
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "company" — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — referred to

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(1) — considered

29 While counsel for the CMI Entities states that the provisions of section 36 have been satisfied, he submits that section 36 is inapplicable to the circumstances of the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company because the threshold requirements are not met. As such, the approval requirements are not triggered. The Monitor supports this position.

30 In support, counsel for the CMI Entities and for the Monitor firstly submit that section 36(1) makes it clear that the section only applies to a debtor company. The terms "debtor company" and "company" are defined in section 2(1) of the *CCAA* and do not expressly include a partnership. The National Post Company is a general partnership and therefore does not fall within the definition of debtor company. While I acknowledge these facts, I do not accept this argument in the circumstances of this case. Relying on case law and exercising my inherent jurisdiction, I extended the scope of the Initial Order to encompass the National Post Company and the other partnerships such that they were granted a stay and other relief. In my view, it would be inconsistent and artificial to now exclude the business and assets of those partnerships from the ambit of the protections contained in the statute.

31 The CMI Entities' and the Monitor's second argument is that the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement represents an internal corporate **reorganization** that is not subject to the requirements of section 36. Section 36 provides for court approval where a debtor under *CCAA* protection proposes to sell or otherwise dispose of assets "outside the ordinary course of business". This implies, so the argument goes, that a transaction that is in the ordinary course of business is not captured by section 36. The Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement is an internal corporate **reorganization** which is in the ordinary course of business and therefore section 36 is not triggered state counsel for the CMI Entities and for the Monitor. Counsel for the Monitor goes on to submit that the subject transaction is but one aspect of a larger transaction. Given the commitments and agreements entered into with the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia as agent for the senior secured lenders to the LP Entities, the transfer cannot be treated as an independent sale divorced from its rightful context. In these circumstances, it is submitted that section 36 is not engaged.

32 The *CCAA* is remedial legislation designed to enable insolvent companies to restructure. As mentioned by me before in this case, the amendments do not detract from this objective. In discussing section 36, the Industry Canada Briefing Book[3] on the amendments states that "The reform is intended to provide the debtor company with greater flexibility in dealing with its property while limiting the possibility of abuse."[4]

33 The term "ordinary course of business" is not defined in the *CCAA* or in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*[5]. As noted by Cullity J. in *Millgate Financial Corp. v. BCED Holdings Ltd.*[6], authorities that have considered the use of the term in various statutes have not provided an exhaustive definition. As one author observed in a different context, namely the *Bulk Sales Act*[7], courts have typically taken a common sense approach to the term "ordinary course of business" and have considered the normal business dealings of each particular seller[8]. In *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re*[9], the Supreme Court of Canada stated:

> It is not wise to attempt to give a comprehensive definition of the term "ordinary course of business" for all transactions. Rather, it is best to consider the circumstances of each case and to take into account the type of business carried on by the debtor and creditor.
>
> We approve of the following passage from Monet J.A.'s reasons discussing the phrase "ordinary course of business"...
>
> 'It is apparent from these authorities, it seems to me, that the concept we are concerned with is an abstract one and that it is the function of the courts to consider the circumstances of each case in order to determine how to characterize a given transaction. This in effect reflects the constant interplay between law and fact.'

34 In arguing that section 36 does not apply to an internal corporate **reorganization**, the CMI Entities rely on the commentary of Industry Canada as being a useful indicator of legislative intent and descriptive of the abuse the section was designed to prevent. That commentary suggests that section 36(4),which deals with dispositions of assets to a related party, was intended to:

> ...prevent the possible abuse by "phoenix corporations". Prevalent in small business, particularly in the restaurant industry, phoenix corporations are the result of owners who engage in serial bankruptcies. A person incorporates a business and proceeds to cause it to become bankrupt. The person then purchases the assets of the business at a discount out of the estate and incorporates a "new" business using the assets of the previous business. The owner continues their

original business basically unaffected while creditors are left unpaid.[10]

35 In my view, not every internal corporate **reorganization** escapes the purview of section 36. Indeed, a phoenix corporation to one may be an internal corporate **reorganization** to another. As suggested by the decision in *Pacific Mobile Corp.*[11]., a court should in each case examine the circumstances of the subject transaction within the context of the business carried on by the debtor.

36 In this case, the business of the National Post Company and the CP Entities are highly integrated and interdependent. The **Canwest** business structure predated the insolvency of the CMI Entities and reflects in part an anomaly that arose as a result of an income trust structure driven by tax considerations. The Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement is an internal **reorganization** transaction that is designed to realign shared services and assets within the **Canwest** corporate family so as to rationalize the business structure and to better reflect the appropriate business model. Furthermore, the realignment of the shared services and transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the publishing side of the business are steps in the larger **reorganization** of the relationship between the CMI Entities and the LP Entities. There is no ability to proceed with either the Shared Services Agreement or the National Post Transition Agreement alone. The Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement provides a framework for the CMI Entities and the LP Entities to properly restructure their inter-entity arrangements for the benefit of their respective stakeholders. It would be commercially unreasonable to require the CMI Entities to engage in the sort of third party sales process contemplated by section 36(4) and offer the National Post for sale to third parties before permitting them to realign the shared services arrangements. In these circumstances, I am prepared to accept that section 36 is inapplicable.

(b) Transition and Reorganization Agreement

37 As mentioned, the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement is by its terms subject to court approval. The court has a broad jurisdiction to approve agreements that facilitate a restructuring: *Stelco Inc., Re*[12] Even though I have accepted that in this case section 36 is inapplicable, court approval should be sought in circumstances where the sale or disposition is to a related person and there is an apprehension that the sale may not be in the ordinary course of business. At that time, the court will confirm or reject the ordinary course of business characterization. If confirmed, at minimum, the court will determine whether the proposed transaction facilitates the restructuring and is fair. If rejected, the court will determine whether the proposed transaction meets the requirements of section 36. Even if the court confirms that the proposed transaction is in the ordinary course of business and therefore outside the ambit of section 36, the provisions of the section may be considered in assessing fairness.

38 I am satisfied that the proposed transaction does facilitate the restructuring and is fair and that the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement should be approved. In this regard, amongst other things, I have considered the provisions of section 36. I note the following. The CMI recapitalization transaction which prompted the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement is designed to facilitate the restructuring of CMI into a viable and competitive industry participant and to allow a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities to continue as going concerns. This preserves value for stakeholders and maintains employment for as many employees of the CMI Entities as possible. The Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement was entered into after extensive negotiation and consultation between the CMI Entities, the LP Entities, their respective financial and legal advisers and restructuring advisers, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP senior secured lenders and their respective financial and legal advisers. As such, while not every stakeholder was included, significant interests have been represented and in many instances, given the nature of their interest, have served as proxies for unrepresented stakeholders. As noted in the materials filed by the CMI Entities, the National Post Transition Agreement provides for the transfer of assets and certain liabilities to the publishing side of the **Canwest** business and the assumption of substantially all of the operating liabilities by the Transferee. Although there is no guarantee that the Transferee will ultimately be able to meet its liabilities as they come due, the liabilities are not stranded in an entity that will have materially fewer assets to satisfy them.

39 There is no prejudice to the major creditors of the CMI Entities. Indeed, the senior secured lender, Irish Holdco., supports the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement as does the Ad Hoc Committee and the senior secured lenders of the LP Entities. The Monitor supports the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement and has concluded that it is in the best interests of a broad range of stakeholders of the CMI Entities, the National Post Company, including its employees, suppliers and customers, and the LP Entities. Notice of this motion has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the

order.

40 In the absence of the Transition and **Reorganization** Agreement, it is likely that the National Post Company would be required to shut down resulting in the consequent loss of employment for most or all the National Post Company's employees. Under the National Post Transition Agreement, all of the National Post Company employees will be offered employment and as noted in the affidavit of the moving parties, the National Post Company's obligations and liabilities under the pension plan will be assumed, subject to necessary approvals.

41 No third party has expressed any interest in acquiring the National Post Company. Indeed, at no time did RBC Dominion Securities Inc. who was assisting in evaluating recapitalization alternatives ever receive any expression of interest from parties seeking to acquire it. Similarly, while the need to transfer the National Post has been in the public domain since at least October 6, 2009, the Monitor has not been contacted by any interested party with respect to acquiring the business of the National Post Company. The Monitor has approved the process leading to the sale and also has conducted a liquidation analysis that caused it to conclude that the proposed disposition is the most beneficial outcome. There has been full consultation with creditors and as noted by the Monitor, the Ad Hoc Committee serves as a good proxy for the unsecured creditor group as a whole. I am satisfied that the consideration is reasonable and fair given the evidence on estimated liquidation value and the fact that there is no other going concern option available.

42 The remaining section 36 factor to consider is section 36(7) which provides that the court should be satisfied that the company can and will make certain pension and employee related payments that would have been required if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement. In oral submissions, counsel for the CMI Entities confirmed that they had met the requirements of section 36. It is agreed that the pension and employee liabilities will be assumed by the Transferee. Although present, the representative of the Superintendent of Financial Services was unopposed to the order requested. If and when a compromise and arrangement is proposed, the Monitor is asked to make the necessary inquiries and report to the court on the status of those payments.

Stay Extension

43 The CMI Entities are continuing to work with their various stakeholders on the preparation and filing of a proposed plan of arrangement and additional time is required. An extension of the stay of proceedings is necessary to provide stability during that time. The cash flow forecast suggests that the CMI Entities have sufficient available cash resources during the requested extension period. The Monitor supports the extension and nobody was opposed. I accept the statements of the CMI Entities and the Monitor that the CMI Entities have acted, and are continuing to act, in good faith and with due diligence. In my view it is appropriate to extend the stay to January 22, 2010 as requested.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 Court approval may nonetheless be required by virtue of the terms of the Initial or other court order or at the request of a stakeholder.

2 The reference to paragraph 6(4)a should presumably be 6(6)a.

3 Industry Canada "Bill C-55: Clause by Clause Analysis — Bill Clause No. 131 — CCAA Section 36".

4 Ibid.

5 R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36 as amended.

6 (2003), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 278 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para.52.

TAB 3

2010 SCC 60
Supreme Court of Canada

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, [2010] S.C.J. No. 60, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 409 N.R. 201, 503 W.A.C. 1, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, J.E. 2011-5

Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010
Judgment: December 16, 2010
Docket: 33239

Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant
Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Tax — Miscellaneous; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Tax
I General principles
I.5 Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Tax
III Goods and Services Tax
III.14 Collection and remittance
III.14.b GST held in trust

Headnote

Tax --- Goods and Services Tax — Collection and remittance — GST held in trust
Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over

GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, ss. 222(1), (1.1).

Tax --- General principles — Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings
Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown.

Taxation --- Taxe sur les produits et services — Perception et versement — Montant de TPS détenu en fiducie
Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyaient que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Taxation --- Principes généraux — Priorité des créances fiscales dans le cadre de procédures en faillite
Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à

obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyaient que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

The debtor company owed the Crown under the Excise Tax Act (ETA) for GST that was not remitted. The debtor commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). Under an order by the B.C. Supreme Court, the amount of the tax debt was placed in a trust account, and the remaining proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets were paid to the major secured creditor. The debtor's application for a partial lifting of the stay of proceedings in order to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while the Crown's application for the immediate payment of the unremitted GST was dismissed.

The Crown's appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal found that the lower court was bound by the ETA to give the Crown priority once bankruptcy was inevitable. The Court of Appeal ruled that there was a deemed trust under s. 222 of the ETA or that an express trust was created in the Crown's favour by the court order segregating the GST funds in the trust account.

The creditor appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Deschamps J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. concurring): A purposive and contextual analysis of the ETA and CCAA yielded the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the CCAA when it amended the ETA in 2000. Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law under both the CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). Unlike for source deductions, there was no express statutory basis in the CCAA or BIA for concluding that GST claims enjoyed any preferential treatment. The internal logic of the CCAA also militated against upholding a deemed trust for GST claims.

Giving the Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would, in practice, deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive CCAA regime. It seemed likely that Parliament had inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly, which could be resolved by giving precedence to s. 18.3 of the CCAA. Section 222(3) of the ETA could no longer be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of the CCAA by being passed subsequently to the CCAA, given the recent amendments to the CCAA. The legislative context supported the conclusion that s. 222(3) of the ETA was not intended to narrow the scope of s. 18.3 of the CCAA.

The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA was sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the BIA, so there was authority under the CCAA to partially lift the stay of proceedings to allow the debtor's entry into liquidation. There should be no gap between the CCAA and BIA proceedings that would invite a race to the courthouse to assert priorities.

The court order did not have the certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary of the funds sufficient to support an express trust, as the funds were segregated until the dispute between the creditor and the Crown could be resolved. The amount collected in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada was not subject to a deemed trust,

priority or express trust in favour of the Crown.

Per Fish J. (concurring): Parliament had declined to amend the provisions at issue after detailed consideration of the insolvency regime, so the apparent conflict between s. 18.3 of the CCAA and s. 222 of the ETA should not be treated as a drafting anomaly. In the insolvency context, a deemed trust would exist only when two complementary elements co-existed: first, a statutory provision creating the trust; and second, a CCAA or BIA provision confirming its effective operation. Parliament had created the Crown's deemed trust in the Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance Act and then confirmed in clear and unmistakable terms its continued operation under both the CCAA and the BIA regimes. In contrast, the ETA created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, purportedly notwithstanding any contrary legislation, but Parliament did not expressly provide for its continued operation in either the BIA or the CCAA. The absence of this confirmation reflected Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings, and so s. 222 of the ETA mentioned the BIA so as to exclude it from its ambit, rather than include it as the other statutes did. As none of these statutes mentioned the CCAA expressly, the specific reference to the BIA had no bearing on the interaction with the CCAA. It was the confirmatory provisions in the insolvency statutes that would determine whether a given deemed trust would subsist during insolvency proceedings.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): The appellate court properly found that s. 222(3) of the ETA gave priority during CCAA proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. The failure to exempt the CCAA from the operation of this provision was a reflection of clear legislative intent. Despite the requests of various constituencies and case law confirming that the ETA took precedence over the CCAA, there was no responsive legislative revision and the BIA remained the only exempted statute. There was no policy justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention and, in any event, the application of other principles of interpretation reinforced this conclusion. Contrary to the majority's view, the "later in time" principle did not favour the precedence of the CCAA, as the CCAA was merely re-enacted without significant substantive changes. According to the Interpretation Act, in such circumstances, s. 222(3) of the ETA remained the later provision. The chambers judge was required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the ETA and so did not have the authority to deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

La compagnie débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA). La débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs de la débitrice a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal. La demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement immédiat des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée.

L'appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli. La Cour d'appel a conclu que le tribunal se devait, en vertu de la LTA, de donner priorité à la Couronne une fois la faillite inévitable. La Cour d'appel a estimé que l'art. 222 de la LTA établissait une fiducie présumée ou bien que l'ordonnance du tribunal à l'effet que les montants de TPS soient détenus dans un compte en fiducie créait une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Le créancier a formé un pourvoi.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Deschamps, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : Une analyse téléologique et contextuelle de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000. Le législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne dans le cadre du droit de l'insolvabilité, sous le régime de la LACC et celui de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI). Contrairement aux retenues à la source, aucune disposition législative expresse ne permettait de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la LACC ou celui de la LFI. La logique interne de la LACC allait également à l'encontre du maintien de la fiducie réputée à l'égard des créances découlant de la TPS.

Le fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet, dans les faits, de priver les compagnies de la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC. Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle, laquelle pouvait être corrigée en donnant préséance à l'art. 18.3 de la LACC. On ne pouvait plus considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC parce qu'il avait été adopté après la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC. Le contexte législatif étayait la conclusion suivant laquelle l'art. 222(3) de la LTA n'avait pas pour but de restreindre la portée de l'art. 18.3 de la LACC.

L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la LACC était suffisant pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI, de sorte qu'il avait, en vertu de la LACC, le pouvoir de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation. Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse, puisque les fonds étaient détenus à part jusqu'à ce que le litige entre le créancier et la Couronne soit résolu. Le montant perçu au titre de la TPS mais non encore versé au receveur général du Canada ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Fish, J. (souscrivant aux motifs des juges majoritaires) : Le législateur a refusé de modifier les dispositions en question suivant un examen approfondi du régime d'insolvabilité, de sorte qu'on ne devrait pas qualifier l'apparente contradiction entre l'art. 18.3 de la LACC et l'art. 222 de la LTA d'anomalie rédactionnelle. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, on ne pourrait conclure à l'existence d'une fiducie présumée que lorsque deux éléments complémentaires étaient réunis : en premier lieu, une disposition législative qui crée la fiducie et, en second lieu, une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI qui confirme l'existence de la fiducie. Le législateur a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne dans la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, le Régime de pensions du Canada et la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi puis, il a confirmé en termes clairs et explicites sa volonté de voir cette fiducie présumée produire ses effets sous le régime de la LACC et de la LFI. Dans le cas de la LTA, il a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne, sciemment et sans égard pour toute législation à l'effet contraire, mais n'a pas expressément prévu le maintien en vigueur de celle-ci sous le régime de la LFI ou celui de la LACC. L'absence d'une telle confirmation témoignait de l'intention du législateur de laisser la fiducie présumée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité. L'intention du législateur était manifestement de rendre inopérantes les fiducies présumées visant la TPS dès l'introduction d'une procédure d'insolvabilité et, par conséquent, l'art. 222 de la LTA mentionnait la LFI de manière à l'exclure de son champ d'application, et non de l'y inclure, comme le faisaient les autres lois. Puisqu'aucune de ces lois ne mentionnait spécifiquement la LACC, la mention explicite de la LFI n'avait aucune incidence sur l'interaction avec la LACC. C'était les dispositions confirmatoires que l'on trouvait dans les lois sur l'insolvabilité qui déterminaient si une fiducie présumée continuerait d'exister durant une procédure d'insolvabilité.

Abella, J. (dissidente) : La Cour d'appel a conclu à bon droit que l'art. 222(3) de la LTA donnait préséance à la fiducie présumée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Le fait que la LACC n'ait pas été soustraite à l'application de cette disposition témoignait d'une intention claire du législateur. Malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes et la jurisprudence ayant confirmé que la LTA l'emportait sur la LACC, le législateur n'est pas intervenu et la LFI est demeurée la seule loi soustraite à l'application de cette disposition. Il n'y avait pas de considération de politique générale qui justifierait d'aller à l'encontre, par voie d'interprétation législative, de l'intention aussi clairement exprimée par le législateur et, de toutes manières, cette conclusion était renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Contrairement à l'opinion des juges majoritaires, le principe de la préséance de la « loi postérieure » ne militait pas en faveur de la présance de la LACC, celle-ci ayant été simplement adoptée à nouveau sans que l'on ne lui ait apporté de modifications importantes. En vertu de la Loi d'interprétation, dans ces circonstances, l'art. 222(3) de la LTA demeurait la disposition postérieure. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi à l'art. 222(3) de la LTA, et il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la LACC.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Deschamps J.*:

Air Canada, Re (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173, 2003 CarswellOnt 2464 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re* [2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2003 CanLII 49366, at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

61 When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the *CCAA*, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

62 Perhaps the most creative use of *CCAA* authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96 (B.C. C.A.), aff'g (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The *CCAA* has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see Metcalfe & Mansfield). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the *CCAA's* supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

63 Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

64 The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the *CCAA* and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during *CCAA* proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the *CCAA* itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

65 I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

66 Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

67 The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

TAB 4

2009 CarswellOnt 4467
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF **NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION**, **NORTEL NETWORKS** LIMITED, **NORTEL NETWORKS** GLOBAL **CORPORATION**, **NORTEL NETWORKS** INTERNATIONAL **CORPORATION** AND **NORTEL NETWORKS** TECHNOLOGY **CORPORATION** (Applicants)

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29,
2009
Written reasons: July 23,
2009
Docket: 09-CL-7950

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David Ward for UK Pension Protection Fund
Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.
Alex MacFarlane for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Arthur O. Jacques, Tom McRae for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)
Robin B. Schwill, Matthew P. Gottlieb for **Nortel Networks** UK Limited
A. Kauffman for Export Development Canada
D. Ullman for Verizon Communications Inc.
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Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIV Administration of estate
XIV.6 Sale of assets
XIV.6.f Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.1 General principles
XIX.1.e Jurisdiction
XIX.1.e.i Court

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues
Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Jurisdiction of court to approve sale
Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (**2009**), **2009** BCCA 319, **2009** CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II ***Corp***. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II* ***Corp****., Re)* 240 O.A.C. 245, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II* ***Corp****., Re)* 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, *(*sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II* ***Corp****., Re)* 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II ***Corp***. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 10918, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital ***Corp***. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of **corporate** insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II **Corp***. (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

> (a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;
>
> (b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and
>
> (c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial*, *supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

> Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern **corporate** law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that **Nortel** seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

> The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the **best interests** of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, *supra*, *Re PSINet*, *supra*, *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra*, *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging*, *supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

> The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.
>
> ...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, *supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, *supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited*, *supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

> [If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited*, *supra*, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc.*, *supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

> I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.), *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple*

with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

(a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?

(b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?

(c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?

(d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that **Nortel's** proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

(a) **Nortel** has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;

(b) in the exercise of its business judgment, **Nortel** has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;

(c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;

(d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;

(e) the auction process will serve to ensure **Nortel** receives the highest possible value for the Business;

(f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the **best interests** of **Nortel** and its stakeholders; and

(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that **Nortel** will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated **corporate** group. They carry on an active international business. I have

TAB 5

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36

L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-36

Current to March 19, 2020

Last amended on November 1, 2019

À jour au 19 mars 2020

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Compromise with secured creditors

5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

R.S., c. C-25, s. 5.

Transaction avec les créanciers garantis

5 Lorsqu'une transaction ou un arrangement est proposé entre une compagnie débitrice et ses créanciers garantis ou toute catégorie de ces derniers, le tribunal peut, à la requête sommaire de la compagnie, d'un de ces créanciers ou du syndic en matière de faillite ou liquidateur de la compagnie, ordonner que soit convoquée, de la manière qu'il prescrit, une assemblée de ces créanciers ou catégorie de créanciers, et, si le tribunal en décide ainsi, des actionnaires de la compagnie.

S.R., ch. C-25, art. 5.

Claims against directors — compromise

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Transaction — réclamations contre les administrateurs

5.1 (1) La transaction ou l'arrangement visant une compagnie débitrice peut comporter, au profit de ses créanciers, des dispositions relativement à une transaction sur les réclamations contre ses administrateurs qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de celle-ci dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Restriction

(2) La transaction ne peut toutefois viser des réclamations portant sur des droits contractuels d'un ou de plusieurs créanciers ou fondées sur la fausse représentation ou la conduite injustifiée ou abusive des administrateurs.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Pouvoir du tribunal

(3) Le tribunal peut déclarer qu'une réclamation contre les administrateurs ne peut faire l'objet d'une transaction s'il est convaincu qu'elle ne serait ni juste ni équitable dans les circonstances.

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

1997, c. 12, s. 122.

Démission ou destitution des administrateurs

(4) Si tous les administrateurs démissionnent ou sont destitués par les actionnaires sans être remplacés, quiconque dirige ou supervise les activités commerciales et les affaires internes de la compagnie débitrice est réputé un administrateur pour l'application du présent article.

1997, ch. 12, art. 122.

Compromises to be sanctioned by court

6 (1) If a majority in number representing two thirds in value of the creditors, or the class of creditors, as the case may be — other than, unless the court orders otherwise, a class of creditors having equity claims, — present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or

Homologation par le tribunal

6 (1) Si une majorité en nombre représentant les deux tiers en valeur des créanciers ou d'une catégorie de créanciers, selon le cas, — mise à part, sauf ordonnance contraire du tribunal, toute catégorie de créanciers ayant des réclamations relatives à des capitaux propres —

meetings of creditors respectively held under sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court and, if so sanctioned, is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for that class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Court may order amendment

(2) If a court sanctions a compromise or arrangement, it may order that the debtor's constating instrument be amended in accordance with the compromise or arrangement to reflect any change that may lawfully be made under federal or provincial law.

Restriction — certain Crown claims

(3) Unless Her Majesty agrees otherwise, the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement only if the compromise or arrangement provides for the payment in full to Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province, within six months after court sanction of the compromise or arrangement, of all amounts that were outstanding at the time of the application for an order under section 11 or 11.02 and that are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under

(a) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, or a premium under Part VII.1 of that Act, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any

présents et votant soit en personne, soit par fondé de pouvoir à l'assemblée ou aux assemblées de créanciers respectivement tenues au titre des articles 4 et 5, acceptent une transaction ou un arrangement, proposé ou modifié à cette ou ces assemblées, la transaction ou l'arrangement peut être homologué par le tribunal et, le cas échéant, lie :

a) tous les créanciers ou la catégorie de créanciers, selon le cas, et tout fiduciaire pour cette catégorie de créanciers, qu'ils soient garantis ou chirographaires, selon le cas, ainsi que la compagnie;

b) dans le cas d'une compagnie qui a fait une cession autorisée ou à l'encontre de laquelle une ordonnance de faillite a été rendue en vertu de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou qui est en voie de liquidation sous le régime de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, le syndic en matière de faillite ou liquidateur et les contributeurs de la compagnie.

Modification des statuts constitutifs

(2) Le tribunal qui homologue une transaction ou un arrangement peut ordonner la modification des statuts constitutifs de la compagnie conformément à ce qui est prévu dans la transaction ou l'arrangement, selon le cas, pourvu que la modification soit légale au regard du droit fédéral ou provincial.

Certaines réclamations de la Couronne

(3) Le tribunal ne peut, sans le consentement de Sa Majesté, homologuer la transaction ou l'arrangement qui ne prévoit pas le paiement intégral à Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d'une province, dans les six mois suivant l'homologation, de toutes les sommes qui étaient dues lors de la demande d'ordonnance visée aux articles 11 ou 11.02 et qui pourraient, de par leur nature, faire l'objet d'une demande aux termes d'une des dispositions suivantes :

a) le paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*;

b) toute disposition du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* qui renvoie au paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu* et qui prévoit la perception d'une cotisation, au sens du *Régime de pensions du Canada*, d'une cotisation ouvrière ou d'une cotisation patronale, au sens de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi*, ou d'une cotisation prévue par la partie VII.1 de cette loi ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités ou autres charges afférents;

c) toute disposition législative provinciale dont l'objet est semblable à celui du paragraphe 224(1.2) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, ou qui renvoie à ce paragraphe, et qui prévoit la perception d'une somme,

related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a *province providing a comprehensive pension plan* as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a *provincial pension plan* as defined in that subsection.

Restriction — default of remittance to Crown

(4) If an order contains a provision authorized by section 11.09, no compromise or arrangement is to be sanctioned by the court if, at the time the court hears the application for sanction, Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province satisfies the court that the company is in default on any remittance of an amount referred to in subsection (3) that became due after the time of the application for an order under section 11.02.

Restriction — employees, etc.

(5) The court may sanction a compromise or an arrangement only if

(a) the compromise or arrangement provides for payment to the employees and former employees of the company, immediately after the court's sanction, of

(i) amounts at least equal to the amounts that they would have been qualified to receive under paragraph 136(1)(d) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* if the company had become bankrupt on the day on which proceedings commenced under this Act, and

(ii) wages, salaries, commissions or compensation for services rendered after proceedings commence under this Act and before the court sanctions the compromise or arrangement, together with, in the case of travelling salespersons, disbursements properly incurred by them in and about the company's business during the same period; and

(b) the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments as required under paragraph (a).

ainsi que des intérêts, pénalités ou autres charges afférents, laquelle somme :

(i) soit a été retenue par une personne sur un paiement effectué à une autre personne, ou déduite d'un tel paiement, et se rapporte à un impôt semblable, de par sa nature, à l'impôt sur le revenu auquel les particuliers sont assujettis en vertu de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*,

(ii) soit est de même nature qu'une cotisation prévue par le *Régime de pensions du Canada*, si la province est une province instituant un régime général de pensions au sens du paragraphe 3(1) de cette loi et si la loi provinciale a institué un régime provincial de pensions au sens de ce paragraphe.

Défaut d'effectuer un versement

(4) Lorsqu'une ordonnance comporte une disposition autorisée par l'article 11.09, le tribunal ne peut homologuer la transaction ou l'arrangement si, lors de l'audition de la demande d'homologation, Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d'une province le convainc du défaut de la compagnie d'effectuer un versement portant sur une somme visée au paragraphe (3) et qui est devenue exigible après le dépôt de la demande d'ordonnance visée à l'article 11.02.

Restriction — employés, etc.

(5) Le tribunal ne peut homologuer la transaction ou l'arrangement que si, à la fois :

a) la transaction ou l'arrangement prévoit le paiement aux employés actuels et anciens de la compagnie, dès son homologation, de sommes égales ou supérieures, d'une part, à celles qu'ils seraient en droit de recevoir en application de l'alinéa 136(1)d) de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* si la compagnie avait fait faillite à la date à laquelle des procédures ont été introduites sous le régime de la présente loi à son égard et, d'autre part, au montant des gages, salaires, commissions ou autre rémunération pour services fournis entre la date de l'introduction des procédures et celle de l'homologation, y compris les sommes que le voyageur de commerce a régulièrement déboursées dans le cadre de l'exploitation de la compagnie entre ces dates;

b) il est convaincu que la compagnie est en mesure d'effectuer et effectuera les paiements prévus à l'alinéa a).

Restriction — pension plan

(6) If the company participates in a prescribed pension plan for the benefit of its employees, the court may sanction a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company only if

(a) the compromise or arrangement provides for payment of the following amounts that are unpaid to the fund established for the purpose of the pension plan:

(i) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that were deducted from the employees' remuneration for payment to the fund,

(ii) if the prescribed pension plan is regulated by an Act of Parliament,

(A) an amount equal to the normal cost, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985*, that was required to be paid by the employer to the fund, and

(B) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that were required to be paid by the employer to the fund under a defined contribution provision, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985*,

(C) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that were required to be paid by the employer to the administrator of a pooled registered pension plan, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the *Pooled Registered Pension Plans Act*, and

(iii) in the case of any other prescribed pension plan,

(A) an amount equal to the amount that would be the normal cost, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985*, that the employer would be required to pay to the fund if the prescribed plan were regulated by an Act of Parliament, and

(B) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that would have been required to be paid by the employer to the fund under a defined contribution provision, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985*, if the prescribed plan were regulated by an Act of Parliament,

(C) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that would have been required to be paid by the employer in respect of a prescribed plan, if it

Restriction — régime de pension

(6) Si la compagnie participe à un régime de pension réglementaire institué pour ses employés, le tribunal ne peut homologuer la transaction ou l'arrangement que si, à la fois :

a) la transaction ou l'arrangement prévoit que seront effectués des paiements correspondant au total des sommes ci-après qui n'ont pas été versées au fonds établi dans le cadre du régime de pension :

(i) les sommes qui ont été déduites de la rémunération des employés pour versement au fonds,

(ii) dans le cas d'un régime de pension réglementaire régi par une loi fédérale :

(A) les coûts normaux, au sens du paragraphe 2(1) du *Règlement de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension*, que l'employeur est tenu de verser au fonds,

(B) les sommes que l'employeur est tenu de verser au fonds au titre de toute disposition à cotisations déterminées au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la *Loi de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension*,

(C) les sommes que l'employeur est tenu de verser à l'administrateur d'un régime de pension agréé collectif au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la *Loi sur les régimes de pension agréés collectifs*,

(iii) dans le cas de tout autre régime de pension réglementaire :

(A) la somme égale aux coûts normaux, au sens du paragraphe 2(1) du *Règlement de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension*, que l'employeur serait tenu de verser au fonds si le régime était régi par une loi fédérale,

(B) les sommes que l'employeur serait tenu de verser au fonds au titre de toute disposition à cotisations déterminées au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la *Loi de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension* si le régime était régi par une loi fédérale,

(C) les sommes que l'employeur serait tenu de verser à l'égard du régime s'il était régi par la *Loi sur les régimes de pension agréés collectifs*;

b) il est convaincu que la compagnie est en mesure d'effectuer et effectuera les paiements prévus à l'alinéa a).

were regulated by the *Pooled Registered Pension Plans Act*; and

(b) the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments as required under paragraph (a).

Non-application of subsection (6)

(7) Despite subsection (6), the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement that does not allow for the payment of the amounts referred to in that subsection if it is satisfied that the relevant parties have entered into an agreement, approved by the relevant pension regulator, respecting the payment of those amounts.

Payment — equity claims

(8) No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 6; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 1997, c. 12, s. 123; 2004, c. 25, s. 194; 2005, c. 47, s. 126, 2007, c. 36, s. 106; 2009, c. 33, s. 27; 2012, c. 16, s. 82.

Court may give directions

7 Where an alteration or a modification of any compromise or arrangement is proposed at any time after the court has directed a meeting or meetings to be summoned, the meeting or meetings may be adjourned on such term as to notice and otherwise as the court may direct, and those directions may be given after as well as before adjournment of any meeting or meetings, and the court may in its discretion direct that it is not necessary to adjourn any meeting or to convene any further meeting of any class of creditors or shareholders that in the opinion of the court is not adversely affected by the alteration or modification proposed, and any compromise or arrangement so altered or modified may be sanctioned by the court and have effect under section 6.

R.S., c. C-25, s. 7.

Scope of Act

8 This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

R.S., c. C-25, s. 8.

Non-application du paragraphe (6)

(7) Par dérogation au paragraphe (6), le tribunal peut homologuer la transaction ou l'arrangement qui ne prévoit pas le versement des sommes mentionnées à ce paragraphe s'il est convaincu que les parties en cause ont conclu un accord sur les sommes à verser et que l'autorité administrative responsable du régime de pension a consenti à l'accord.

Paiement d'une réclamation relative à des capitaux propres

(8) Le tribunal ne peut homologuer la transaction ou l'arrangement qui prévoit le paiement d'une réclamation relative à des capitaux propres que si, selon les termes de celle-ci, le paiement intégral de toutes les autres réclamations sera effectué avant le paiement de la réclamation relative à des capitaux propres.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 6; 1992, ch. 27, art. 90; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 1997, ch. 12, art. 123; 2004, ch. 25, art. 194; 2005, ch. 47, art. 126, 2007, ch. 36, art. 106; 2009, ch. 33, art. 27; 2012, ch. 16, art. 82.

Le tribunal peut donner des instructions

7 Si une modification d'une transaction ou d'un arrangement est proposée après que le tribunal a ordonné qu'une ou plusieurs assemblées soient convoquées, cette ou ces assemblées peuvent être ajournées aux conditions que peut prescrire le tribunal quant à l'avis et autrement, et ces instructions peuvent être données tant après qu'avant l'ajournement de toute ou toutes assemblées, et le tribunal peut, à sa discrétion, prescrire qu'il ne sera pas nécessaire d'ajourner quelque assemblée ou de convoquer une nouvelle assemblée de toute catégorie de créanciers ou actionnaires qui, selon l'opinion du tribunal, n'est pas défavorablement atteinte par la modification proposée, et une transaction ou un arrangement ainsi modifié peut être homologué par le tribunal et être exécutoire en vertu de l'article 6.

S.R., ch. C-25, art. 7.

Champ d'application de la loi

8 La présente loi n'a pas pour effet de limiter mais d'étendre les stipulations de tout instrument actuellement ou désormais existant relativement aux droits de créanciers ou de toute catégorie de ces derniers, et elle est pleinement exécutoire et effective nonobstant toute stipulation contraire de cet instrument.

S.R., ch. C-25, art. 8.

available to any person specified in the order on any terms or conditions that the court considers appropriate.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 10; 2005, c. 47, s. 127.

peut être communiqué, aux conditions qu'il estime indiquées, à la personne qu'il nomme.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 10; 2005, ch. 47, art. 127.

General power of court

11 Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 11; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Pouvoir général du tribunal

11 Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, le tribunal peut, dans le cas de toute demande sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard d'une compagnie débitrice, rendre, sur demande d'un intéressé, mais sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 11; 1992, ch. 27, art. 90; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Relief reasonably necessary

11.001 An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

2019, c. 29, s. 136.

Redressements normalement nécessaires

11.001 L'ordonnance rendue au titre de l'article 11 en même temps que l'ordonnance rendue au titre du paragraphe 11.02(1) ou pendant la période visée dans l'ordonnance rendue au titre de ce paragraphe relativement à la demande initiale n'est limitée qu'aux redressements normalement nécessaires à la continuation de l'exploitation de la compagnie débitrice dans le cours ordinaire de ses affaires durant cette période.

2019, ch. 29, art. 136.

Rights of suppliers

11.01 No order made under section 11 or 11.02 has the effect of

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or

(b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Droits des fournisseurs

11.01 L'ordonnance prévue aux articles 11 ou 11.02 ne peut avoir pour effet :

a) d'empêcher une personne d'exiger que soient effectués sans délai les paiements relatifs à la fourniture de marchandises ou de services, à l'utilisation de biens loués ou faisant l'objet d'une licence ou à la fourniture de toute autre contrepartie de valeur qui ont lieu après l'ordonnance;

b) d'exiger le versement de nouvelles avances de fonds ou de nouveaux crédits.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Stays, etc. — initial application

11.02 (1) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 10 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

Suspension : demande initiale

11.02 (1) Dans le cas d'une demande initiale visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période maximale de dix jours qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Stays, etc. — other than initial application

(2) A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Burden of proof on application

(3) The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

Restriction

(4) Orders doing anything referred to in subsection (1) or (2) may only be made under this section.

2005, c. 47, s. 128, 2007, c. 36, s. 62(F); 2019, c. 29, s. 137.

Stays — directors

11.03 (1) An order made under section 11.02 may provide that no person may commence or continue any action against a director of the company on any claim against directors that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relates to obligations of the company if directors are under any law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of those obligations, until a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company, if one is filed, is sanctioned by the court or is refused by the creditors or the court.

b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

Suspension : demandes autres qu'initiales

(2) Dans le cas d'une demande, autre qu'une demande initiale, visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime des lois mentionnées à l'alinéa (1)a);

b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

Preuve

(3) Le tribunal ne rend l'ordonnance que si :

a) le demandeur le convainc que la mesure est opportune;

b) dans le cas de l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (2), le demandeur le convainc en outre qu'il a agi et continue d'agir de bonne foi et avec la diligence voulue.

Restriction

(4) L'ordonnance qui prévoit l'une des mesures visées aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) ne peut être rendue qu'en vertu du présent article.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128, 2007, ch. 36, art. 62(F); 2019, ch. 29, art. 137.

Suspension — administrateurs

11.03 (1) L'ordonnance prévue à l'article 11.02 peut interdire l'introduction ou la continuation de toute action contre les administrateurs de la compagnie relativement aux réclamations qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de la compagnie dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit, tant que la transaction ou l'arrangement, le cas échéant, n'a pas été homologué par le tribunal ou rejeté par celui-ci ou les créanciers.

consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

Factors to be considered

(4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

Additional factor — initial application

(5) When an application is made under subsection (1) at the same time as an initial application referred to in subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection, no order shall be made under subsection (1) unless the court is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 36, s. 65; 2019, c. 29, s. 138.

Assignment of agreements

11.3 (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to every party to an agreement and the monitor, the court may make an order assigning the rights and obligations of the company under the agreement to any person who is specified by the court and agrees to the assignment.

Exceptions

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of rights and obligations that are not assignable by reason of their nature or that arise under

rendue en vertu du paragraphe (1) que sur consentement de la personne en faveur de qui cette ordonnance a été rendue.

Facteurs à prendre en considération

(4) Pour décider s'il rend l'ordonnance, le tribunal prend en considération, entre autres, les facteurs suivants :

a) la durée prévue des procédures intentées à l'égard de la compagnie sous le régime de la présente loi;

b) la façon dont les affaires financières et autres de la compagnie seront gérées au cours de ces procédures;

c) la question de savoir si ses dirigeants ont la confiance de ses créanciers les plus importants;

d) la question de savoir si le prêt favorisera la conclusion d'une transaction ou d'un arrangement viable à l'égard de la compagnie;

e) la nature et la valeur des biens de la compagnie;

f) la question de savoir si la charge ou sûreté causera un préjudice sérieux à l'un ou l'autre des créanciers de la compagnie;

g) le rapport du contrôleur visé à l'alinéa 23(1)b).

Facteur additionnel : demande initiale

(5) Lorsqu'une demande est faite au titre du paragraphe (1) en même temps que la demande initiale visée au paragraphe 11.02(1) ou durant la période visée dans l'ordonnance rendue au titre de ce paragraphe, le tribunal ne rend l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) que s'il est également convaincu que les modalités du financement temporaire demandé sont limitées à ce qui est normalement nécessaire à la continuation de l'exploitation de la compagnie débitrice dans le cours ordinaire de ses affaires durant cette période.

1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128; 2007, ch. 36, art. 65; 2019, ch. 29, art. 138.

Cessions

11.3 (1) Sur demande de la compagnie débitrice et sur préavis à toutes les parties au contrat et au contrôleur, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, céder à toute personne qu'il précise et qui y a consenti les droits et obligations de la compagnie découlant du contrat.

Exceptions

(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas aux droits et obligations qui, de par leur nature, ne peuvent être cédés ou qui découlent soit d'un contrat conclu à la date à laquelle une procédure a été intentée sous le régime de la

(a) an agreement entered into on or after the day on which proceedings commence under this Act;

(b) an eligible financial contract; or

(c) a collective agreement.

Factors to be considered

(3) In deciding whether to make the order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the monitor approved the proposed assignment;

(b) whether the person to whom the rights and obligations are to be assigned would be able to perform the obligations; and

(c) whether it would be appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to that person.

Restriction

(4) The court may not make the order unless it is satisfied that all monetary defaults in relation to the agreement — other than those arising by reason only of the company's insolvency, the commencement of proceedings under this Act or the company's failure to perform a non-monetary obligation — will be remedied on or before the day fixed by the court.

Copy of order

(5) The applicant is to send a copy of the order to every party to the agreement.

1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 29, s. 107, c. 36, ss. 65, 112.

11.31 [Repealed, 2005, c. 47, s. 128]

Critical supplier

11.4 (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

Obligation to supply

(2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

présente loi ou par la suite, soit d'un contrat financier admissible, soit d'une convention collective.

Facteurs à prendre en considération

(3) Pour décider s'il rend l'ordonnance, le tribunal prend en considération, entre autres, les facteurs suivants :

a) l'acquiescement du contrôleur au projet de cession, le cas échéant;

b) la capacité de la personne à qui les droits et obligations seraient cédés d'exécuter les obligations;

c) l'opportunité de lui céder les droits et obligations.

Restriction

(4) Il ne peut rendre l'ordonnance que s'il est convaincu qu'il sera remédié, au plus tard à la date qu'il fixe, à tous les manquements d'ordre pécuniaire relatifs au contrat, autres que ceux découlant du seul fait que la compagnie est insolvable, est visée par une procédure intentée sous le régime de la présente loi ou ne s'est pas conformée à une obligation non pécuniaire.

Copie de l'ordonnance

(5) Le demandeur envoie une copie de l'ordonnance à toutes les parties au contrat.

1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128; 2007, ch. 29, art. 107, ch. 36, art. 65 et 112.

11.31 [Abrogé, 2005, ch. 47, art. 128]

Fournisseurs essentiels

11.4 (1) Sur demande de la compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut par ordonnance, sur préavis de la demande aux créanciers garantis qui seront vraisemblablement touchés par la charge ou sûreté, déclarer toute personne fournisseur essentiel de la compagnie s'il est convaincu que cette personne est un fournisseur de la compagnie et que les marchandises ou les services qu'elle lui fournit sont essentiels à la continuation de son exploitation.

Obligation de fourniture

(2) S'il fait une telle déclaration, le tribunal peut ordonner à la personne déclarée fournisseur essentiel de la compagnie de fournir à celle-ci les marchandises ou services qu'il précise, à des conditions compatibles avec les modalités qui régissaient antérieurement leur fourniture ou aux conditions qu'il estime indiquées.

Obligations and Prohibitions

Obligation to provide assistance

35 (1) A debtor company shall provide to the monitor the assistance that is necessary to enable the monitor to adequately carry out the monitor's functions.

Obligation to duties set out in section 158 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*

(2) A debtor company shall perform the duties set out in section 158 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* that are appropriate and applicable in the circumstances.

2005, c. 47, s. 131.

Restriction on disposition of business assets

36 (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

Notice to creditors

(2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

Factors to be considered

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

Obligations et interdiction

Assistance

35 (1) La compagnie débitrice est tenue d'aider le contrôleur à remplir adéquatement ses fonctions.

Obligations visées à l'article 158 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*

(2) Elle est également tenue de satisfaire aux obligations visées à l'article 158 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* selon ce qui est indiqué et applicable dans les circonstances.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131.

Restriction à la disposition d'actifs

36 (1) Il est interdit à la compagnie débitrice à l'égard de laquelle une ordonnance a été rendue sous le régime de la présente loi de disposer, notamment par vente, d'actifs hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires sans l'autorisation du tribunal. Le tribunal peut accorder l'autorisation sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'obtenir l'acquiescement des actionnaires, et ce malgré toute exigence à cet effet, notamment en vertu d'une règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale.

Avis aux créanciers

(2) La compagnie qui demande l'autorisation au tribunal en avise les créanciers garantis qui peuvent vraisemblablement être touchés par le projet de disposition.

Facteurs à prendre en considération

(3) Pour décider s'il accorde l'autorisation, le tribunal prend en considération, entre autres, les facteurs suivants :

a) la justification des circonstances ayant mené au projet de disposition;

b) l'acquiescement du contrôleur au processus ayant mené au projet de disposition, le cas échéant;

c) le dépôt par celui-ci d'un rapport précisant que, à son avis, la disposition sera plus avantageuse pour les créanciers que si elle était faite dans le cadre de la faillite;

d) la suffisance des consultations menées auprès des créanciers;

e) les effets du projet de disposition sur les droits de tout intéressé, notamment les créanciers;

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

f) le caractère juste et raisonnable de la contrepartie reçue pour les actifs compte tenu de leur valeur marchande.

Additional factors — related persons

(4) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

Autres facteurs

(4) Si la compagnie projette de disposer d'actifs en faveur d'une personne à laquelle elle est liée, le tribunal, après avoir pris ces facteurs en considération, ne peut accorder l'autorisation que s'il est convaincu :

a) d'une part, que les efforts voulus ont été faits pour disposer des actifs en faveur d'une personne qui n'est pas liée à la compagnie;

b) d'autre part, que la contrepartie offerte pour les actifs est plus avantageuse que celle qui découlerait de toute autre offre reçue dans le cadre du projet de disposition.

Related persons

(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes

(a) a director or officer of the company;

(b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and

(c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

Personnes liées

(5) Pour l'application du paragraphe (4), les personnes ci-après sont considérées comme liées à la compagnie :

a) le dirigeant ou l'administrateur de celle-ci;

b) la personne qui, directement ou indirectement, en a ou en a eu le contrôle de fait;

c) la personne liée à toute personne visée aux alinéas a) ou b).

Assets may be disposed of free and clear

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

Autorisation de disposer des actifs en les libérant de restrictions

(6) Le tribunal peut autoriser la disposition d'actifs de la compagnie, purgés de toute charge, sûreté ou autre restriction, et, le cas échéant, est tenu d'assujettir le produit de la disposition ou d'autres de ses actifs à une charge, sûreté ou autre restriction en faveur des créanciers touchés par la purge.

Restriction — employers

(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(5)(a) and (6)(a) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

Restriction à l'égard des employeurs

(7) Il ne peut autoriser la disposition que s'il est convaincu que la compagnie est en mesure d'effectuer et effectuera les paiements qui auraient été exigés en vertu des alinéas 6(5)a) et (6)a) s'il avait homologué la transaction ou l'arrangement.

Restriction — intellectual property

(8) If, on the day on which an order is made under this Act in respect of the company, the company is a party to an agreement that grants to another party a right to use intellectual property that is included in a sale or disposition authorized under subsection (6), that sale or disposition does not affect that other party's right to use the

Restriction à l'égard de la propriété intellectuelle

(8) Si, à la date à laquelle une ordonnance est rendue à son égard sous le régime de la présente loi, la compagnie est partie à un contrat qui autorise une autre partie à utiliser un droit de propriété intellectuelle qui est compris dans la disposition d'actifs autorisée en vertu du paragraphe (6), cette disposition n'empêche pas l'autre partie

Statutory Crown securities

39 (1) In relation to proceedings under this Act in respect of a debtor company, a security provided for in federal or provincial legislation for the sole or principal purpose of securing a claim of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or a workers' compensation body is valid in relation to claims against the company only if, before the day on which proceedings commence, the security is registered under a system of registration of securities that is available not only to Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or a workers' compensation body, but also to any other creditor who holds a security, and that is open to the public for information or the making of searches.

Effect of security

(2) A security referred to in subsection (1) that is registered in accordance with that subsection

(a) is subordinate to securities in respect of which all steps necessary to setting them up against other creditors were taken before that registration; and

(b) is valid only in respect of amounts owing to Her Majesty or a workers' compensation body at the time of that registration, plus any interest subsequently accruing on those amounts.

2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 79.

Act binding on Her Majesty

40 This Act is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province.

2005, c. 47, s. 131.

Miscellaneous

Certain sections of *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* do not apply

41 Sections 65 and 66 of the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* do not apply to any compromise or arrangement to which this Act applies.

2005, c. 47, s. 131.

Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts

42 The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

2005, c. 47, s. 131.

Garanties créées par législation

39 (1) Dans le cadre de toute procédure intentée à l'égard d'une compagnie débitrice sous le régime de la présente loi, les garanties créées aux termes d'une loi fédérale ou provinciale dans le seul but — ou principalement dans le but — de protéger des réclamations de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d'une province ou d'un organisme compétent au titre d'une loi sur les accidents du travail ne sont valides que si elles ont été enregistrées avant la date d'introduction de la procédure et selon un système d'enregistrement des garanties qui est accessible non seulement à Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou de la province ou à l'organisme, mais aussi aux autres créanciers détenant des garanties, et qui est accessible au public à des fins de consultation ou de recherche.

Rang

(2) Les garanties enregistrées conformément au paragraphe (1) :

a) prennent rang après toute autre garantie à l'égard de laquelle les mesures requises pour la rendre opposable aux autres créanciers ont toutes été prises avant l'enregistrement;

b) ne sont valides que pour les sommes dues à Sa Majesté ou à l'organisme lors de l'enregistrement et les intérêts échus depuis sur celles-ci.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131; 2007, ch. 36, art. 79.

Obligation de Sa Majesté

40 La présente loi lie Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d'une province.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131.

Dispositions diverses

Inapplicabilité de certains articles de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*

41 Les articles 65 et 66 de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations* ne s'appliquent à aucune transaction ni à aucun arrangement auxquels la présente loi est applicable.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131.

Application concurrente d'autres lois

42 Les dispositions de la présente loi peuvent être appliquées conjointement avec celles de toute loi fédérale ou provinciale, autorisant ou prévoyant l'homologation de transactions ou arrangements entre une compagnie et ses actionnaires ou une catégorie de ces derniers.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131.

TAB 6

2015 ONSC 5557, 2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140

2015 ONSC 5557
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nelson Education Ltd., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 2015 ONSC 5557, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140

In the Matter of the Companies' Lenders Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nelson Education Ltd. and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd., Applicants

Newbould J.

Heard: August 13, 27, 2015
Judgment: September 8, 2015
Docket: CV15-10961-00CL

Counsel: Benjamin Zarnett, Jessica Kimmel, Caroline Descours for Applicants
Robert W. Staley, Kevin J. Zych, Sean Zweig for First Lien Agent and the First Lien Steering Committee
John L. Finnigan, D.J. Miller, Kyla E.M. Mahar for Royal Bank of Canada
Orestes Pasparaskis for Monitor

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.5 Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous
Education publishing company obtained protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Bank was one of 22 first lien lenders, second lien lender and agent for second lien lenders — Credit bid for sale of substantially all assets to newly incorporated entity owned by first ranked secured lenders, if approved, would results in second lien lenders receiving nothing on outstanding loans — Company brought motion for approval of sale; bank brought motion for order that amounts owing to it and portion of consent fee be paid by company prior to sale — Company's motion granted; bank's motion dismissed — Normally, sale process is undertaken after court approves proposed sale methodology with monitor participating in process and reporting to court — While none of this occurred, sale or investment sales process ("SISP") and credit bid sale transaction met requirements of CCAA — SISP was typical and consistent with processes that had been approved by court in many CCAA proceedings — Results of SISP showed that no interested parties could offer price sufficient to repay amounts owing to first lien lenders — Intercreditor agreement governed, and led to conclusion that order in favour of bank as second lien agent was not appropriate as payment would reduce collateral subject to rights of first lien lenders in that collateral.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

(a) The design of the SISP was typical of such marketing processes and was consistent with processes that have been approved by the courts in many CCAA proceedings;

(b) The SISP allowed interested parties adequate opportunity to conduct due diligence, both A&M and management appear to have been responsive to all requests from potentially interested parties and the timelines provided for in the SISP were reasonable in the circumstances;

(c) The activities undertaken by A&M were consistent with the activities that any investment banker or sale advisor engaged to assist in the sale of a business would be expected to undertake;

(d) The selection of A&M as investment banker would not have had a detrimental effect on the SISP or the value of offers;

(e) Both key senior management and A&M were incentivised to achieve the best value available and there was no impediment to doing so;

(f) The SISP was undertaken in a thorough and professional manner;

(g) The results of the SISP clearly demonstrate that none of the interested parties would, or would be likely to, offer a price for the Nelson business that would be sufficient to repay the amounts owing to the first lien lenders under the first lien credit agreement

(h) The SISP was a thorough market test and can be relied on to establish that there is no value beyond the first lien debt.

36 The Monitor expressed the further view that:

(a) There is no realistic prospect that Nelson could obtain a new source of financing sufficient to repay the first lien debt;

(b) An alternative debt restructuring that might create value for the second lien lenders is not a viable alternative at this time;

(c) There is no reasonable prospect of a new sale process generating a transaction at a value in excess of the first lien debt;

(d) It does not appear that there are significant operational improvements reasonably available that would materially improve profitability in the short-term such that the value of the Nelson business would increase to the extent necessary to repay the first lien debt and, accordingly, there is no apparent benefit from delaying the sale of the business.

37 *Soundair* established factors to be considered in an application to approve a sale in a receivership. These factors have widely been considered in such applications in a CCAA proceeding. They are:

(a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the receiver or debtor (as applicable) has not acted improvidently;

(b) whether the interests of all parties have been considered;

(c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and

(d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

38 These factors are now largely mirrored in section 36(3) of the CCAA that requires a court to consider a number of factors, among other things, in deciding to authorize a sale of a debtor's assets. It is necessary to deal briefly with them.

> (a) Whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances. In this case, despite the fact that there was no prior court approval to the SISP, I accept the Monitor's view that the process was reasonable.
>
> (b) Whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition. In this case there was no monitor at the time of the SISP. This factor is thus not strictly applicable as it assumes a sale process undertaken in a CCAA proceeding. However, the report of FTI blessing the SISP that took place is an important factor to consider.
>
> (c) Whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy. The Monitor did not make such a statement in its report. However, there is no reason to think that a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy would be more beneficial to the creditors. The creditors negatively affected could not expect to fare better in a bankruptcy.
>
> (d) The extent to which the creditors were consulted. The first lien steering committee was obviously consulted. Before the SISP, RBC, the second lien lenders' agent, was consulted and actively participated in the reconstruction discussions. I take it from the evidence that RBC did not actively participate in the SISP, a decision of its choosing, but was provided some updates.
>
> (e) The effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties. The positive effect is that all ordinary course creditors, employees, suppliers and customers will be protected. The effect on the second lien lenders is to wipe out their security and any chance of their loans being repaid. However, apart from their being deemed to have consented to the sale, it is clear that the second lien lenders have no economic interest in the Nelson assets except as might be the case some years away if Nelson were able to improve its profitability to the point that the second lien lenders could be paid something towards the debt owed to them. RBC puts this time line as perhaps five years and it is clearly conjecture. The first lien lenders however are not obliged to wait in the hopes of some future result. As the senior secured creditor, they have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders.
>
> There are some excluded liabilities and a small amount owing to former terminated employees that will not be paid. As to these the Monitor points out that there is no reasonable prospect of any alternative solution that would provide a recovery for those creditors, all of whom rank subordinate to the first lien lenders.
>
> (f) Whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value. The Monitor is of the view that the results of the SISP indicate that the consideration is fair and reasonable in the circumstances and that the SISP can, and should, be relied on for the purposes of such a determination. There is no evidence to the contrary and I accept the view of the Monitor.

39 In the circumstances, taking into account the *Soundair* factors and the matters to be considered in section 36(3) of the CCAA, I am satisfied that the sale transaction should be approved. Whether the ancillary relief should be granted is a separate issue, to which I now turn.

(ii) Ancillary claimed relief

(a) Vesting order

40 The applicants seek a vesting order vesting all of Nelson's right, title and interest in and to the purchased assets in the purchaser, free and clear of all interests, liens, charges and encumbrances, other than the permitted encumbrances and assumed liabilities contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement. It is normal relief given in an asset sale under the CCAA and it is appropriate in this case.

TAB 7

1991 CarswellOnt 205
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v. SOUNDAIR CORPORATION (respondent), CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant) and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991
Judgment: July 3, 1991
Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.
J. T. Morin, Q.C. , for Air Canada.
L.A.J. Barnes and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.
S.F. Dunphy and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.
W.G. Horton , for Ontario Express Limited.
N.J. Spies , for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver
VII.6.a General conduct of receiver

Headnote

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed.

Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?

(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) , at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. It should consider the interests of all parties.

3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.

4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In do ing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* , supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

> Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it* . It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.
>
> If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) , at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

> In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

TAB 8

2019 ABCA 433
Alberta Court of Appeal

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd

2019 CarswellAlta 2418, 2019 ABCA 433, [2019] A.W.L.D. 4519, 312 A.C.W.S. (3d) 237, 74 C.B.R. (6th) 14, 98 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1

Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as Receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd. (Respondent / Cross-Appellants / Applicant) and 1905393 Alberta Ltd., David Podollan and Steller One Holdings Ltd. (Appellants / Cross-Respondents / Respondents) and Servus Credit Union Ltd., Ducor Properties Ltd., Northern Electric Ltd. and Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd. (Respondents / Interested Parties)

Thomas W. Wakeling, Dawn Pentelechuk, Jolaine Antonio JJ.A.

Heard: September 3, 2019
Judgment: November 14, 2019
Docket: Edmonton Appeal 1903-0134-AC

Counsel: D.M. Nowak, J.M. Lee, Q.C., for Respondent, Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.
D.R. Peskett, C.M. Young, for Appellants
C.P. Russell, Q.C., R.T. Trainer, for Respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd.
S.A. Wanke, for Respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd.
S.T. Fitzgerald, for Respondent, Northern Electric Ltd.
H.S. Kandola, for Respondent, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XVII Practice and procedure in courts
XVII.7 Appeals
XVII.7.e Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Appeals — Miscellaneous
Appellants appeal Approval and Vesting Order which approved sale proposed in Asset Purchase Agreement between Receiver, PWC, and respondent, D Ltd. — Appeal dismissed — Chambers judge was keenly alive to abbreviated marketing period and appraised values of hotels — Nevertheless, having regard to unique nature of property, incomplete construction of development hotel, difficulties with prospective purchasers in branding hotels in area outside of major centre and area which was in midst of economic downturn, she concluded that receiver acted in commercially reasonable manner and obtained best price possible in circumstances — Even with abbreviated period for submission of offers, chambers judge reasonably concluded that receiver undertook extensive marketing campaign, engaged commercial realtor and construction consultant, and consulted and dialogued with owner throughout process, which process appellants took no issue with, until offers were received.

Power Corp. v. R.J.K. Power Systems Ltd., 2002 ABCA 201 (Alta. C.A.) at para 4, (2002), 317 A.R. 192 (Alta. C.A.).

10 As regards the first question, the parties agree that Court approval requires the Receiver to satisfy the well-known test in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.) at para 16, (1991), 46 O.A.C. 321 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Soundair*"). That test requires the Court to consider four factors: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) whether the interests of all parties have been considered, not just the interests of the creditors of the debtor; (iii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and (iv) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

11 The appellants suggest that *Soundair* has been modified by our Court in *Bank of Montreal v. River Rentals Group Ltd.*, 2010 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A.) at para 13, (2010), 469 A.R. 333 (Alta. C.A.), to require an additional four factors in assessing whether a receiver has complied with its duties: (a) whether the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; (b) whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids; (c) whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; and (d) whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interests of either the creditor or the owner. The appellants argue that, although the chambers judge considered the *Soundair* factors, she erred by failing to consider the additional *River Rentals* factors and, in so doing, in effect applied the "wrong law".

12 We disagree. The chambers judge expressly referred to the *River Rentals* case. *River Rentals*, it must be recalled, simply identified a subset of factors that a Court might also consider when considering the first prong of the *Soundair* test as to whether a receiver failed to get the best price and has not acted providently. Moreover, the type of factors that might be considered is by no means a closed category and there may be other relevant factors that might lead a court to refuse to approve a sale: *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 65 A.R. 372 (Alta. C.A.) at paras 12-13. At its core, *River Rentals* highlights the need for a Court to balance several factors in determining whether a receiver complied with its duties and to confirm a sale. It did not purport to modify the *Soundair* test, establish a hierarchy of factors, nor limit the types of things that a Court might consider. The chambers judge applied the correct test. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

13 At its core, then, the appellants challenge how the chambers judge applied and weighed the relevant factors in this case. The appellants suggest that the failure to obtain a price at or close to the appraised value of the Hotels is an overriding factor that trumps all the others in assessing whether the Receiver acted improvidently. That is not the test. A reviewing Court's function is not to consider whether a Receiver has failed to get the best price. Rather, a Receiver's duty is to act in a commercially reasonable manner in the circumstances with a view to obtaining the best price having regard to the competing interests of the interested parties: *Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 4, [1999] O.J. No. 4300 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), aff'd on appeal (2000), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.).

14 Nor is it the Court's function to substitute its view of how a marketing process should proceed. The appellants suggest that if the Hotels were re-marketed with an exposure period closer to that which the appraisals were based on, then a better offer might be obtained. Again, that is not the test. The Receiver's decision to enter into an agreement for sale must be assessed under the circumstances then existing. The chambers judge was aware that the Receiver considered the risk of not accepting the approved offer to be significant. There was no assurance that a longer marketing period would generate a better offer and, in the interim, the Receiver was incurring significant carrying costs. To ignore these circumstances would improperly call into question a receiver's expertise and authority in the receivership process and thereby compromise the integrity of a sales process and would undermine the commercial certainty upon which court-supervised insolvency sales are based: *Soundair* at para 43. In such a case, chaos in the commercial world would result and "receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement": *Soundair* at para 22.

15 The fact that three of the four offers came in so close together in terms of amount, with the fourth one being even lower, is significant. Absent evidence of impropriety or collusion in the preparation of those confidential offers — of which there is absolutely none — the fact that those offers were all substantially lower than the appraised value speaks loudly to the existing hotel market in Grande Prairie. Moreover, the appellants have not brought any fresh evidence application to admit cogent evidence that a better offer might materialize if the Hotels were re-marketed. Indeed, the appellants have indicated that they do not rely on what the leave judge described as a "fairly continuous flow of material", the scent of which was to suggest that there were better offers waiting in the wings but were prevented from bidding because of the Receiver's abbreviated marketing process. Clearly the impression meant to be created by that late flow of material was an important

TAB 9

2015 QCCS 1920
Cour supérieure du Québec

Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re

2015 CarswellQue 4072, 2015 QCCS 1920, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 1, J.E. 2015-830, EYB 2015-251727

In the matter of the companies' creditors arrangement act, r.s.c. 1985, c. C-36, as amended: Bloom lake General Partner Limited, Quinto Mining Corporation, 8568391 Canada Limited and Cliffs Québec Iron mining ULC, Petitioners, and The bloom lake iron ore mine limited partnership and Bloom lake railway company limited, Mises en cause, and FTI Consulting Cananda Inc., Monitor, and 9201955 Canada inc., Mise en cause, and Eabametoong first nation, Ginoogaming first nation, Constance Lake first nation and Long Lake # 58 first nation, Aroland first nation and Marten Falls first nation, Objectors, and 8901341 Canada inc. and Canadian Development And Marketing Corporation, Interveners

Hamilton J.C.S.

Heard: 24 april 2015
Judgment: 27 april 2015
Docket: C.S. Qué. Montréal 500-11-048114-157

Counsel: Me Bernard Boucher, Me Sébastien Guy, Me Steven J. Weisz for Bloom Lake General Partner Limited, Quinto Mining Corporation, 8568391 Canada Limited, Cliffs Quebec Iron Mining ULC, The Bloom Lake Iron Ore Mine Limited Partnership, Bloom Lake Railway Company Limited
Me Sylvain Rigaud, Me Chrystal Ashby for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Me Jean-Yves Simard, Me Sean Zweig for 9201955 Canada Inc.
Me Stéphane Hébert, Me Maurice Fleming for Eabametoong First Nation Ginoogaming First Nation, Constance Lake First Nation and Long Lake # 58 First Nation, Aroland First Nation, Marten Falls First Nation
Me Sandra Abitan, Me Éric Préfontaine, Me Julien Morissette for 8901341 Canada inc. Canadian Development and Marketing Corporation

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency; Public

Related Abridgment Classifications

Aboriginal and Indigenous law
XII Miscellaneous

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

Civil practice and procedure
III Parties
III.4 Standing

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous
Sellers, who were parent company and affiliates of petitioners, sought to sell interests in chromite mining projects in Ring of Fire mining district — Sellers executed initial Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with N, which made provision for "superior proposal" mechanism allowing sellers to accept unsolicited, superior offer from third party — Petitioners commenced motion for issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to initial SPA — C made unsolicited, superior offer — Sellers developed supplemental bid process giving C and N chance to submit their best and final offers — Sellers ultimately accepted N's higher bidding offer and entered into revised SPA with N — Petitioners amended their motion to seek issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to revised SPA — Ruling was made on petitioners' amended motion — Motion was granted — Sale process was fair, reasonable and efficient within s. 36(3)(a) of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — There was no legal requirement that sale process be approved in advance — Sellers had no obligation to accept C's unsolicited and superior offer and to terminate initial SPA — Initial SPA permitted sellers to terminate it, but did not require them to do so — Sellers' supplemental bid process was very reasonable and fair, and in best interests of creditors — N submitted its offer in compliance with rules, and there was no fundamental flaw in process such as parties having unequal access to information or one party seeking to amend its offer after it had knowledge of other offers.

Aboriginal and indigenous law --- Miscellaneous
Sellers, who were parent company and affiliates of petitioners, sought to sell interests in chromite mining projects in Ring of Fire mining district — Sellers executed initial Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with N, which made provision for "superior proposal" mechanism allowing sellers to accept unsolicited, superior offer from third party — Petitioners commenced motion for issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to initial SPA — First Nations bands filed objection to motion — Following C's unsolicited superior offer and supplemental bidding process, sellers accepted N's highest bidding offer and entered into revised SPA with N — Petitioners amended their motion to seek issuance of approval and vesting order with respect to revised SPA, but First Nations bands maintained their objection — Ruling was made on petitioners' amended motion — Motion was granted — It was not clear to what extent First Nations bands had knowledge of sale process and could have participated — There was no evidence to suggest that bands on their own could have made serious offer, or that they would have partnered with party that was not already identified and included in process — It was pure speculation whether First Nations would have presented offer in excess of N's offer — Sale of shares from one private party to another did not trigger duty to consult First Nations — It was difficult to see how granting of two or three percent royalty impacted rights of First Nations bands.

Civil practice and procedure --- Parties — Standing
Parties had standing and their objections were not dismissed due to lack of interest or standing.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Divers
Vendeurs, qui représentaient la société mère et les filiales des pétitionnaires, voulaient vendre leurs intérêts dans les projets miniers de chromite dans le district minier du Cercle de Feu — Vendeurs ont signé avec N une convention d'achat d'actions prévoyant un mécanisme de [TRADUCTION] « propositions supérieures » qui permettait aux vendeurs d'accepter des offres supérieures non-sollicitées — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête en vue d'obtenir une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention — C a fait une offre supérieure non-sollicitée — Vendeurs ont élaboré un processus de soumissions supplémentaire permettant à C et N de présenter leurs meilleures offres finales — Vendeurs ont accepté l'offre supérieure de N et ont signé une convention d'achat d'actions révisée avec N — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête modifiée en vue de l'émission d'une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention révisée — Décision a été rendue à la suite du dépôt de la requête modifiée par les pétitionnaires — Requête a été accordée — Processus de vente a été équitable, raisonnable et efficace au regard de l'art. 36(3)a) de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Il n'existait aucune obligation juridique de faire approuver la vente à l'avance — Vendeurs n'avaient pas l'obligation d'accepter l'offre supérieure non-sollicitée de C et de mettre fin à la convention initiale — Convention initiale autorisait les vendeurs à y mettre fin, mais ne l'exigeait pas — Processus de soumissions supplémentaire des vendeurs était très raisonnable et équitable, et dans le meilleur intérêt des créanciers — N a présenté son offre en conformité avec les règles, donc il n'y avait pas d'erreur fondamentale dans le processus qui aurait eu pour effet de rendre inégal l'accès des parties à l'information ou qui aurait fait en sorte qu'une partie modifie son offre après avoir eu connaissance d'autres offres.

Droit autochtone --- Divers
Vendeurs, qui représentaient la société mère et les filiales des pétitionnaires, voulaient vendre leurs intérêts dans les projets miniers de chromite dans le district minier du Cercle de Feu — Vendeurs ont signé avec N une convention d'achat d'actions

prévoyant un mécanisme de [TRADUCTION] « propositions supérieures » qui permettait aux vendeurs d'accepter des offres supérieures non-sollicitées — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête en vue d'obtenir une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention — Bandes de Premières Nations ont soulevé une objection à l'encontre de la requête — Suite à l'offre supérieure et non-sollicitée de C et au processus de soumissions supplémentaire, vendeurs ont accepté l'offre supérieure de N et ont signé une convention d'achat d'actions révisée avec N — Vendeurs ont accepté l'offre supérieure de N et ont signé une convention d'achat d'actions révisée avec N — Pétitionnaires ont déposé une requête modifiée en vue de l'émission d'une ordonnance d'approbation et d'acquisition portant sur la convention révisée, mais les bandes de Premières Nations ont maintenu leur objection — Décision a été rendue à la suite du dépôt de la requête modifiée par les pétitionnaires — Requête a été accordée — On ignorait ce que les bandes de Premières Nations savaient du processus de vente et dans quelle mesure elles auraient pu y participer — Il n'existait aucun élément de preuve laissant croire que les bandes auraient pu, d'elles-mêmes, faire une offre sérieuse ou qu'elles auraient pu s'entendre avec une partie au processus qui n'était pas déjà identifiée — Hypothèse selon laquelle les Premières Nations auraient pu présenter une offre supérieure à l'offre de N relevait de la pure spéculation — Vente d'actions d'une partie privée à une autre partie privée n'a pas déclenché l'obligation de consulter les Premières Nations — Il était difficile d'imaginer comment l'octroi de deux ou trois points de pourcentage en termes de redevances pouvait avoir un impact sur les droits des bandes de Premières Nations.

Procédure civile --- Parties — Intérêt pour agir
Objections des parties n'ont pas été rejetées en raison de leur manque d'intérêt ou d'intérêt pour agir.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Hamilton J.C.S.*:

AbitibiBowater Inc., Re (2009), 2009 QCCS 6460, 2009 CarswellQue 14189 (C.S. Que.) — followed

AbitibiBowater Inc., Re (2010), 2010 QCCS 1742, 2010 CarswellQue 4082, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220 (C.S. Que.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5319, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Aveos Fleet Performance Inc./Aveos performance aéronautique inc., Re (2012), 2012 QCCS 4074, 2012 CarswellQue 8620 (C.S. Que.) — considered

BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc. (2009), 2009 ONCA 665, 2009 CarswellOnt 5535, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 186 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 753, [2004] R.J.Q. 965, 5 C.B.R. (5th) 197 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABQB 442, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v. British Columbia (Utilities Commission) (2010), 2010 SCC 43, 2010 CarswellBC 2867, 2010 CarswellBC 2868, 96 R.P.R. (4th) 1, [2010] 11 W.W.R. 577, 54 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, 9 B.C.L.R. (5th) 205, *(*sub nom. *Rio Tinto Alcon Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council)* [2010] 4 C.N.L.R. 250, 406 N.R. 333, 325 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 11 Admin. L.R. (5th) 246, 293 B.C.A.C. 175, 496 W.A.C. 175, *(*sub nom. *Rio Tinto Alcon Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council)* [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, *(*sub nom. *Rio Tinto Alcon Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council)* 225 C.R.R. (2d) 75 (S.C.C.) — followed

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 150 O.A.C. 384, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208, [2001] O.T.C. 459 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

> (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
>
> (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.
>
> (6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

. . .

26 The criteria in Section 36(3) of the CCAA have been held not to be cumulative or exhaustive. The Court must look at the proposed transaction as a whole and decide whether it is appropriate, fair and reasonable:

> [48] The elements which can be found in Section 36 CCAA are, first of all, not limitative and secondly they need not to be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.
>
> [49] The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the process for reasons others than those mentioned in Section 36 CCAA or refuse to grant it for reasons which are not mentioned in Section 36 CCAA.[16]

27 Further, in the context of one of the asset sales in *AbitibiBowater*, Mr. Justice Gascon, then of this Court, adopted the following list of relevant factors:

> [36] The Court has jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of CCAA proceedings, notably when such a sale of assets is in the best interest of the stakeholders generally.
>
> [37] In determining whether to authorize a sale of assets under the CCAA, the Court should consider, amongst others, the following key factors:
>
> • have sufficient efforts to get the best price been made and have the parties acted providently;
>
> • the efficacy and integrity of the process followed;
>
> • the interests of the parties; and
>
> • whether any unfairness resulted from the working out process.
>
> [38] These principles were enunciated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* They are equally applicable in a CCAA sale situation.[17]

28 The Court must give due consideration to two further elements in assessing whether the sale should be approved under Section 36 CCAA:

> 1. the business judgment rule:
>
> [70] That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.
>
> [71] A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.[18]

> 2. the weight to be given to the recommendation of the Monitor:
>
> The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with the Court in any approval process. Absent some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, a Court should accept an applicant's proposed sale process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the stakeholders.[19]

29 Debtors often ask the Court to authorize the sale process in advance. This has the advantage of ensuring that the process is clear and of reducing the likelihood of a subsequent challenge. In the present matter, the Petitioners did seek the Court's authorization with respect to a sale process for their other assets, but they did not seek the Court's authorization with respect to the sale process for the Ring of Fire interests because that sale process was already well under way before the CCAA filing. There is no legal requirement that the sale process be approved in advance, but it creates the potential for the process being challenged after the fact, as in this case.

30 The Court will therefore review the sale process in light of these factors.

(1) From October 2014 to the execution of the Noront letter of intent on February 13, 2015

31 The sale process began in earnest in October 2014 when Cliffs engaged Moelis.

32 Moelis identified a group of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners, with the assistance of CQIM and Cliffs. The group included traders, resource buyers, financial sector participants, local strategic partners, and market participants, as well as parties who had previously expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire.

33 Moelis began contacting the potential interested parties to solicit interest in purchasing the Ring of Fire project. It sent a form of non-disclosure agreement to fifteen parties. Fourteen executed the agreement and were given access to certain confidential information.

34 Negotiations ensued with seven of the interested parties, and six were given access to the data room that was established in November 2014.

35 By January 21, 2015, non-binding letters of intent were received from Noront and from a third party. There were also two verbal expressions of interest, but neither resulted in a letter of intent.

36 The Noront letter of intent was determined by the sellers in consultation with Moelis and the Monitor to be the better offer. Moelis then contacted all parties who had indicated a preliminary level of interest to give them the opportunity to submit a letter of intent in a price range superior to the Noront letter of intent, but no such letter was received.

37 Negotiations continued with Noront and a letter of intent was executed with Noront on February 13, 2015.[20]

38 With respect to this portion of the process, CDM does not raise any issue but the First Nations bands complain that they were not included in the list of potential interested parties and were not otherwise consulted.

39 The Court will discuss the special status of the First Nations bands in the next section of this judgment. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that the sale process must be reasonable, but is not required to be perfect. Even if the initial list of eighteen potential buyers and strategic partners omitted some potential buyers, this is not a basis for the Court to intervene, provided that the sellers, with Moelis and the Monitor, took reasonable steps.[21] The Court is satisfied that this test was met.

(2) From letter of intent to initial SPA

40 Between February 13, 2015 and March 22, 2015, the sellers negotiated the SPA with Noront and signed the initial SPA. In that same period, CDM expressed an interest in the Ring of Fire interests and sent three separate offers, all of which were refused by the sellers.

TAB 10

Court File No. CV-19-00632079-00CL

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	TUESDAY, THE 21ST
	)	
JUSTICE HAINEY	)	DAY OF APRIL, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF WAYLAND GROUP CORP., MARICANN INC. AND NANOLEAF TECHNOLOGIES INC.

(collectively, the "**Applicants**" and each an "**Applicant**")

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicants, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**"), for an order, *inter alia*, (i) approving the Share Purchase Agreement (the "**Sale Agreement**") among Wayland Group Corp. ("**Wayland**"), Maricann Inc. ("**Maricann**"), and Canadelaar B.V. (the "**Purchaser**") dated April 15, 2020 and attached as Exhibit "A" to the affidavit of Matthew McLeod sworn April 15, 2020 (the "**Seventh McLeod Affidavit**") and the transactions contemplated thereby (the "**Transactions**"), (ii) adding 2751609 Ontario Inc. ("**Residual Co**") as an Applicant to these CCAA proceedings, (iii) vesting all of Maricann's right, title and interest in and to the Excluded Assets (as defined in the Sale Agreement) in Residual Co, (iv) transferring and vesting all of the Excluded Contracts and Excluded Liabilities in Residual Co, (v) vesting all of Wayland's right, title and interest in and to the Transferred Assets (as defined in the Sale Agreement) in Maricann, (vi) vesting all of the right, title and interest in and to the Maricann Shares (as defined in the Sale

Agreement) in the Purchaser, (vii) granting the Payables Charge (as defined below), and (viii) granting certain related relief, was heard this day in writing at Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Notice of Motion of the Applicants, the Seventh McLeod Affidavit, the sixth report of PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., in its capacity as monitor of the Applicants (the "**Monitor**"), dated April 16, 2020, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, the Monitor, the Purchaser, the DIP Lender and such other counsel as were present, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Karin Sachar sworn April 16, 2020:

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

DEFINED TERMS

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that capitalized terms used in this Order and not otherwise defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the Seventh McLeod Affidavit and/or the Sale Agreement and/or the Second Amended and Restated Initial Order of this Court in the within proceedings dated December 2, 2019 (as amended and restated on December 16, 2019 and otherwise modified, the "**Initial Order**"), as applicable.

APPROVAL AND VESTING

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Sale Agreement and the Transactions are hereby approved and the execution of the Sale Agreement by Wayland and Maricann is hereby authorized and approved, with such minor amendments as the parties thereto may deem necessary, with the approval of the Monitor and the DIP Lender. The Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to perform their obligations under the Sale Agreement and to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transactions and for the conveyance of the Maricann Shares to the Purchaser.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by the Applicants to proceed with the Transactions (including, for certainty, the Pre-Closing Reorganization) and that no shareholder or other approval shall be required in connection therewith.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, upon the delivery of the Monitor's certificate (the "**Monitor's Certificate**") to the Purchaser (the "**Effective Time**"), substantially in the form attached as Schedule "A" hereto , the following shall occur and shall be deemed to have occurred at the Effective Time in the following sequence:

(a) first, all of Maricann's right, title and interest in and to the Excluded Assets shall vest absolutely and exclusively in Residual Co, and all Claims and Encumbrances (each as defined below) shall continue to attach to the Excluded Assets with the same nature and priority as they had immediately prior to their transfer;

(b) second, (i) all of Wayland's right, title and interest in and to the Transferred Assets shall vest absolutely and exclusively in Maricann free and clear of and from any and all Claims and Encumbrances (each as defined below); and (ii) all Assumed Liabilities which are to be assigned by Wayland to, and assumed by Maricann pursuant to the Sale Agreement shall be and are hereby assigned to, assumed by and shall vest absolutely and exclusively in Maricann; and for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Transferred Assets are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Transferred Assets;

(c) third, all Excluded Contracts and Excluded Liabilities (which, for certainty includes all debts, liabilities, obligations, indebtedness, contracts, leases, agreements, and undertakings of any kind or nature whatsoever (whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise) of Maricann other than the Assumed Liabilities) shall be transferred to, assumed by and vest absolutely and exclusively in, Residual Co such that the Excluded Contracts and Excluded Liabilities shall become obligations of Residual Co and shall no longer be

obligations of Maricann, and Maricann and all of its assets, licenses, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever and wherever situate (including, for certainty, the Transferred Assets and the Retained Assets, the "**Maricann Property**") shall be and are hereby forever released and discharged from such Excluded Contracts and Excluded Liabilities and all related Claims (as defined below), and all Encumbrances (as defined below) affecting or relating to the Maricann Property are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Maricann Property;

(d) fourth, all options, conversion privileges, equity-based awards, warrants, securities, debentures, loans, notes or other rights, agreements or commitments of any character whatsoever that are held by any Person (as defined below) and are convertible or exchangeable for any securities of Maricann or which require the issuance, sale or transfer by Maricann, of any shares or other securities of Maricann, or otherwise evidencing a right to acquire the Maricann Shares and/or the share capital of Maricann, or otherwise relating thereto, shall be deemed terminated and cancelled; and

(e) fifth, all of the right, title and interest in and to the Maricann Shares shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "**Claims**") including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Initial Order, the KERP & SISP Approval Order of this Court dated January 13, 2020, or any other Order of the Court; (ii) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or any other personal property registry system; and (iii) those Claims listed on Schedule "B" hereto (all of which are collectively referred to as the "**Encumbrances**", which term shall not include the permitted encumbrances, easements and restrictive covenants listed on Schedule "C" hereto) and, for

greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Maricann Shares are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Maricann Shares; and

(f) sixth, Maricann shall and shall be deemed to cease to be an Applicant in these CCAA proceedings, and Maricann shall be deemed to be released from the purview of the Initial Order and all other Orders of this Court granted in respect of these CCAA proceedings, save and except for this Order the provisions of which (as they relate to Maricann) shall continue to apply in all respects.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that upon the registration in the Land Registry Office #37 for the Land Titles Division of Norfolk (Simcoe) of an Application for Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Land Titles Act* (Ontario) and/or the *Land Registration Reform Act* (Ontario), the Land Registrar is hereby directed to vacate and expunge from title to the subject real property identified in Schedule "D" hereto (the "**Real Property**") all of the Claims listed in Schedule "B" hereto.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof in connection with the Transactions.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor may rely on written notice from Wayland and the Purchaser regarding the fulfillment of conditions to closing under the Sale Agreement and shall have no liability with respect to delivery of the Monitor's Certificate.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims, the net proceeds from the sale of the Maricann Shares (including, for greater certainty, the net proceeds realized from the Cash Payment and any Conditional Payments) (the "**Proceeds**") shall stand in the place and stead of the Maricann Shares, and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate and the payment of the Priority Payments pursuant to paragraph 27 hereof, all Claims and Encumbrances shall attach to the remaining Proceeds, if any, following the payment of the Priority Payments with the same priority as they had with respect to the Maricann Shares immediately prior to the sale, as if the Maricann Shares had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the Person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the Canada *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, the Applicants or the Monitor, as the case may be, is authorized, permitted and directed to, at the Effective Time, disclose to the Purchaser all human resources and payroll information in Maricann's records pertaining to past and current employees of Maricann. The Purchaser shall maintain and protect the privacy of such information in accordance with applicable law and shall be entitled to use the personal information provided to it in a manner which is in all material respects identical to the prior use of such information by Maricann.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, at the Effective Time and without limiting the provisions of paragraph 5 hereof, the Purchaser and Maricann shall be deemed released from any and all claims, liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent) or obligations with respect to any Taxes (including penalties and interest thereon) of, or that relate to, the Applicants (provided, as it relates to Maricann, such release shall not apply to Taxes in respect of the business and operations conducted by Maricann after the Effective Time), including without limiting the generality of the foregoing all taxes that could be assessed against the Purchaser or Maricann (including its affiliates and any predecessor corporations) pursuant to section 160 of the *Income Tax Act* (Canada), or any provincial equivalent, in connection with the Applicants.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except to the extent expressly contemplated by the Sale Agreement, all Contracts to which Maricann is a party upon delivery of the Monitor's Certificate (including, for certainty, those Contracts constituting Transferred Assets) will be and remain in full force and effect upon and following delivery of the Monitor's Certificate and no individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entity (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") who is a party to any such arrangement may accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of set-off, dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such arrangement and no automatic termination will have any validity or effect, by reason of:

(a) any event that occurred on or prior to the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate and is not continuing that would have entitled such Person to enforce those rights or

remedies (including defaults or events of default arising as a result of the insolvency of any Applicant);

(b) the insolvency of any Applicant or the fact that the Applicants sought or obtained relief under the CCAA;

(c) any compromises, releases, discharges, cancellations, transactions, arrangements, reorganizations or other steps taken or effected pursuant to the Sale Agreement, the Transactions or the provisions of this Order, or any other Order of the Court in these proceedings; or

(d) any transfer or assignment, or any change of control of Maricann arising from the implementation of the Sale Agreement, the Transactions or the provisions of this Order.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS**, for greater certainty, that (a) nothing in paragraph 12 hereof shall waive, compromise or discharge any obligations of Maricann in respect of any Assumed Liabilities, and (b) the designation of any Claim as an Assumed Liability is without prejudice to Maricann's right to dispute the existence, validity or quantum of any such Assumed Liability, and (c) nothing in this Order or the Sale Agreement shall affect or waive Maricann's rights and defences, both legal and equitable, with respect to any Assumed Liability, including, but not limited to, all rights with respect to entitlements to set-offs or recoupments against such Assumed Liability.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Effective Time, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of any Applicant then existing or previously committed by any Applicant, or caused by any Applicant, directly or indirectly, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, undertaking, positive or negative pledge, term, provision, condition or obligation, expressed or implied, in any Contract, existing between such Person and Maricann (including, for certainty, those Contracts constituting Transferred Assets) arising directly or indirectly from the filing by the Applicants under the CCAA and the implementation of the Transactions, including without limitation any of the matters or events listed in paragraph 12 hereof and any and all notices of default and demands for payment or any step or proceeding taken or commenced in connection therewith under a

Contract shall be deemed to have been rescinded and of no further force or effect, provided that nothing herein shall be deemed to excuse Maricann or Wayland from performing their obligations under the Sale Agreement or be a waiver of defaults by Maricann or Wayland under the Sale Agreement and the related documents.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Effective Time, any and all Persons shall be and are hereby forever barred, estopped, stayed and enjoined from commencing, taking, applying for or issuing or continuing any and all steps or proceedings, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, and including without limitation, administrative hearings and orders, declarations and assessment, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced, taken or proceeded with against Maricann or the Maricann Property relating in any way to or in respect of any Excluded Assets or Excluded Liabilities and any other claims, Obligations and other matters which are waived, released, expunged or discharged pursuant to this Order.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, from and after the Effective Time:

(a) the nature of the Assumed Liabilities retained by Maricann, including, without limitation, their amount and their secured or unsecured status, shall not be affected or altered as a result of the Transactions or this Order;

(b) the nature of the Excluded Liabilities, including, without limitation, their amount and their secured or unsecured status, shall not be affected or altered as a result of their transfer to Residual Co;

(c) any Person that prior to the Effective Time had a valid right or claim against Maricann under or in respect of any Excluded Contract or Excluded Liability (each an "**Excluded Liability Claim**") shall no longer have such right or claim against Maricann but will have an equivalent Excluded Liability Claim against Residual Co in respect of the Excluded Contract and Excluded Liability from and after the Effective Time in its place and stead, and nothing in this Order limits, lessens or extinguishes the Excluded Liability Claim of any Person as against Residual Co; and

(d) the Excluded Liability Claim of any Person against Residual Co following the Effective Time shall have the same rights, priority and entitlement as such Excluded Liability Claim had against Maricann prior to the Effective Time.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, as of the Effective Time:

(a) Residual Co shall be a company to which the CCAA applies; and

(b) Residual Co shall be added as an Applicant in these CCAA proceedings and all references in any Order of this Court in respect of these CCAA proceedings to (i) an "Applicant" or the "Applicants" shall refer to and include Residual Co, *mutatis mutandis*, and (ii) "Property" shall include the current and future assets, licenses, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof, of Residual Co. (the "**Residual Co. Property**"), and, for greater certainty, each of the Charges (as defined in the Initial Order and including for greater certainty the Payables Charge (as defined below)), shall constitute a charge on the Residual Co. Property.

CLOSING FUNDING AND CHARGE

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Closing Funding is hereby approved, and Wayland is hereby authorized and empowered to obtain and borrow the Closing Funding from the Purchaser (or one of its Affiliates) (the "**Closing Funding Lender**") in accordance with the terms of the Sale Agreement, provided that such Closing Funding shall not exceed the aggregate principal amount of $1,000,000 and that the Closing Funding shall be on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Sale Agreement and, without limitation, shall be used solely for the purposes set out in the Sale Agreement.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Closing Funding Lender shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "**Payables Charge**") on the Property of the Applicants (including the entitlement of any Applicant to receive the Conditional Payments), which Payables Charge shall not secure an obligation that exists before this Order is made. The Closing Funding Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraph 22 hereof.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order:

(a) the Purchaser may take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to file, register, record or perfect the Payables Charge; and

(b) upon the failure of the Applicants to comply with their obligations under the Sale Agreement as they relate to the Closing Funding (including the use and repayment thereof), the Purchaser, upon seven (7) days' notice to the Applicants and the Monitor, may exercise any and all of its rights and remedies against the Applicants or the Property under or pursuant to the Sale Agreement and the Payables Charge, including to apply for the appointment of a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or for a bankruptcy order against the Applicants.

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Purchaser shall be treated as unaffected in any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by any Applicant under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by any Applicant under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) (the "**BIA**"), with respect to any advances of Closing Funding made under the Sale Agreement.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Payables Charge shall rank in priority to all Encumbrances (as defined in the Initial Order) other than the Administration Charge, the Directors' Priority Charge, the KERP Charge, and the DIP Lender's Charge, and the priority as among the Charges shall be as follows:

First – Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $1,000,000);

Second – Directors' Priority Charge (to the maximum amount of $200,000);

Third – KERP Charge (to the maximum amount of $500,000);

Fourth – DIP Lender's Charge;

Fifth – Payables Charge (to the maximum amount of $1,000,000); and

Sixth – Directors' Subordinate Charge (to the maximum amount of $250,000).

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Payables Charge shall not be required, and that the Payables Charge shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected

subsequent to the Payables Charge coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicants shall not grant any Encumbrances (as defined in the Initial Order) over any of their Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, the Payables Charge unless the Applicants also obtain the prior written consent of the Closing Funding Lender and the beneficiaries of the Directors' Subordinate Charge.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sale Agreement (as it pertains to the Closing Funding) and the Payables Charge shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the Purchaser thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances (as defined in the Initial Order), contained in any Agreement which binds any of the Applicants, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(a) neither the creation of the Payables Charge nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of the Sale Agreement shall create or be deemed to constitute a breach by any Applicant of any Agreement to which it is a party; and

(b) the Purchaser and the Closing Funding Lender shall have no liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from Wayland and Maricann entering into the Sale Agreement or the creation of the Payables Charge.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Payables Charge over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the Applicants' interest in such real property leases.

PRIORITY PAYMENTS

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS** that the Proceeds shall be distributed by the Monitor as soon as is practicable following the Effective Time through the following payments in the following order (collectively, the "**Priority Payments**"):

(a) First, an amount equal to $100,000 to the Monitor to establish the Post-Closing Reserve (as defined below);

(b) Second, to the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge, on a *pro rata* basis, in satisfaction of the Applicants' obligations secured thereby up to the maximum amount secured by such charge and set out in Paragraph 22 hereof;

(c) Third, to the beneficiaries of the Directors' Priority Charge, on a *pro rata* basis, in satisfaction of the Applicants' obligations secured thereby (if any) up to the maximum amount secured by such charge and set out in Paragraph 22 hereof;

(d) Fourth, to the beneficiaries of the KERP Charge, on a *pro rata* basis, in satisfaction of the Applicants' obligations secured thereby (if any) up to the maximum amount secured by such charge and set out in Paragraph 22 hereof;

(e) Fifth, to the DIP Lender in satisfaction of the DIP Obligations (as defined in the Initial Order) secured by the DIP Lender's Charge;

(f) Sixth, to the Closing Funding Lender in satisfaction of the Applicants' obligations secured by the Payables Charge; and

(g) Seventh, to the beneficiaries of the Directors' Subordinate Charge, on a *pro rata* basis, in satisfaction of the Applicants' obligations secured thereby (if any) up to the maximum amount secured by such charge.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any remainder of the Proceeds following the payment in full of the Priority Payments shall be held by the Monitor pending further order of the Court, subject to paragraphs 29 and 30 of this Order.

POST-CLOSING RESERVE

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is hereby authorized and directed to establish a cash reserve (the "**Post-Closing Reserve**") from the Proceeds, which shall be held in a segregated account and shall be used to pay costs and fees incurred by the Monitor or the Applicants following the Effective Time in connection with completing these CCAA proceedings, including for greater certainty, (i) the fees and disbursements of the Applicants' counsel, the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and other professionals engaged by the Applicants or the Monitor incurred following the Effective Time, including in the exercise of the Applicants' and Monitor's powers and duties pursuant to the CCAA, the Initial Order, this Order, and any other Order granted in these proceedings, and (ii) any fees, expenses, or disbursements incurred in relation to any proceeding under the BIA in respect of any of the Applicants (collectively, the "**Post-Closing Costs**").

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor is hereby authorized to pay any Post-Closing Costs in its own name or in the name of and on behalf of the Applicants, as it deems necessary, appropriate, or desirable, in its discretion.

RELEASES

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that effective upon the filing of the Monitor's Certificate, (i) the current directors, officers, employees, legal counsel and advisors of the Applicants (including, for certainty, Maricann), and (ii) the Monitor and its legal counsel (collectively, the "**Released Parties**") shall be deemed to be forever irrevocably released and discharged from any and all present and future claims (including, without limitations, claims for contribution or indemnity), liabilities, indebtedness, demands, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, damages, judgments, executions, recoupments, debts, sums of money, expenses, accounts, liens, taxes, recoveries, and obligations of any nature or kind whatsoever (whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise) based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place prior to the filing of the Monitor's Certificate (a) undertaken or completed pursuant to the terms of this Order, or (b) arising in connection with or relating to the SPA or the completion of the Transaction (collectively, the "**Released Claims**"), which

Released Claims are hereby fully, finally, irrevocably and forever waived, discharged, released, cancelled and barred as against the Released Parties, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall waive, discharge, release, cancel or bar any claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA or that arose in or relates to the period prior to the granting of the Initial Order. For greater certainty, nothing in this paragraph 31: (i) affects any claims against the directors and officers of any of the Applicants for breach of trust arising from acts or omissions occurring before the date of the Initial Order; or (ii) releases, fetters or prejudices: (a) the right of any person or entity to commence a claim against Wayland Group Corp. or any directors and officers of Wayland Group Corp. with respect to the class action or the issues giving rise to the class action against Wayland Group Corp., including without limitation for contribution and indemnity, or contractual indemnity (in each case subject to the stay of proceedings); and (b) the availability of any applicable insurance to satisfy such class action claims (including any future cross and third party claims).

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

(a) the pendency of these proceedings;

(b) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the BIA in respect of the Applicants and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and

(c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of the Applicants;

the Sale Agreement, the implementation of the Transactions (including without limitation the transfer and vesting of the Excluded Assets, Excluded Contract and Excluded Liabilities in and to Residual Co, the transfer and vesting of the Transferred Assets in and to Maricann, and the transfer and vesting of the Maricann Shares in and to the Purchaser), the payment of the Priority Payments, the granting of the Payables Charge, and any payments by or to the Purchaser, the Closing Funding Lender, the Applicants or the Monitor authorized herein shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of the Applicants and/or Residual Co and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Applicants or Residual Co, as applicable, nor shall they constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue, or other reviewable transaction under the CCAA, the BIA or

any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall they constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

GENERAL

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, following the Effective Time, the Purchaser shall be authorized to take all steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of the Claims and Encumbrances as against the Maricann Shares and the Maricann Property.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, following the Effective Time, the title of these proceedings is hereby changed to:

> IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED
>
> AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF WAYLAND GROUP CORP., 2751609 ONTARIO INC. AND NANOLEAF TECHNOLOGIES INC.

35. **THIS COURT DECLARES** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

36. **THIS COURT DECLARES** that the Applicants shall be authorized to apply as they may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement this Order and, without limitation to the foregoing, an order under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for which the Monitor shall be the foreign representative of the Applicants. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.

37. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the

Applicants and the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Prevailing Eastern Time on the date hereof.

Hainey J.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

APR 2 1 2020

PER / PAR:

TAB 11

July 17/15

R.J. Chadwick and R. Wolfen for the applicants
A. Taylor for the Monitor
S. Weisz for North Shore Power Groups Inc., secured creditor
S. Vora Allen for Canadian Water Projects, secured creditor
J. Mieha for the City of Ottawa
L. Brost for the Ministry of Research and Innovation of Ontario
M. Wasserk for the Employees Committee

The applicants seek approval of (1) a sale transaction with Maynards Industries Ltd. ("Maynards") of certain equipment (the "Equipment"); and (2) settlement agreements among (i) the applicants, Plasco Energy ~~Group~~ Inc. L.P. Holdings S.à.r.l., North Shore Power Groups Inc. ("NSPG") and Canadian Water Projects ("CWP"), referred to as the "Global Settlement", and (ii) among Plasco Energy Group Inc. ("Plasco"), Plasco Trail Road Inc. ("PTR") and the Ministry of Research and Innovation of the Province of Ontario ("MRI"), referred to as the "MRI Settlement". These agreements collectively form a package intended to sell the principal assets of the applicants and ensure the demolition of the applicants' demonstration facility with a view to advancing significantly the winding up and liquidation process of the applicants.

With respect to the Maynards sale agreement, the record establishes that the requirements of s. 36 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") as well as the test set out in Royal Bank v Soundair Corp. have been satisfied. In particular, the transaction is the result of an extensive sales process which failed to

produce any bids for the applicants' business as an entirety and represents the best of the remaining share and liquidation bids. The applicants also consulted with the secured creditors, who support the transaction, as well as the other creditors and stakeholders likely to be affected by the transaction. In this regard, there is no evidence of any unfairness in the sales process. Accordingly, this transaction is approved.

With respect to the settlement agreements, the CCAA gives the Court the authority to approve such agreements under section 11 provided always that the approval furthers the purposes of the CCAA which, in this case, entails an orderly wind-up of the applicants' business and a maximization of recoveries for its creditors and other stakeholders. The test for approval requires demonstration that: (1) the settlement is fair and reasonable; (2) the settlement will be beneficial to the debtor and its stakeholders generally; and (3) that the settlement is consistent with the purpose and spirit of the CCAA. I am satisfied that each of the proposed settlements meets this test for the following reasons.

With respect to the Global Settlement, the agreement ~~transfers~~ effectively transfers the current tax losses and the applicants' intellectual property on a basis which recognizes value for such assets after the failure of the sales process to identify a better offer for the applicants' business as an entirety. In doing so, it also recognizes the security in the intellectual property that currently exists in favour of

NSPG and CWP. The settlement advances the CCAA proceedings insofar as it provides for disposition of the assets leased by these parties to the applicants and thereby for the decommissioning of the demonstration facility in a cost effective way through the Maynards transaction. As such, the Global Settlement addresses the requirements of fairness and reasonableness and is consistent with the purpose of the CCAA. While it appears the shareholders will have no economic interest in the applicants, the settlement is also supported by creditors having approximately 95% of all known unsecured obligations of the applicants, upon which, in addition to the facts above, the Court can rely as evidence that the settlement is beneficial to the applicants and the shareholders generally.

The Global Settlement contemplates implementation of a corporate reorganization by which the shares of Plasco will be transferred to an acquisition corporation owned by NSPG and CWP and the remaining assets of the applicants will be held by a new corporation, referred to as "New Plasco", which will assume all of the liabilities and obligations of ~~the Applicants~~ Plasco. I am satisfied that the Court has authority under section 11 of the CCAA to authorize such transactions notwithstanding that the applicants are not proceeding under s. 6(2) of the CCAA insofar as it is not contemplated that the applicants will propose a plan of arrangement or compromise. For this purpose, I consider that the Global Settlement is analogous to such a plan in the context of these

particular proceedings. The reorganization requires an amendment to the articles of Nasco to consolidate the shares and eliminate fractional shares arising on such consolidation. The Court has authority to approve such actions under section 11 of the CCAA which will constitute an order for the purposes of section 191(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, which governs Nasco.

Based on the foregoing, but subject to the qualification below, the Global Settlement and the reorganization contemplated therein to implement the Global Settlement are hereby approved.

With respect to the MRI Settlement, the MRI claims in respect of the GE engines will be released in return for payment of an amount approximately equal to the value allocated to the GE engines by Maynards, which is also at arm's length to the applicants. The MRI Settlement resolves a significant claim against the applicants and allows the Maynards transaction to proceed. On this basis, the MRI Settlement is fair and reasonable and furthers the purpose of the CCAA. It is also beneficial to applicants and the stakeholders for the same reasons.

Based on the foregoing, ~~and~~ but subject to the qualification below, the MRI Settlement is hereby approved.

I note that the City of Ottawa, which appeared today, has not consented to any of the

Maynards transaction, the Global Settlement or the MRI Settlement, pending its review of these transactions and has reserved its rights to object thereto at a hearing scheduled for July 24, 2015. The approvals herein are also subject to approval of an order or orders giving effect to such approvals after finalization of the transactions and the determination of any outstanding issues which are to be addressed at such hearing.

W. Hon-Siegel J.

TAB 12

SUPERIOR COURT
(Commercial Division)

CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

N°: 500-11-057094-191

DATE: October 7, 2019

PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE LOUIS J. GOUIN, J.S.C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED:

STORNOWAY DIAMOND CORPORATION

-&-

STORNOWAY DIAMONDS (CANADA) INC.

-&-

ASHTON MINING OF CANADA INC.

-&-

FCDC SALES AND MARKETING INC.

Petitioners

-&-

COMPUTERSHARE TRUST COMPANY OF CANADA

-&-

DIAQUEM INC.

-&-

INVESTISSEMENT QUÉBEC

-&-

FONDS DE SOLIDARITÉ DES TRAVAILLEURS DU QUÉBEC

-&-

FONDS RÉGIONAL DE SOLIDARITÉ F.T.Q. NORD-DU-QUÉBEC, SOCIÉTÉ EN COMMANDITE

-&-

NATION CRIE DE MISTISSINI

-&-

GRAND CONSEIL DES CRIS (EEYOU ISTCHEE)

-&-

ADMINISTRATION RÉGIONALE CRIE

-&-

CATERPILLAR FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED

-&-

CHUBB LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA

-&-

BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA

-&-

XEROX CANADA LTD.

-&-

ATLAS COPCO CANADA INC.

-&-

CWB NATIONAL LEASING INC.

-&-

OSISKO GOLD ROYALTIES LTD

-&-

CDPQ RESOURCES INC.

-&-

TF R&S CANADA LTD.

-&-

ALBION EXPLORATION FUND LLC

-&-

WASHINGTON STATE INVESTMENT BOARD

-&-

TSX INC.

-&-

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

-&-

QUEBEC REVENUE AGENCY

-&-

THE DIRECTOR APPOINTED PURSUANT TO THE CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

-&-

THE REGISTRAR OF THE REGISTER OF PERSONAL AND MOVABLE REAL RIGHTS OF QUEBEC, represented by the QUEBEC MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

-&-

11641603 CANADA INC.

-&-

11641638 CANADA INC.

-&-

11641735 CANADA INC.

-&-

11272420 CANADA INC.

-&-

THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION OF QUEBEC

-&-

THE MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMY OF QUÉBEC

-&-

THE LAND REGISTRAR FOR THE REGISTRY OFFICE FOR THE REGISTRATION

DIVISION OF SEPT-ILES

-&-

THE REGISTRAR OF PUBLIC REGISTER OF REAL AND IMMOVABLE MINING RIGHTS KEPT BY THE MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉNERGIE ET DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES (QUÉBEC)

Mis-en-cause

-&-

DELOITTE RESTRUCTURING INC.

Monitor

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

[1] **ON READING** the Petitioners' *Motion Seeking (i) Extension of the Stay of Proceedings, (ii) Amendment and Restatement of the Initial Order; and (iii) Leave to Enter Into the Participating Streamers/Diaquem Transaction with Issuance of an Approval and Vesting Order and Ancillary Relief* (the "**Motion**"), the affidavit and the exhibits in support thereof, as well as the Report of the Monitor dated October 2, 2019 (the "**Report**");

[2] **SEEING** the service of the Motion;

[3] **SEEING** the submissions of Petitioners' attorneys;

[4] **SEEING** that it is appropriate to issue an order approving: the purchase and sale and other transactions (the "**Purchase and Sale Transactions**") contemplated in the agreement entitled Share Purchase Agreement dated October 6, 2019 (the "**Purchase Agreement**") by and between the Petitioners, as vendor, and *11272420 Canada Inc.* (the "**Purchaser**"), as purchaser, copy of which is attached as **Schedule "A"** to this Order, forming part hereof, including the pre-closing reorganization transactions contemplated in Exhibit A thereto (the "**Pre-Closing Reorganization**" and, collectively with the other transactions contemplated in the Purchase Agreement, the "**Transactions**");

WHEREFORE, THE COURT:

[5] **GRANTS** the Motion.

[6] **ORDERS** that, unless otherwise indicated or defined herein, capitalized terms used in this Order shall have the meanings given to them in the Purchase Agreement and/or in the Initial Order and/or Initial Motion, as extended, amended and restated from time to time.

PURCHASE AGREEMENT:

[7] **AUTHORIZES** and **APPROVES** the execution by the Petitioners of the Purchase Agreement and the completion of the Transactions, with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor.

PRE-CLOSING REORGANIZATION

[8] **AUTHORIZES** the Petitioners (including Mises en cause 11641603 Canada Inc., 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. as the case may be) to implement and complete the Pre-Closing Reorganization contemplated in Exhibit A to the Purchase Agreement, in the sequence provided for therein.

[9] **AUTHORIZES** the Petitioners (including Mises en cause 11641603 Canada Inc., 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. as the case may be), in completing the transactions contemplated in the Pre-Closing Reorganization:

a) to execute and deliver any documents and assurances governing or giving effect to the Pre-Closing Reorganization as the Petitioners, in their discretion, may deem to be reasonably necessary or advisable to conclude the Pre-Closing Reorganization, including the execution of such deeds, contracts or documents, as may be contemplated in the Purchase Agreement and all such deeds, contracts or documents are hereby ratified, approved and confirmed; and

b) to take such steps as are, in the opinion of the Petitioners, necessary or incidental to the implementation of the Pre-Closing Reorganization.

[10] **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Petitioners (including Mises en cause 11641603 Canada Inc., 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. as the case may be) are hereby permitted to execute and file articles of amendment, amalgamation, continuance or reorganization or such other documents or instruments as may be required to permit or enable and effect the Pre-Closing Reorganization and that such articles, documents or other instruments shall be

deemed to be duly authorized, valid and effective notwithstanding any requirement under federal or provincial law to obtain director or shareholder approval with respect to such actions or to deliver any statutory declarations that may otherwise be required under corporate law to effect the Pre-Closing Reorganization.

[11] **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by the CCAA Parties to proceed with the Pre-Closing Reorganization and that no director, shareholder or regulatory approval shall be required in connection with any of the steps contemplated pursuant to the Pre-Closing Reorganization save for those contemplated in the Purchase Agreement.

[12] **ORDERS** the Director appointed pursuant to Section 260 of the CBCA to accept and receive any articles of amendment, amalgamation, continuance or reorganization or such other documents or instruments as may be required to permit or enable and effect the Pre-Closing Reorganization contemplated in the Purchase Agreement, filed by either the CCAA Parties, as the case may be;

SALE APPROVAL

[13] **AUTHORIZES** the Petitioners (including Mises en cause 11641603 Canada Inc., 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. as the case may be), the Vendor, the Monitor, as the case may be, and the Purchaser to perform all acts, sign all documents and take any necessary action to execute any agreement, contract, deed, provision, transaction or undertaking stipulated in the Purchase Agreement and any other ancillary document which could be required or useful to give full and complete effect thereto.

[14] **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by the Petitioners and the Vendor, as the case may be, to proceed with the Pre-Closing Reorganization, the Purchase and Sale Transactions, the other Transactions and that no shareholder or regulatory approval, if applicable, shall be required in connection therewith.

[15] **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that the Vendor, in consummating the transactions contemplated by the Purchase Agreement, which is a "related party transaction" for purposes of Multilateral Instrument 61-101 - *Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions* ("**MI 61-101**") and subject to a court order under applicable bankruptcy or insolvency laws, is not required to comply with both the formal valuation and minority approval requirements under Sections 5.4 and 5.6, respectively, of MI 61-101.

[16] **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that upon the issuance of a Monitor's certificate substantially in the form appended as **Schedule "B"** hereto (the "**Certificate**"),

all right, title and interest in and to the Purchased Shares, the COA and the MSA shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all claims, Liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), obligations, taxes, prior claims, right of retention, liens, security interests, charges, hypothecs, trusts, deemed trusts (statutory or otherwise), judgments, writs of seizure or execution, notices of sale, contractual rights (including purchase options, rights of first refusal, rights of first offer or any other pre-emptive contractual rights), encumbrances, whether or not they have been registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "**Encumbrances**"[1]), including without limiting the generality of the foregoing all Encumbrances created by order of this Court and all charges, or security evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the *Civil Code of Québec* in movable / immovable property, excluding however, the permitted encumbrances listed on **Schedule "C"** hereto (the "**Permitted Encumbrances**") and, for greater certainty, **ORDERS** that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Purchased Shares, other than the Permitted Encumbrances, be cancelled and discharged as against the Purchased Shares, in each case effective as of the applicable time and date of the Certificate.

[17] **ORDER** and **DECLARES** that upon the issuance of the Certificate, any agreement, contract, plan, indenture, deed, certificate, subscription right, conversion rights, pre-emption rights or other document or instrument governing and/or having been created, granted in connection with the Purchased Shares and/or the share capital of SDCI, Ashton and FCDC shall be deemed terminated and cancelled.

[18] **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Sept-Iles and the Registrar of the Public Register of Real and Immovable Mining Rights (known as GESTIM Plus), upon presentation of the Certificate and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and cancel the Encumbrances listed in **Schedule "D"** on the immovable properties identified therein.

[19] **ORDERS** the Quebec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a true copy of this Order and the Certificate, to strike the registration listed in **Schedule "D"**.

[20] **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that upon the issuance of the Certificate, Purchaser and AmalCo (including any predecessor corporations) shall be deemed released from any and all claims, liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent) or

obligations with respect to any taxes (including penalties and interest thereon) of, or that relate to, the Vendor, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing all taxes that could be assessed against Purchaser and Amalco (including any predecessor corporations) pursuant to section 160 of the *Income Tax Act* (Canada), or any provincial equivalent, in connection with the Vendor.

[21] **ORDERS** that upon issuance of the Certificate, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of the CCAA Parties then existing or previously committed by the CCAA Parties or caused by the CCAA Parties, directly or indirectly, or non-compliance with any covenant, positive or negative pledge, warranty, representation, term, provision, condition or obligation, express or implied, in any contract, credit document, agreement for sale, lease or other agreement, written or oral, and any and all amendments or supplements thereto, existing between such Person and the CCAA Parties arising from the filing by the CCAA Parties under the CCAA or the completion of the Transactions, and any and all notices of default and demands for payment under any instrument, including any guarantee arising from such default, shall be deemed to have been rescinded.

[22] **ORDERS** that the implementation of the Transactions shall be deemed not to constitute a change in ownership or change in control under any financial instrument, loan or financing agreement, executory contract or unexpired lease or contract, lease or agreement in existence on the Effective Date and to which the CCAA Parties are a party.

[23] **ORDERS and DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Certificate, no later than one business day after the issuance thereof.

[24] **DECLARES** that upon the filing of the Certificate, the Purchase and Sale Transactions shall be deemed to constitute and shall have the same effect as a sale under judicial authority as per the provisions of the *Code of Civil Procedure* and a forced sale as per the provisions of the *Civil Code of Quebec*.

CCAA PETITIONERS

[25] **ORDERS** that upon filing of the Monitor's Certificate:

a) 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. are companies to which the CCAA applies;

b) 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. shall be added as Petitioners in these CCAA proceedings and any reference in any Order of this Court in respect of these CCAA proceedings to a "Petitioner", the "Petitioners" or "CCAA Parties" shall refer to 11641638 Canada Inc. and

11641735 Canada Inc., *mutadis mutandis*, and, for greater certainty, each of the Charges (as such term is defined in the Initial Order) shall constitute a charge on the property of 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc.; and

c) SDCI, Ashton, FCDC and 11641603 Canada Inc., as amalgamated shall each be deemed to cease to be Petitioners in these CCAA proceedings, and each such entity shall be deemed to be released from the purview of any Order of this Court granted in respect of these CCAA Proceedings, save and except for the present Order the terms of which (as they related to any such entity) shall continue to apply in all respects.

[26] **ORDERS** that upon the issuance of the Certificate and in accordance with the terms of the Purchase Agreement:

a) all Excluded Assets shall vest absolutely and exclusively in 11641638 Canada Inc. and all Encumbrances shall continue to attach to the Excluded Assets with the same nature and priority as they had immediately prior to their transfer;

b) all debts, liabilities, obligations, indebtedness, contracts, leases, agreements, and undertakings of any kind or nature whatsoever (whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise) of Amalco, whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise (collectively, "**Obligations**") other than the Assumed Liabilities (all such Obligations that are not expressly identified in the Purchase Agreement as being Assumed Liabilities being referred to as the "**Excluded Liabilities**") shall be transferred to, assumed by and vest absolutely and exclusively in, 11641735 Canada Inc. such that, at the time provided for in the Pre-Closing Reorganization and before the Closing Date, the Excluded Liabilities shall be novated and become obligations of 11641735 Canada Inc. and not obligations of AmalCo, and AmalCo shall be forever released and discharged from such Excluded Liabilities, and all Encumbrances securing Excluded Liabilities shall be forever released and discharged, it being understood that nothing in the present Order shall be deemed to cancel any of the Permitted Encumbrances, as applicable to AmalCo (including any predecessor corporations);

c) the commencement or prosecution, whether directly, indirectly, derivatively or otherwise of any demands, claims, actions, counterclaims, suits, judgements, or other remedy or recovery with respect to any indebtedness, liability, obligation or cause of action against Amalco in respect of the Excluded Liabilities shall be permanently enjoined;

d) the nature of the Obligations retained by Amalco including, without limitation, their amount and their secured or unsecured status, shall not be affected or altered as a result of the Purchase Agreement or the steps and actions taken in accordance with the terms thereof;

e) the nature and priority of the Excluded Liabilities, including, without limitation, their amount and their secured or unsecured status, shall not be affected or altered as a result of their transfer to and assumption by 11641638 Canada Inc. and/or 11641735 Canada Inc.; and

f) any person that, prior to the Closing Date, had a valid right or claim against AmalCo in respect of the Excluded Liabilities (each a "**Claim**") shall no longer have such Claim against AmalCo, but will have an equivalent Claim against 11641638 Canada Inc. and/or 11641735 Canada Inc. in respect of the Excluded Liabilities from and after the Closing Date in its place and stead, and, nothing in this Order limits, lessens or extinguishes the Excluded Liabilities or the Claim of any person as against 11641638 Canada Inc. and/or 11641735 Canada Inc.

RELEASES

[27] **ORDERS** that effective upon the filing of the Certificate, (i) the present and former directors, officers, employees, legal counsel and advisors of the Petitioners (including for purpose of clarity 11641638 Canada Inc., 11641735 Canada Inc. and AmalCo), (ii) the Monitor and its legal counsel, and (iii) the Streamers under the Stream Agreement, Diaquem Inc. and Investissement Québec, including in each case their respective directors, officers, employees, legal counsel and advisors (the persons listed in (i), (ii) and (iii) being collectively the "**Released Parties**") shall be deemed to be forever irrevocably released and discharged from any and all present and future claims (including, without limitations, claims for contribution or indemnity), liabilities, indebtedness, demands, actions, causes of action, counterclaims, suits, damages, judgments, executions, recoupments, debts, sums of money, expenses, accounts, liens, taxes, recoveries, and obligations of any nature or kind whatsoever (whether direct or indirect, known or unknown, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, matured or unmatured or due or not yet due, in law or equity and whether based in statute or otherwise) based in whole

or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place prior to the issuance of the Certificate or completed pursuant to the terms of this Order and/or in connection with the Transactions, in respect of the Petitioners or their assets, business or affairs wherever or however conducted or governed, the administration and/or management of the Petitioners, the Stream Agreement, the Diaquem Loan Agreement, the Diaquem Royalty Agreement and these proceedings (collectively, the "**Released Claims**"), which Released Claims are hereby fully, finally, irrevocably and forever waived, discharged, released, cancelled and barred as against the Released Parties, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall waive, discharge, release, cancel or bar any claim against the Directors and Officers of the Petitioners that is not permitted to be released pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

[28] **ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

a) the pendency of these proceedings;

b) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) (the "**BIA**") in respect of the Petitioners, 11641638 Canada Inc., 11641735 Canada Inc. or Amalco and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and

c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of the Petitioners, 11641638 Canada Inc., 11641735 Canada Inc. or Amalco,

the implementation of the Pre-Closing Reorganization (including the transfer of the Excluded Assets to 11641638 Canada Inc. and the transfer of the Excluded Liabilities to 11641638 Canada Inc. and/or to 11641735 Canada Inc.) and the implementation of the Purchase and Sale Transactions under and pursuant to the Purchase Agreement (i) shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of the Petitioners, 11641638 Canada Inc., 11641735 Canada Inc. or Amalco and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the Petitioners, 11641638 Canada Inc. or 11641735 Canada Inc., as applicable, (ii) shall not constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue, or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, and (iii) shall not constitute nor be deemed to be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct by the Petitioners or the Released Parties pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

THE MONITOR

[29] **PRAYS ACT** of the Monitor's Second Report.

[30] **ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is authorized, entitled and empowered to assign or cause to be assigned, at any time after the Closing Date, Stornoway Diamond Corporation, 11641638 Canada Inc. and 11641735 Canada Inc. into bankruptcy and the Monitor shall be entitled but not obligated to act as trustee in bankruptcy thereof.

[31] **DECLARES** that, subject to other orders of this Court, nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, or to otherwise manage all or any part of the assets of the Petitioners. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order, be deemed to be in possession of any assets of the Petitioners within the meaning of environmental legislation, the whole pursuant to the terms of the CCAA.

[32] **DECLARES** that the Monitor shall incur no liability as a result of acting in accordance with this Order, other than any liability arising out of or in connection with the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the Monitor.

[33] **DECLARES** that no action lies against the Monitor by reason of this Order or the performance of any act authorized by this Order, except by leave of the Court. The entities related to the Monitor or belonging to the same group as the Monitor shall benefit from the protection arising under the present paragraph.

GENERAL

[34] **ORDERS** that the Purchaser shall be authorized to take all steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of the Encumbrances as against the assets of AmalCo.

[35] **DECLARES** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

[36] **DECLARES** that the Monitor shall be authorized to apply as it may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement the Order and, without limitation to the foregoing, an order under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for which the Monitor shall be the foreign representative of the Debtor. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.

[37] **REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America

and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of the Order.

[38] **ORDERS** the provisional execution of the present Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the requirement to provide any security or provision for costs whatsoever.

THE WHOLE WITHOUT COSTS.

J.S.C.

The Honourable Louis J. Gouin, J.S.C.

Date of hearing: October 7, 2019

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TAB 13

2018 ONSC 3678, 2018 CarswellOnt 9960, 293 A.C.W.S. (3d) 475, 61 C.B.R. (6th) 68

2018 ONSC 3678
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Dundee Oil and Gas Limited (Re)

2018 CarswellOnt 9960, 2018 ONSC 3678, 293 A.C.W.S. (3d) 475, 61 C.B.R. (6th) 68

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF DUNDEE OIL & GAS LIMITED

S.F. Dunphy J.

Heard: June 11, 2018
Judgment: June 13, 2018
Docket: Toronto CV-18-591908-00CL

Counsel: E. Patrick Shea, B. Arnold, for Applicants
Grant Moffat, Rachel Bengino, for Monitor FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
J. Wallace, for purchaser Lagasco Inc.
S. Kromkamp, B. McPherson, for HMQ in right of Ontario
Aubrey E. Kauffman, for National Bank of Canada
M.P. Gottlieb, for Canadian Overseas Petroleum Limited

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.ii Discretion of court

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Discretion of court
Debtor entered into asset purchase agreement subject to court approval — Debtor was operating under provisions of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Significant aspect of proposed sale transaction was requirement that assignment of underlying contracts be accomplished by order pursuant to s. 11.3 of CCAA — Debtor applied, supported by monitor, for approval of sale — Application judge approved proposed sale subject to requiring further evidence regarding requested assignment of executory contracts — Application was adjourned — Debtor brought matter back before judge — Application granted — Monitor approved proposed assignments and made detailed and thoughtful submissions outlining basis of approval — Cash flow from debtor's operations was quite solid — Debtor's insolvency was not result of operating losses — Forecasts of future business justified inference that there was reasonable basis to conclude that cash flow from acquired assets would sustain operations and acquisition debt — Purchaser had plan to reduce expenses and operating costs to provide further margin of safety and level of institutional experience to make plan credible — Debtor had no trouble in past funding capping expenses from operations and those expenses were accounted for in cash flow forecasts used — It was appropriate to assign debtor's rights and obligations to purchaser — Purchaser was someone who was able to perform

obligations assigned.

Table of Authorities

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 11.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.3(3)(b) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.3(3)(c) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.3(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

RETURN of application for approval of proposed sale of assets.

***S.F. Dunphy J.*:**

1 Dundee Oil and Gas Limited brought an application, supported by the Monitor, seeking approval of a sale of substantially all of its assets before me on May 23, 2018. I approved the proposed sale subject to requiring further evidence regarding the requested assignment of executory contracts under s. 11.3 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* on June 11, 2018.

2 The matter came back before me on June 11, 2018 where, based upon the new evidence filed, I approved the transaction including the assignment of the executory contracts with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Background facts

3 Dundee entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement subject to court approval dated April 4, 2018. The sale was the result of a long process that began in August 2017 when Dundee was operating under the protection of the proposal provisions of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. Those proceedings were continued under the CCAA on February 13, 2018.

4 Dundee's assets consist primarily of a large number of petroleum and natural gas leases as well as associated equipment, gathering pipelines, etc. Many of the assets are in fact leased or are otherwise the subject of contractual arrangements between Dundee and the owner of the affected land. Accordingly, a significant aspect of the proposed sale transaction was a requirement that an assignment of the underlying contracts be accomplished by an order pursuant to s. 11.3 of the CCAA.

5 On May 23, 2018 I indicated to the parties that I was satisfied with the necessity and advisability of ordering the requested relief and the process leading up to it save and except one aspect. In approving an assignment using the authority vested in me by s. 11.3 of the CCAA, I am required to inquire into a number of matters about which I found the record before me that day to be deficient. One landowner, Mr. Whittle, had made a formal objection and availed himself of the opportunity to express his concerns by telephone. He raised a number of objections to what he perceived to be concerns regarding the operational stability of the purchaser and their ability to see to eventual remediation obligations.

a. Communications directly with the judge are to be discouraged generally;

b. Where necessary, such communications should be copied to the service list generally absent some very compelling reason not to do so; but

18 I would have preferred that this course of conduct had been followed here. The Monitor was copied and the integrity of the process was in no way compromised.

19 The substantive question before me was whether I ought to approve the provisions of the requested approval and vesting order that would compel the assignment of certain executory contracts under s. 11.3 of the CCAA.

20 Section 11.3 of the CCAA authorizes the court to assign "the rights and obligations of the company" to an agreement to any person specified in the court order that is willing to accept the assignment. Post-filing contracts, eligible financial contracts and collective agreements may not be assigned in this fashion.

21 There was no issue in this case with the technical aspects of the case. Proper notice was given. No prohibited categories of contracts were proposed to be assigned. The terms of the proposed assignment were designed to ensure the payment of cure costs would be made. A procedure for resolving any disputes about cure costs was designed to avoid compromising the rights of affected parties.

22 The issue to be decided was whether this was an appropriate case for me to exercise my jurisdiction to make the order under s. 11.3. Section 11.3 does not provide an exhaustive code of the factors for me to consider. Rather, s. 11.3(3) lists three factors that, among others, I am to consider:

(a) whether the monitor approved the proposed assignment;

(b) whether the person to whom the rights and obligations are to be assigned would be able to perform the obligations; and

(c) whether it would be appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to that person.

23 In the present case, the Monitor has approved the proposed assignments and has made detailed and thoughtful submissions to me outlining the basis of that approval. The concerns expressed by me on May 23, 2018 did not fall on deaf ears.

24 The purchaser Lagasco is largely a shell company for the time being. It will own the business being purchased. The evidence before me indicates that substantially all of the purchase price is to be debt financed — partly through financing secured by the equipment to be purchased and party through a credit facility. On day one there will be little to no equity in the purchaser and the significant leverage will have to be serviced entirely from cash flow.

25 Taken in isolation, this factor raised grave concerns in my mind as to whether the assignee would be able to perform the obligations or whether, in light of the potential fragility of the assignee, it would be appropriate to compel the contract counterparties to accept the assignee.

26 I still have those concerns. I think it helpful that I should elaborate somewhat on what the concerns are and how I have resolved them. The Monitor's dispassionate and frank analysis of the issues has been very helpful in this process.

27 Section 11.3 of the CCAA is an extraordinary power. It permits the court to require counterparties to an executory contract to accept future performance from somebody they never agreed to deal with. But for s. 11.3 of the CCAA, a counterparty in the unfortunate position of having a bankrupt or insolvent counterpart might at least console themselves with the thought of soon recovering their freedom to deal with the subject-matter of the contract. Unlike creditors, the counterparty subjected to a non-consensual assignment will be required to deal with the credit-risk of an assignee post-insolvency and potentially for a long time. Creditors, on the other hand, will generally be in a position to take their lumps and turn the page.

28 Of course, insolvency is not always a catastrophe for such counterparties. Sometimes it is a godsend. Assets locked into long-term contracts at advantageous prices may be freed up to allow the counterparty to re-price to current market. In such cases, the creditors are at risk of seeing the debtor lose critical assets while the counterparty receives an unexpected windfall. The business and value of the debtor's assets may evaporate in the process — be it from one large contract lost or many smaller ones.

29 Bankruptcy and insolvency always involves a balancing of a number of such competing interests. Creditors, contract counterparties - all of these have rights arising under agreements with the debtor that are either actually compromised or at risk of being compromised by insolvency. The CCAA and BIA regimes are predicated on facilitating a pragmatic approach to minimize the damage arising from insolvency more than they are concerned to advance the interests of one stakeholder over another.

30 It seems to me that a fundamental condition precedent to requiring a contract counterpart to be locked into an involuntary assignment post-insolvency is that the court sanctioning the assignment is able to conclude that the assignee will, in the words of s. 11.3(3)(b) of the CCAA, "be able to perform the obligations". This does not imply iron-clad guarantees. It does not give license to the counterparty to demand the receipt of financial covenants or assurances that it did not previously enjoy under the contract it originally negotiated with the debtor.

31 A proposed purchaser starting life with close to 100% leverage gives this judge a considerable degree of heartburn when it comes to answering the question of whether the assignee is a person who will be able to perform the obligations. That concern is amplified when one adds the prospect of landowners being made liable for environmental remediation caused by lessees and others on their land.

32 So, if that is my concern, by what process have I allayed it?

33 Firstly, the financial information before me is that cash flow from these operations has been quite solid. Dundee's insolvency has not been a result of operating losses.

34 Secondly, while any projection of future business results will always be subject to a number of contingencies and imponderables outside of the control of the parties, the forecast reserves prepared by Deloitte in this case have been prepared under NI 51.01 which means at the very least that they have been prepared to reviewable standards of reasonableness. The forecasts, such as they are, justify the inference that there is a *reasonable basis* to conclude that the cash flow from the acquired assets will sustain operations and the acquisition debt. It will be a while before an equity cushion will be built though.

35 Thirdly, the purchaser has a plan to reduce G&A and operating costs to provide a further margin of safety and a level of institutional experience to make such a plan credible.

36 Fourthly, the environmental risk is mitigated somewhat by the fact that Ontario's regulatory model operates on a "pay as you play" basis requiring the building of reserves to handle capping costs as wells move past their expected lives. Dundee has had no trouble in the past funding capping expenses from operations and these expenses are accounted for in the cash flow forecasts used.

37 Finally, the MNR has agreed to a voluntary assignment of its leases (off-shore) while no on-shore landowners have seen fit to object to the proposed assignments despite quite adequate notice being given.

38 I must also be mindful that contract counterparties are not expected to *improve* their situation by reason of an assignment. A counterpart to an executory contract that is subject to involuntary assignment under s. 11.3 of the CCAA has managed to find itself contractually bound to an insolvent debtor notwithstanding whatever contractual safeguards were negotiated to avoid that outcome. The debtor is now insolvent. The desire to ensure the assignee is a reasonably fit and proper one should not morph into an exercise in patching up contracts previously negotiated by requiring financial covenants and safeguards never before required.

TAB 14

2011 ABCA 158
Alberta Court of Appeal

Ford Credit Canada Ltd. v. Welcome Ford Sales Ltd.

2011 CarswellAlta 883, 2011 ABCA 158, [2011] 8 W.W.R. 221, [2011] A.W.L.D. 2361, [2011] A.J. No. 592, 44 Alta. L.R. (5th) 81, 505 A.R. 146, 522 W.A.C. 146, 77 C.B.R. (5th) 278

Ford Motor Company of Canada, Limited (Appellant / Applicant) and Welcome Ford Sales Ltd. and Royle Smith (Respondents / Respondents)

Ford Motor Company of Canada, Limited (Appellant / Applicant) and Welcome Ford Sales Ltd., by its Receiver, Manager and Trustee in Bankruptcy, Myers Norris Penny Ltd. and Bank of Montreal (Respondents / Respondents)

Keith Ritter, Peter Martin, Myra Bielby JJ.A.

Heard: March 4, 2011
Judgment: May 27, 2011
Docket: Edmonton Appeal 1003-0089-AC, 1003-0362-AC

Proceedings: affirming *Ford Credit Canada Ltd. v. Welcome Ford Sales Ltd.* (2010), 2010 ABQB 199, 2010 CarswellAlta 2518 (Alta. Q.B.)

Counsel: K.B. Mills, K.J. Bourassa for Appellant
J.H. Hockin, B.P. Maruyama for Respondents, Welcome Ford Sales Ltd., Royle Smith, Welcome Ford Sales Ltd., by its Receiver, Manager and Trustee in Bankruptcy, Meyers Norris Penny Ltd.
R.C. Rutman, A.L. Murray for Respondent, Bank of Montreal

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.7 Actions involving receiver
VII.7.e Practice and procedure
VII.7.e.iv Miscellaneous

Headnote

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Actions by and against receiver — Practice and procedure — General principles
Bankruptcy trustee was granted permission to sell auto dealership agreement to third party over objections of other party to agreement, auto manufacturer — Manufacturer appealed — Appeal dismissed — Manufacturer would receive benefits parties intended to receive when agreement was created — All other rights and obligations under assigned dealership agreement were to remain unchanged but for change in identity of dealer — Chambers judge reasonably concluded that manufacturer unreasonably withheld its consent.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

contractual rights of some creditors, such as Ford in this case, are compromised. Therefore, even if Ford otherwise had the right to terminate the dealership agreement for breach of condition, and its assignment clause was not one which survived the termination, s. 84.1 nonetheless allows the trustee to apply to the Court for permission to assign the contract so long as the provisions of the statute are met.

31 Ford argues that the provisions of s. 84.1 which are prerequisite to granting permission to assign have not been met.

32 Section 84.1 reads in part:

> (1) On application by a trustee and on notice to every party to an agreement, a court may make an order assigning the rights and obligations of a bankrupt under the agreement to any person who is specified by the court and agrees to the assignment.
>
> . . .
>
> (3) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of rights and obligations that are not assignable by reason of their nature ...
>
> (4) In deciding whether to make the order, the court is to consider, among other things,
>
> (a) whether the person to whom the rights and obligations are to be assigned is able to perform the obligations; and
>
> (b) whether it is appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to that person.

33 The Appellant did not argue, nor did the chambers judge find, that s. 84.1 expressly excludes auto dealership agreements from its operation. Indeed, the word "agreement" found in that section is wide enough to cover this type of agreement. The chambers judge correctly concluded, therefore, that he had jurisdiction under s. 84.1 to order the assignment (sale) in the proper circumstances.

34 Ford argued, rather, that those proper circumstances did not exist, as discussed below.

(i) Is s. 84.1(3) to be interpreted without reference to s. 84.1(4)?

35 Ford argued that whether the rights and obligations of an agreement are assignable "by reason of their nature" pursuant to s. 84.1(3) must be decided before, and independently of, any consideration under s. 84.1(4) as to whether the proposed assignee is capable of performing the obligations and it is appropriate to assign the rights and obligations. If so, it is irrelevant that the ultimate purchaser is an otherwise approved dealer and a proven performer. The issue of whether the nature of the agreement precludes its assignment would thus have to be resolved independently of any consideration of whether the agreement's commercial purpose would be achieved in the hands of the proposed assignee.

36 This interpretation is not supported by the literal words found in s. 84.1 which do not make a determination under s. 84.1(3) an independent precondition to a determination under s. 84.1(4). Legislative intent may be taken into account as an aide to interpretation only in the case of ambiguity in the words of the statute. Even if such an ambiguity existed here, and one is not apparent, Parliament's intent does not support Ford's interpretation. The chambers judge concluded that s. 84.1 should be interpreted in light of Parliament's intention that the provision be used to protect and enhance the assets of the estate of a bankrupt by permitting the sale/assignment of existing agreements to third parties for value: see Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, 4th ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) vol. 2 at 3-499. He purported to interpret s. 84.1 in the context of its role as remedial legislation.

37 Prior to the coming into force of s. 84.1 in 2009, a trustee in bankruptcy could not assign (sell) a contract to a third party where the counter-party to that contract opposed the assignment. As a result, a bankrupt estate was vulnerable to losing the benefit of a valuable contract to the detriment of the estate and often to the detriment of third parties.

38 The estate of a bankrupt may include various forms of property. Sometimes the most valuable property in an estate

will be the contractual rights possessed by the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy. Those rights may be embodied in, for example, a franchise agreement, a purchase agreement, a license agreement, a lease, a supply agreement or an auto dealership agreement.

39 The clear intent of Parliament in enacting s. 84.1 of the BIA was to address this vulnerability; it made a policy decision that a court ought to have the discretion to authorize a trustee to assign (sell) the rights and obligations of a bankrupt under such an agreement notwithstanding the objections of the counter-party.

40 A statutory provision analogous to s. 84.1 is that of s. 8(2) of the *Landlord's Rights on Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-5. It provides that, notwithstanding the legal effect of a provision in a lease purporting to terminate the lease upon the tenant becoming bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy may elect to retain the leased premises for some or all of the unexpired term of the lease. The trustee may then, upon payment of all overdue rent, assign the lease to a capable third party upon securing an order to that effect from the Court of Queen's Bench. The purpose of the legislation is to enable the trustee to maximize realization without putting the landlord in any worse position that it would have been under the lease before the bankruptcy: see *Bank of Montreal v. Phoenix Rotary Equipment Ltd.*, 2007 ABQB 86 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 51, (2007), 72 Alta. L.R. (4th) 321 (Alta. Q.B.).

41 Similarly, s. 84.1 of the BIA allows a court to approve the assignment (sale) of any agreement to obtain maximum benefit for creditors upon payment of any monetary breaches and upon concluding that the rights and remedies of the counter-party will be preserved.

42 Ford suggested the contrary, offering an extract from the Briefing Book placed before Parliament when it considered this amendment. The Briefing Book gives as a reason for the enactment of the language "not assignable by reason of its nature" (then subsection 3(d)) that it "is intended to provide flexibility to the court to review each agreement in light of the circumstances to determine whether or not it would be appropriate to allow the assignment". It further states, "[s]ubsection (4) provides the courts with legislative guidance as to when an agreement may be assigned. The guidance is limited to enable the court to exercise its discretion to address individual fact situations". These stated purposes are not, however, mutually exclusive.

43 Rather, to the extent that legislative intent is at all relevant, it is as described by the chambers judge as well as Justice Romaine of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in *Alberta Health Services v. Networc Health Inc.*, 2010 ABQB 373 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 20, (2010), 28 Alta. L.R. (5th) 118 (Alta. Q.B.):

> The BIA is remedial legislation. It is clear that it should be given "such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects": *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21 at section 12. In *Mercure v. A. Marquette & Fils Inc.*, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 547 at 556, the Supreme Court commented:
>
> > Before going on to another point it is perhaps not inappropriate to recall that the *Bankruptcy Act*, while not business legislation in the strict sense, clearly has its origins in the business world. Interpretation of it must take these origins into account. It concerns relations among businessmen, and to interpret it using an overly narrow, legalistic approach is to misinterpret it.

44 Ford has suggested no business reason to support its interpretation of s. 84.1(3) and (4). There is no apparent reason as to why appropriateness of the assignment or the capability of the proposed assignee would not be relevant to determining whether the rights and obligations are assignable by their nature. Rather, the opposite would appear to be true.

45 Therefore, I conclude that s. 84.1(3) is to be interpreted upon considering, among other things, the capacity of the proposed assignee and whether it is appropriate to assign the rights and obligations as set out in s. 84.1(4).

(ii)(a) Are the rights and obligations established by the dealership agreement not assignable by reason of their nature because the estate will not benefit from the assignment?

TAB 15

2015 ONSC 303
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 620, 2015 ONSC 303, [2015] O.J. No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 753

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 15, 2015
Judgment: January 16, 2015
Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Tracy Sandler, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC
Jay Swartz for Target Corporation
Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Jesse Mighton for Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez")
Terry O'Sullivan for Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust
Susan Philpott for Proposed Employee Representative Counsel, for Employees of the Applicants

Subject: Insolvency; Property

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.e Proceedings subject to stay
XIX.2.e.vi Miscellaneous

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.2 Initial application
XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Proceedings subject to stay — Miscellaneous
Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — Stay extended to certain limited partnerships, which were related to or carried on operations integral to applicants' business — Stay of proceedings extended to rights of third party tenants against

landlords that arose out of insolvency — Stay extended to T Co. and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims derivative of claims against Canadian operations.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous
Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — It was appropriate to grant broad relief to ensure status quo was maintained — Applicants were all insolvent — Although there was no prospect restructured "going concern" solution would result, use of CCAA protection was appropriate in circumstances — Creation of employee trust to cover payments to employees was approved — Key employee retention program (KERP) and charge as security for KERP payments were approved — Appointment of Employee Representative Counsel was approved — DIP Lenders' Charge and DIP Facility were approved — Administration charge and Directors' and Officers' charge approved.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz R.S.J.*:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 196, 75 C.C.P.B. 206, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, *(*sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1914, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, *(*sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), *(*sub

anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

68 The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

69 The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

70 The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

71 Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. $175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

72 Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCCA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

73 With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of $6.75 million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

74 In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and

f. The position of the Monitor.

75 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

76 The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to $64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

77 Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

TAB 16

2010 BCSC 1563
British Columbia Supreme Court [In Chambers]

HSBC Bank Canada v. Bear Mountain Master Partnership

2010 CarswellBC 2962, 2010 BCSC 1563, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 11, 194 A.C.W.S. (3d) 477, 72 C.B.R. (4th) 276

In The Matter Of The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.-36, As Amended

And In The Matter Of A Plan Of Compromise Or Arrangement Of Bear Mountain Master Partnership, Bear Mountain Development Holdings Ltd., 18 on 18 Developments Ltd., And Bear Mountain Resort Management Corp.

HSBC Bank Canada (Petitioner) and Bear Mountain Master Partnership, Bear Mountain Development Holdings Ltd., 18 on 18 Developments Ltd., Bear Mountain Resort Management Corp., 391043 Alberta Ltd. as trustee of the Vernon Family Trust, Kory Les Rasmus Gronnestad as trustee of the Gronnestad Family Trust, Leonard Greig Barrie as trustee of the Barrie Family Trust, 624583 B.C. Ltd., Bear Mountain Developments Corporation as trustee of Bear Mountain Realty Fund, Vulpine Enterprises Ltd., Jackson Penney, Afrt Bear Mountain Investment Corp., Wildhorse Management Ltd., 670513 B.C. Ltd., Grappler Development Ltd. (Respondent)

Masuhara J.

Heard: September 29, 2010
Oral reasons: September 29, 2010
Written reasons: October 4, 2010
Docket: Vancouver S102120

Counsel: J. Grieve for Petitioner
David Gruber, Eli Walker for Respondent, Turner Lane Development Corp.
S. Golick for Chief Restructuring Officer
N. Beckie for Respondent, Canada Revenue Agency
C. Emslie for The Monitor Price Waterhouse Coopers
J. Milton for Respondent, Bear Mountain Master Partnership

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"
Debtor company underwent restructuring under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — General creditors voted to approve plan of arrangement, including votes of creditor bank — Monitor and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") also endorsed plan — Unsecured creditor filed claim of over $3 million; monitor objected to $1.8 million of claim — Unsecured

creditor opposed plan on, inter alia, grounds that bank should not have been permitted to vote in general creditor class because it was related party to debtor, that bank took equity risk rather than credit risk, and that monitor and bank did not consult with unsecured creditor in good faith — Bank applied for order sanctioning amended plan of arrangement and order vesting assets defined in plan — Application granted — Unsecured creditor did not provide any evidence to establish that bank controlled shares of debtor — Unsecured creditor also did not adduce any evidence to suggest that financing provided by bank to debtor was anything but arm's length debt financing — Rhetorical questions regarding bank's loan without adequate credit controls was not sufficient basis to characterize bank as equity holder and to disallow its vote — With respect to consultation, monitor did review unsecured creditor's idea of distributing tax losses but considered it uneconomical — While discussions at consultation meeting did not lead to any changes, it could not be stated that consultation did not occur — In light of, inter alia, significant level of approval whether one included bank vote or not, endorsement of monitor, support of larger unsecured creditors, and benefits to broader constituents in community, plan was fair.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Masuhara J.*:

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(2) — considered

s. 6 — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

APPLICATION by creditor bank for order sanctioning plan of arrangement and order vesting assets defined in plan.

***Masuhara J.*:**

1 On September 29, 2010, HSBC Canada ("HSBC") applied for an order sanctioning the amended plan of arrangement (the "Plan") filed in this proceeding and an order vesting the assets as defined in the Plan, or such of the assets as HSBC may seek to be vested from time to time, in subsidiaries of the bank. The Monitor and the Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") have endorsed the Plan. In an earlier ruling, I approved the filing of a consolidated plan and the creation of the current general creditor class. At that time, I also invited Turner Lane Development Corp. ("Turner Lane") to make submissions with respect to fairness at this hearing.

2 The meeting of the general creditor class was held on September 21, 2010, to approve the Plan.

3 Turner Lane opposes the sanctioning of the Plan. This appears to be a late decision, as I am advised that following the meeting of the general creditor class, Turner Lane, through counsel, had advised that it did not intend to oppose sanctioning of the Plan. This is also evidenced by the fact that Mr. Gruber, Turner Lane's counsel, did not have written materials to present to this court or parties until midway through the sanction hearing. I also note that only more recently did Turner Lane file an Appearance, despite having been duly notified of these proceedings.

4 The report of the Monitor says that the general creditors have voted to approve the Plan by the requisite majorities under section 6 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement* Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA")*, including the votes of HSBC in respect of the HSBC deficiency claim and the assigned claims. The result of the vote was 97 percent in number and 97.2

19 I also reject Turner Lane's assertion that the votes of CRA should be disallowed simply because Bear Mountain has filed notices of objections against the amounts assessed by CRA for the purpose of preserving its ability to challenge these assessments at some point in the future. In my view, the votes should remain. The Monitor allowed the claim for voting at the meeting of the general creditors.

20 In my view, the unsecured claim of CRA, as opposed to the deemed trust claim which is not in the vote, is not different from any other unsecured creditor claim.

21 I also note that CRA has conducted an audit of Bear Mountain and that aspects of the CRA claim were recently before me in the last hearing in these proceedings. This indicates a level of some diligence behind CRA's position.

22 Mr. Bjola questions the change of CRA's position from abstaining at the meeting to voting in favour of the Plan. However, there is nothing to preclude a person from changing their mind as to whether they will or will not vote. Again, there is no evidence to suggest that the change resulted from wrongdoing or bad faith on the part of anyone. While I can see an argument for inconsistency, I am also aware that such things are done to preserve positions. I am not persuaded that the inclusion of the vote of CRA was inappropriate.

23 Given all of the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the HSBC and CRA vote should be disallowed. Further, I find no irregularity or defect to disallow the votes of Scansa or 665821 (B.C.) Ltd. Mr. Barrie and Mr. Leseur no longer have any management role or decision-making authority in the Bear Mountain Development.

24 In sanctioning a plan, the court is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all stakeholders. The court is to look forward and determine whether the plan represents a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge. The court is also to consider whether the proposed plan brings more value to creditors in the bankruptcy or liquidation.

25 A broad set of factors are to be considered. A key measure of the Plan being fair is the level of approval for the Plan. In my view, there is a significant level of approval whether you include the HSBC vote or not. I recognize that there is considerable dissatisfaction on the part of Turner Lane as to features of the Plan and I am sure that this is shared by others who oppose the Plan. I note that the initial payment is small. However, I am also persuaded by the following factors: the results of the vote, which indicate a high level of support for the Plan; the endorsement of the Monitor who has indicated that HSBC's proposal is the only "game in town"; the support of larger unsecured creditors who are arguably in the same general range as those identified by Mr. Bjola as having opposed the Plan; the benefits of the initial distribution to a large number of smaller creditors; the benefits to the broader constituents such as employees, suppliers and homeowners in Bear Mountain and the general community surrounding the resort as set out in the Monitor's report; the potential to participate in a future distribution in the next three years, at which time it is hoped the market will have improved; the real possibility of HSBC pursuing a receivership; the $5.9 million that HSBC has funded into the project post filing; and HSBC's foregoing of its $58 million unsecured claims in participating in any of the 1/3 surplus over net recovery from a sale of the project. In light of these facts, I conclude that the order sanctioning the Plan should be granted.

26 In conclusion, the order sanctioning the Plan is granted and the vesting orders as sought are approved.

Application granted.

End of Document

TAB 17

2000 ABQB 442
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re

2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, [2000] A.W.L.D. 654, [2000] A.J. No. 771, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 265 A.R. 201, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act (Alberta) S.A. 1981, c. B-15, as Amended, Section 185

In the Matter of Canadian Airlines Corporation and Canadian Airlines International Ltd.

Paperny J.

Heard: June 5-19, 2000
Judgment: June 27, 2000*
Docket: Calgary 0001-05071

Counsel: *A.L. Friend, Q.C.*, *H.M. Kay, Q.C.*, *R.B. Low, Q.C.*, and *L. Goldbach*, for Petitioners.
S.F. Dunphy, *P. O'Kelly*, and *E. Kolers*, for Air Canada and 853350 Alberta Ltd.
D.R. Haigh, Q.C., *D.N. Nishimura*, *A.Z.A. Campbell* and *D. Tay*, for Resurgence Asset Management LLC.
L.R. Duncan, Q.C., and *G. McCue*, for Neil Baker, Michael Salter, Hal Metheral, and Roger Midiaty.
F.R. Foran, Q.C., and *P.T. McCarthy, Q.C.*, for Monitor, PwC.
G.B. Morawetz, R.J. Chadwick and *A. McConnell*, for Senior Secured Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co.
C.J. Shaw, Q.C., for Unionized Employees.
T. Mallett and *C. Feasby*, for Amex Bank of Canada.
E.W. Halt, for J. Stephens Allan, Claims Officer.
M. Hollins, for Pacific Costal Airlines.
P. Pastewka, for JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2.
J. Thom, for Royal Bank of Canada.
J. Medhurst-Tivadar, for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
R. Wilkins, Q.C., for Calgary and Edmonton Airport Authority.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Civil practice and procedure

XXIII Practice on appeal
XXIII.10 Leave to appeal
XXIII.10.c Appeal from refusal or granting of leave

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"
Airline brought application for approval of plan of arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Investment corporation brought counter-application for declaration that plan constituted merger or transfer of airline's assets to AC Corp., that plan would not affect investment corporation, and directing repurchase of notes pursuant to trust indenture, and that actions of airline and AC Corp. in formulating plan were oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to them — Application granted; counter-application dismissed — All statutory conditions were fulfilled and plan was fair and reasonable — Fairness did not require equal treatment of all creditors — Aim of plan was to allow airline to sustain operations and permanently adjust debt structure to reflect current market for asset values and carrying costs, in return for AC Corp. providing guarantee of restructured obligations — Plan was not oppressive to minority shareholders who, in alternative bankruptcy scenario, would receive less than under plan — Reorganization of share capital did not cancel minority shareholders' shares, and did not violate s. 167 of Business Corporations Act of Alberta — Act contemplated reorganizations in which insolvent corporation would eliminate interests of common shareholders, without requiring shareholder approval — Proposed transaction was not "sale, lease or exchange" of airline's property which required shareholder approval — Requirements for "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of Ontario Securities Commission were waived, since plan was fair and reasonable — Plan resulted in no substantial injustice to minority creditors, and represented reasonable balancing of all interests — Evidence did not support investment corporation's position that alternative existed which would render better return for minority shareholders — In insolvency situation, oppression of minority shareholder interests must be assessed against altered financial and legal landscape, which may result in shareholders' no longer having true interest to be protected — Financial support and corporate integration provided by other airline was not assumption of benefit by other airline to detriment of airline, but benefited airline and its stakeholders — Investment corporation was not oppressed — Corporate reorganization provisions in plan could not be severed from debt restructuring — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.1(2) — Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15, s. 167.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Paperny J.*:

Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway, Re (1890), [1891] 1 Ch. 213, 60 L.J. Ch. 221, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1143, 64 L.T. 127, 7 T.L.R. 171, 2 Meg. 377 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (April 16, 1992), Doc. Toronto B62/91-A (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Bruce Agra Foods Inc. v. Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of) (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169, 22 O.T.C. 247 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (February 6, 1995), Doc. B348/94 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Campeau Corp., Re (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Crabtree (Succession de) c. Barrette, 47 C.C.E.L. 1, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 1, *(sub nom. Barrette v. Crabtree (Succession de))*

1 After a decade of searching for a permanent solution to its ongoing, significant financial problems, Canadian Airlines Corporation (”CAC”) and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. (”CAIL”) seek the court’s sanction to a plan of arrangement filed under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (”CCAA”) and sponsored by its historic rival, Air Canada Corporation (”Air Canada”). To Canadian, this represents its last choice and its only chance for survival. To Air Canada, it is an opportunity to lead the restructuring of the Canadian airline industry, an exercise many suggest is long overdue. To over 16,000 employees of Canadian, it means continued employment. Canadian Airlines will operate as a separate entity and continue to provide domestic and international air service to Canadians. Tickets of the flying public will be honoured and their frequent flyer points maintained. Long term business relationships with trade creditors and suppliers will continue.

2 The proposed restructuring comes at a cost. Secured and unsecured creditors are being asked to accept significant compromises and shareholders of CAC are being asked to accept that their shares have no value. Certain unsecured creditors oppose the plan, alleging it is oppressive and unfair. They assert that Air Canada has appropriated the key assets of Canadian to itself. Minority shareholders of CAC, on the other hand, argue that Air Canada’s financial support to Canadian, before and during this restructuring process, has increased the value of Canadian and in turn their shares. These two positions are irreconcilable, but do reflect the perception by some that this plan asks them to sacrifice too much.

3 Canadian has asked this court to sanction its plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The court’s role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all the stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

II. Background

Canadian Airlines and its Subsidiaries

4 CAC and CAIL are corporations incorporated or continued under the *Business Corporations Act* of Alberta, S.A. 1981, c. B-15 (”ABCA”). 82% of CAC’s shares are held by 853350 Alberta Ltd.(”853350”) and the remaining 18% are held publicly. CAC, directly or indirectly, owns the majority of voting shares in and controls the other Petitioner, CAIL and these shares represent CAC’s principal asset. CAIL owns or has an interest in a number of other corporations directly engaged in the airline industry or other businesses related to the airline industry, including Canadian Regional Airlines Limited (”CRAL”). Where the context requires, I will refer to CAC and CAIL jointly as “Canadian” in these reasons.

5 In the past fifteen years, CAIL has grown from a regional carrier operating under the name Pacific Western Airlines (”PWA”) to one of Canada’s two major airlines. By mid-1986, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited (”CP Air”), had acquired the regional carriers Nordair Inc. (”Nordair”) and Eastern Provincial Airways (”Eastern”). In February, 1987, PWA completed its purchase of CP Air from Canadian Pacific Limited. PWA then merged the four predecessor carriers (CP Air, Eastern, Nordair, and PWA) to form one airline, “Canadian Airlines International Ltd.”, which was launched in April, 1987.

6 By April, 1989, CAIL had acquired substantially all of the common shares of Wardair Inc. and completed the integration of CAIL and Wardair Inc. in 1990.

7 CAIL and its subsidiaries provide international and domestic scheduled and charter air transportation for passengers and cargo. CAIL provides scheduled services to approximately 30 destinations in 11 countries. Its subsidiary, Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. (”CRAL 98”) provides scheduled services to approximately 35 destinations in Canada and the United States. Through code share agreements and marketing alliances with leading carriers, CAIL and its subsidiaries provide service to approximately 225 destinations worldwide. CAIL is also engaged in charter and cargo services and the provision of services to third parties, including aircraft overhaul and maintenance, passenger and cargo handling, flight simulator and equipment rentals, employee training programs and the sale of Canadian Plus frequent flyer points. As at December 31, 1999, CAIL operated approximately 79 aircraft.

8 CAIL directly and indirectly employs over 16,000 persons, substantially all of whom are located in Canada. The balance of the employees are located in the United States, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America and Mexico. Approximately 88% of the active employees of CAIL are subject to collective bargaining agreements.

which had a significant negative impact on financial performance, particularly in the fourth quarter. Canadian's eroded capital base gave it limited capacity to withstand negative effects on traffic and revenue. These factors included lower than expected operating revenues resulting from a continued weakness of the Asian economies, vigorous competition in Canadian's key western Canada and the western U.S. transborder markets, significant price discounting in most domestic markets following a labour disruption at Air Canada and CAIL's temporary loss of the ability to code-share with American Airlines on certain transborder flights due to a pilot dispute at American Airlines. Canadian also had increased operating expenses primarily due to the deterioration of the value of the Canadian dollar and additional airport and navigational fees imposed by NAV Canada which were not recoverable by Canadian through fare increases because of competitive pressures. This resulted in Canadian and its subsidiaries reporting a consolidated loss of $137.6 million for 1998.

18 As a result of these continuing weak financial results, Canadian undertook a number of additional strategic initiatives including entering the *oneworldTM* Alliance, the introduction of its new "Proud Wings" corporate image, a restructuring of CAIL's Vancouver hub, the sale and leaseback of certain aircraft, expanded code sharing arrangements and the implementation of a service charge in an effort to recover a portion of the costs relating to NAV Canada fees.

19 Beginning in late 1998 and continuing into 1999, Canadian tried to access equity markets to strengthen its balance sheet. In January, 1999, the Board of Directors of CAC determined that while Canadian needed to obtain additional equity capital, an equity infusion alone would not address the fundamental structural problems in the domestic air transportation market.

20 Canadian believes that its financial performance was and is reflective of structural problems in the Canadian airline industry, most significantly, over capacity in the domestic air transportation market. It is the view of Canadian and Air Canada that Canada's relatively small population and the geographic distribution of that population is unable to support the overlapping networks of two full service national carriers. As described further below, the Government of Canada has recognized this fundamental problem and has been instrumental in attempts to develop a solution.

Initial Discussions with Air Canada

21 Accordingly, in January, 1999, CAC's Board of Directors directed management to explore all strategic alternatives available to Canadian, including discussions regarding a possible merger or other transaction involving Air Canada.

22 Canadian had discussions with Air Canada in early 1999. AMR also participated in those discussions. While several alternative merger transactions were considered in the course of these discussions, Canadian, AMR and Air Canada were unable to reach agreement.

23 Following the termination of merger discussions between Canadian and Air Canada, senior management of Canadian, at the direction of the Board and with the support of AMR, renewed its efforts to secure financial partners with the objective of obtaining either an equity investment and support for an eventual merger with Air Canada or immediate financial support for a merger with Air Canada.

Offer by Onex

24 In early May, the discussions with Air Canada having failed, Canadian focussed its efforts on discussions with Onex Corporation ("Onex") and AMR concerning the basis upon which a merger of Canadian and Air Canada could be accomplished.

25 On August 23, 1999, Canadian entered into an Arrangement Agreement with Onex, AMR and Airline Industry Revitalization Co. Inc. ("AirCo") (a company owned jointly by Onex and AMR and controlled by Onex). The Arrangement Agreement set out the terms of a Plan of Arrangement providing for the purchase by AirCo of all of the outstanding common and non-voting shares of CAC. The Arrangement Agreement was conditional upon, among other things, the successful completion of a simultaneous offer by AirCo for all of the voting and non-voting shares of Air Canada. On August 24, 1999, AirCo announced its offers to purchase the shares of both CAC and Air Canada and to subsequently merge the operations of the two airlines to create one international carrier in Canada.

present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

60 Prior to sanctioning a plan under the CCAA, the court must be satisfied in regard to each of the following criteria:

(1) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;

(2) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(3) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

61 A leading articulation of this three-part test appears in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) at 182-3, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.) and has been regularly followed, see for example *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at 172 and *Re T. Eaton Co.* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 7. Each of these criteria are reviewed in turn below.

1. Statutory Requirements

62 Some of the matters that may be considered by the court on an application for approval of a plan of compromise and arrangement include:

(a) the applicant comes within the definition of "debtor company" in section 2 of the CCAA;

(b) the applicant or affiliated debtor companies have total claims within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000;

(c) the notice calling the meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court;

(d) the creditors were properly classified;

(e) the meetings of creditors were properly constituted;

(f) the voting was properly carried out; and

(g) the plan was approved by the requisite double majority or majorities.

63 I find that the Petitioners have complied with all applicable statutory requirements. Specifically:

(a) CAC and CAIL are insolvent and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of section 2 of the

CCAA. This was established in the affidavit evidence of Douglas Carty, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian, and so declared in the March 24, 2000 Order in these proceedings and confirmed in the testimony given by Mr. Carty at this hearing.

(b) CAC and CAIL have total claims that would be claims provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of $5,000,000.

(c) In accordance with the April 7, 2000 Order of this court, a Notice of Meeting and a disclosure statement (which included copies of the Plan and the March 24th and April 7th Orders of this court) were sent to the Affected Creditors, the directors and officers of the Petitioners, the Monitor and persons who had served a Notice of Appearance, on April 25, 2000.

(d) As confirmed by the May 12, 2000 ruling of this court (leave to appeal denied May 29, 2000), the creditors have been properly classified.

(e) Further, as detailed in the Monitor's Fifth Report to the Court and confirmed by the June 14, 2000 decision of this court in respect of a challenge by Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence"), the meetings of creditors were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was approved by the requisite double majorities in each class. The composition of the majority of the unsecured creditor class is addressed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable".

2. Matters Unauthorized

64 This criterion has not been widely discussed in the reported cases. As recognized by Blair J. in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Farley J. in *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (February 6, 1995), Doc. B348/94 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), within the CCAA process the court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the parties in ensuring nothing contrary to the CCAA has occurred or is contemplated by the plan.

65 In this proceeding, the dissenting groups have raised two matters which in their view are unauthorized by the CCAA: firstly, the Minority Shareholders of CAC suggested the proposed share capital reorganization of CAIL is illegal under the ABCA and Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1, and as such cannot be authorized under the CCAA and secondly, certain unsecured creditors suggested that the form of release contained in the Plan goes beyond the scope of release permitted under the CCAA.

a. Legality of proposed share capital reorganization

66 Subsection 185(2) of the ABCA provides:

(2) If a corporation is subject to an order for reorganization, its articles may be amended by the order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 167.

67 Sections 6.1(2)(d) and (e) and Schedule "D" of the Plan contemplate that:

a. All CAIL common shares held by CAC will be converted into a single retractable share, which will then be retracted by CAIL for $1.00; and

b. All CAIL preferred shares held by 853350 will be converted into CAIL common shares.

68 The Articles of Reorganization in Schedule "D" to the Plan provide for the following amendments to CAIL's Articles

(c) — cancellation	167(1)(g.1)
(d) — change in shares	167(1)(f)
(e) — change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(f) — cancellation	167(1)(g.1)

73 The Minority Shareholders suggested that the proposed reorganization effectively cancels their shares in CAC. As the above review of the proposed reorganization demonstrates, that is not the case. Rather, the shares of CAIL are being consolidated, altered and then retracted, as permitted under section 167 of the ABCA. I find the proposed reorganization of CAIL's share capital under the Plan does not violate section 167.

74 In R. Dickerson et al, *Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada*, Vol.1: Commentary (the "Dickerson Report") regarding the then proposed Canada Business Corporations Act, the identical section to section 185 is described as having been inserted with the object of enabling the "court to effect any necessary amendment of the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment".

75 The architects of the business corporation act model which the ABCA follows, expressly contemplated reorganizations in which the insolvent corporation would eliminate the interest of common shareholders. The example given in the Dickerson Report of a reorganization is very similar to that proposed in the Plan:

> For example, the reorganization of an insolvent corporation may require the following steps: first, reduction or even elimination of the interest of the common shareholders; second, relegation of the preferred shareholders to the status of common shareholders; and third, relegation of the secured debenture holders to the status of either unsecured Noteholders or preferred shareholders.

76 The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.

77 The Petitioners were unable to provide any case law addressing the use of section 185 as proposed under the Plan. They relied upon the decisions of *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.* (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 279 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *T. Eaton Co.*, *supra* in which Farley J.of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice emphasized that shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in liquidation or liquidation related scenarios.

78 Section 185 provides for amendment to articles by court order. I see no requirement in that section for a meeting or vote of shareholders of CAIL, quite apart from shareholders of CAC. Further, dissent and appraisal rights are expressly removed in subsection (7). To require a meeting and vote of shareholders and to grant dissent and appraisal rights in circumstances of insolvency would frustrate the object of section 185 as described in the Dickerson Report.

79 In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders, contrary to the CCAA.

Section 183 of the ABCA

80 The Minority Shareholders argued in the alternative that if the proposed share reorganization of CAIL were not a cancellation of their shares in CAC and therefore allowed under section 167 of the ABCA, it constituted a "sale, lease, or exchange of substantially all the property" of CAC and thus required the approval of CAC shareholders pursuant to section 183 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the common shares in CAIL were substantially all of the assets of CAC and that all of those shares were being "exchanged" for $1.00.

Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co., *supra*, at page 9:

> "Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction — although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity — and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

95 The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 (Alta. Q.B.) at 574; *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) at 368.

96 The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

a. The composition of the unsecured vote;

b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;

c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;

d. Oppression;

e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and

f. The public interest.

a. Composition of the unsecured vote

97 As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position then the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, *supra*:

> As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

98 However, given the manner of voting under the CCAA, the court must be cognizant of the treatment of minorities within a class: see for example *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.) and *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway* (1890), 60 L.J. Ch. 221 (Eng. C.A.). The court can address this by ensuring creditors' claims are properly classified. As well, it is sometimes appropriate to tabulate the vote of a particular class so the results can be assessed from a fairness perspective. In this case, the classification was challenged by Resurgence and I dismissed that application. The vote was also tabulated in this case and the results demonstrate that the votes of Air Canada and the Senior

> In deciding what is unfair, the history and nature of the corporation, the essential nature of the relationship between the corporation and the creditor, the type of rights affected in general commercial practice should all be material. More concretely, the test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the following considerations: The protection of the underlying expectation of a creditor in the arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts complained of were unforeseeable where the creditor could not reasonably have protected itself from such acts and the detriment to the interests of the creditor.

142 While expectations vary considerably with the size, structure, and value of the corporation, all expectations must be reasonably and objectively assessed: *Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.* (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont. C.A.).

143 Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: *Royal Oak Mines Ltd., supra*, para. 4., *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), and *T. Eaton Company, supra*.

144 To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

145 It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner.

Oppression allegations by Resurgence

146 Resurgence alleges that it has been oppressed or had its rights disregarded because the Petitioners and Air Canada disregarded the specific provisions of their trust indenture, that Air Canada and 853350 dealt with other creditors outside of the CCAA, refusing to negotiate with Resurgence and that they are generally being treated inequitably under the Plan.

147 The trust indenture under which the Unsecured Notes were issued required that upon a "change of control", 101% of the principal owing thereunder, plus interest would be immediately due and payable. Resurgence alleges that Air Canada, through 853350, caused CAC and CAIL to purposely fail to honour this term. Canadian acknowledges that the trust indenture was breached. On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders, including the Unsecured Noteholders. As a result of this moratorium, Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases.

148 The moratorium was not directed solely at the Unsecured Noteholders. It had the same impact on other creditors, secured and unsecured. Canadian, as a result of the moratorium, breached other contractual relationships with various creditors. The breach of contract is not sufficient to found a claim for oppression in this case. Given Canadian's insolvency, which Resurgence recognized, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable expectation that it would be paid in full under the terms of the trust indenture, particularly when Canadian had ceased making payments to other creditors as well.

TAB 18

1993 CarswellOnt 182
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.

1993 CarswellOnt 182, [1993] O.J. No. 545, 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 38 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1149

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re plan of arrangement of OLYMPIA & YORK DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED and all other companies set out in Schedule "A" attached hereto

R.A. Blair J.

Heard: February 1 and 5, 1993
Oral reasons: February 5, 1993
Written reasons: February 24, 1993
Judgment: February 24, 1993
Docket: Doc. B125/92

Counsel: [List of counsel attached as Schedule "A" hereto.]

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
XIX.3 Arrangements
XIX.3.b Approval by court
XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Approval by Court — "Fair and reasonable"

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Plan of arrangement — Sanctioning of plan — Unanimous approval of plan by all classes of creditors not being necessary where plan being fair and reasonable.

Under the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), O & Y negotiated a plan of arrangement. The final plan of arrangement was voted on by the numerous classes of creditors: 27 of the 35 classes voted in favour of the plan, eight voted against it. O & Y applied to the court under s. 6 of the CCAA for sanctioning of its final plan.

Held:

The application was allowed.

In considering whether to sanction a plan of arrangement, the court must consider whether: (1) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements; (2) all materials filed and procedures carried out are authorized by the CCAA; and (3) the plan is fair and reasonable.

13 In *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.), Doherty J.A. concluded his examination of the purpose and scheme of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, with this overview, at pp. 308-309:

> Viewed in its totality, the Act gives the court control over the initial decision to put the reorganization plan before the creditors, the classification of creditors for the purpose of considering the plan, conduct affecting the debtor company pending consideration of that plan, and the ultimate acceptability of any plan agreed upon by the creditors. The Act envisions that the rights and remedies of individual creditors, the debtor company, and others may be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in an effort to serve the greater good by arriving at some acceptable reorganization which allows the debtor company to continue in operation: *Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (No. 1)* (1989), 102 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), at p. 165.

14 Mr. Justice Doherty's summary, I think, provides a very useful focus for approaching the task of sanctioning a Plan.

15 Section 6 of the CCAA reads as follows:

> 6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, *the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding*
>
> (*a*) *on all the creditors or the class of creditors*, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, *and on the company*; and
>
> (*b*) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company. (Emphasis added)

16 Thus, the final step in the CCAA process is court sanctioning of the Plan, after which the Plan becomes binding on the creditors and the company. The exercise of this statutory obligation imposed upon the court is a matter of discretion.

17 The general principles to be applied in the exercise of the Court's discretion have been developed in a number of authorities. They were summarized by Mr. Justice Trainor in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.) and adopted on appeal in that case by McEachern C.J.B.C., who set them out in the following fashion at (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.), p. 201:

> The authorities do not permit any doubt about the principles to be applied in a case such as this. They are set out over and over again in many decided cases and may be summarized as follows:
>
> (1) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
>
> (2) all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done which is not authorized by the C.C.A.A.;
>
> (3) The plan must be fair and reasonable.

18 In an earlier Ontario decision, *Re Dairy Corp. of Canada*, [1934] O.R. 436 (C.A.), Middleton J.A. applied identical criteria to a situation involving an arrangement under the Ontario *Companies Act*. The N.S.C.A. recently followed *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* in *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S.C.A.). Farley J. did as well in *Re Campeau Corp.*, [1992] O.J. No. 237 (Ont. Ct. of Justice, Gen. Div.) [now reported at 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104].

Strict Compliance with Statutory Requirements

19 Both this first criterion, dealing with statutory requirements, and the second criterion, dealing with the absence of any unauthorized conduct, I take to refer to compliance with the various procedural imperatives of the legislation itself, or to compliance with the various orders made by the court during the course of the CCAA process: See *Re Campeau*, *supra*.

20 At the outset, on May 14, 1992 I found that the Applicants met the criteria for access to the protection of the Act — they are insolvent; they have outstanding issues of bonds issued in favour of a trustee, and the compromise proposed at that time, and now, includes a compromise of the claims of those creditors whose claims are pursuant to the trust deeds. During the course of the proceedings Creditors' Committees have been formed to facilitate the negotiation process, and creditors have been divided into classes for the purposes of voting, as envisaged by the Act. Votes of those classes of creditors have been held, as required.

21 With the consent, and at the request of, the Applicants and the Creditors' Committees, The Honourable David H.W. Henry, a former Justice of this Court, was appointed "Claims Officer" by Order dated September 11, 1992. His responsibilities in that capacity included, as well as the determination of the value of creditors' claims for voting purposes, the responsibility of presiding over the meetings at which the votes were taken, or of designating someone else to do so. The Honourable Mr. Henry, himself, or The Honourable M. Craig or The Honourable W. Gibson Gray — both also former Justices of this Court — as his designees, presided over the meetings of the Classes of Creditors, which took place during the period from January 11, 1993 to January 25, 1993. I have his Report as to the results of each of the meetings of creditors, and confirming that the meetings were duly convened and held pursuant to the provisions of the Court Orders pertaining to them and the CCAA.

22 I am quite satisfied that there has been strict compliance with the statutory requirements of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Unauthorized conduct

23 I am also satisfied that nothing has been done or purported to have been done which is not authorized by the CCAA.

24 Since May 14, the court has been called upon to make approximately 60 Orders of different sorts, in the course of exercising its supervisory function in the proceedings. These Orders involved the resolution of various issues between the creditors by the court in its capacity as "referee" of the negotiation process; they involved the approval of the "GAR" Orders negotiated between the parties with respect to the funding of O & Y's general and administrative expenses and restructuring costs throughout the "stay" period; they involved the confirmation of the sale of certain of the Applicants' assets, both upon the agreement of various creditors and for the purposes of funding the "GAR" requirements; they involved the approval of the structuring of Creditors' Committees, the classification of creditors for purposes of voting, the creation and defining of the role of "Information Officer" and, similarly, of the role of "Claims Officer". They involved the endorsement of the information circular respecting the Final Plan and the mailing and notice that was to be given regarding it. The Court's Orders encompassed, as I say, the general supervision of the negotia tion and arrangement period, and the interim sanctioning of procedures implemented and steps taken by the Applicants and the creditors along the way.

25 While the court, of course, has not been a participant during the elaborate negotiations and undoubted boardroom brawling which preceded and led up to the Final Plan of Compromise, I have, with one exception, been the Judge who has made the orders referred to. No one has drawn to my attention any instances of something being done during the proceedings which is not authorized by the CCAA.

26 In these circumstances, I am satisfied that nothing unauthorized under the CCAA has been done during the course of the proceedings.

27 This brings me to the criterion that the Plan must be "fair and reasonable".

Fair and reasonable

28 The Plan must be "fair and reasonable". That the ultimate expression of the Court's responsibility in sanctioning a Plan should find itself telescoped into those two words is not surprising. "Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. "Fairness" is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction — although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation make its exercise an exercise in equity — and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

29 From time to time, in the course of these proceedings, I have borrowed liberally from the comments of Mr. Justice Gibbs whose decision in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) contains much helpful guidance in matters of the CCAA. The thought I have borrowed most frequently is his remark, at p. 116, that the court is "called upon to weigh the equities, or balance the relative degrees of prejudice, which would flow from granting or refusing" the relief sought under the Act. This notion is particularly apt, it seems to me, when consideration is being given to the sanctioning of the Plan.

30 If a debtor company, in financial difficulties, has a reasonable chance of staving off a liquidator by negotiating a compromise arrangement with its creditors, "fairness" to its creditors as a whole, and to its shareholders, prescribes that it should be allowed an opportunity to do so, consistent with not "unfairly" or "unreasonably" depriving secured creditors of their rights under their security. Negotiations should take place in an environment structured and supervised by the court in a "fair" and balanced — or, "reasonable" — manner. When the negotiations have been completed and a plan of arrangement arrived at, and when the creditors have voted on it — technical and procedural compliance with the Act aside — the plan should be sanctioned if it is "fair and reasonable".

31 When a plan is sanctioned it becomes binding upon the debtor company and upon creditors of that company. What is "fair and reasonable", then, must be addressed in the context of the impact of the plan on the creditors and the various classes of creditors, in the context of their response to the plan, and with a view to the purpose of the CCAA.

32 On the appeal in *Re Northland Properties Ltd., supra*, at p. 201, Chief Justice McEachern made the following comment in this regard:

> ... there can be no doubt about the purpose of the C.C.A.A. It is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and of the company, particularly to keep a company in financial difficulties alive and out of the hands of liquidators. To make the Act workable, it is often necessary to permit a requisite majority of each class to bind the minority to the terms of the plan, but the plan must be fair and reasonable.

33 In *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. at 231 (C.A.), a case involving a scheme and arrangement under the *Joint Stock Companies Arrangements Act, 1870* [(U.K.), 33 & 34 Vict., c. 104], Lord Justice Bowen put it this way, at p. 243:

> Now, I have no doubt at all that it would be improper for the Court to allow an arrangement to be forced on any class of creditors, if the arrangement cannot reasonably be supposed by sensible business people to be for the benefit of that class as such, otherwise the sanction of the Court would be a sanction to what would be a scheme of confiscation. The object of this section is not confiscation ... Its object is to enable compromises to be made which are for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such.

Again at p. 245:

> It is in my judgment desirable to call attention to this section, and to the extreme care which ought to be brought to bear upon the holding of meetings under it. It enables a compromise to be forced upon the outside creditors by a majority of the body, or upon a class of the outside creditors by a majority of that class.

34 Is the Final Plan presented here by the O & Y Applicants "fair and reasonable"?

35 I have reviewed the Plan, including the provisions relating to each of the Classes of Creditors. I believe I have an

understanding of its nature and purport, of what it is endeavouring to accomplish, and of how it proposes this be done. To describe the Plan as detailed, technical, enormously complex and all-encompassing, would be to understate the proposition. This is, after all, we are told, the largest corporate restructuring in Canadian — if not, worldwide — corporate history. It would be folly for me to suggest that I comprehend the intricacies of the Plan in all of its minutiae and in all of its business, tax and corporate implications. Fortunately, it is unnecessary for me to have that depth of understanding. I must only be satisfied that the Plan is fair and reasonable in the sense that it is feasible and that it fairly balances the interests of all of the creditors, the company and its shareholders.

36 One important measure of whether a Plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval of the Plan, and the degree to which approval has been given.

37 As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspects of the Plan, descending into the negotiating arena and substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

38 This point has been made in numerous authorities, of which I note the following: *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175, at p. 184 (B.C.S.C.), affirmed (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, at p. 205 (B.C.C.A.); *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123 (C.A.), at p. 129; *Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245; *École Internationale de Haute Esthétique Edith Serei Inc. (Receiver of) c. Edith Serei Internationale (1987) Inc.* (1989), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 36 (C.S. Qué.).

39 In *Re Keddy Motors Inns Ltd., supra*, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal spoke of "a very heavy burden" on parties seeking to show that a Plan is not fair and reasonable, involving "matters of substance", when the Plan has been approved by the requisite majority of creditors (see pp. 257-258). Freeman J.A. stated at p. 258:

> The Act clearly contemplates rough-and-tumble negotiations between debtor companies desperately seeking a chance to survive and creditors willing to keep them afloat, but on the best terms they can get. What the creditors and the company must live with is a plan of their own design, not the creation of a court. The court's role is to ensure that creditors who are bound unwillingly under the Act are not made victims of the majority and forced to accept terms that are unconscionable.

40 In *École Internationale, supra* at p. 38, Dugas J. spoke of the need for "serious grounds" to be advanced in order to justify the court in refusing to approve a proposal, where creditors have accepted it, unless the proposal is unethical.

41 In this case, as Mr. Kennedy points out in his affidavit filed in support of the sanction motion, the final Plan is "the culmination of several months of intense negotiations and discussions between the applicants and their creditors, [reflects] significant input of virtually all of the classes of creditors and [is] the product of wide-ranging consultations, give and take and compromise on the part of the participants in the negotiating and bargaining process." The body of creditors, moreover, Mr. Kennedy notes, "consists almost entirely of sophisticated financial institutions represented by experienced legal counsel" who are, in many cases, "members of creditors' committees constituted pursuant to the amended order of may 14, 1992." Each creditors' committee had the benefit of independent and experienced legal counsel.

42 With the exception of the 8 classes of creditors that did not vote to accept the Plan, the Plan met with the overwhelming approval of the secured creditors and the unsecured creditors of the Applicants. This level of approval is something the court must acknowledge with some deference.

43 Those secured creditors who have approved the Plan retain their rights to realize upon their security at virtually any time, subject to certain requirements regarding notice. In the meantime, they are to receive interest on their outstanding indebtedness, either at the original contract rate or at some other negotiated rate, and the payment of principal is postponed for a period of 5 years.

44 The claims of creditors — in this case, secured creditors — who did not approve the Plan are specifically treated under the Plan as "unaffected claims" i.e. claims not compromised or bound by the provisions of the Plan. Section 6.2(C) of the Final Plan states that the applicants may apply to the court for a sanction Order which sanctions the Plan only insofar as it

TAB 19

B.C. Statutes
Business Corporations Act
Part 9 — Company Alterations (ss. 256-311)
Division 5 — Arrangements

S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, s. 288

s 288. Arrangement may be proposed

Currency

288.Arrangement may be proposed
288(1) Despite any other provision of this Act, a company may propose an arrangement with shareholders, creditors or other persons and may, in that arrangement, make any proposal it considers appropriate, including a proposal for one or more of the following:

(a) an alteration to the memorandum, notice of articles or articles of the company;

(b) an alteration to any of the rights or special rights or restrictions attached to any of the shares of the company;

(c) an amalgamation of the company with one or more corporations;

(d) a division of the business carried on by the company;

(e) a transfer of all or any part of the money, securities or other property, rights and interests of the company to another corporation in exchange for money, securities or other property, rights and interests of the other corporation;

(f) a transfer of all or any part of the liabilities of the company to another corporation;

(g) an exchange of securities of the company held by security holders for money, securities or other property, rights and interests of the company or for money, securities or other property, rights and interests of another corporation;

(h) a dissolution without liquidation, or a liquidation and dissolution, of the company;

(i) a compromise between the company and its creditors or any class of its creditors, or between the company and the persons holding its securities or any class of those persons.

288(2) Before an arrangement proposed under this section takes effect, the arrangement must be

(a) adopted in accordance with section 289, and

(b) approved by the court under section 291.

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B.C. Statutes
Business Corporations Act
Part 9 — Company Alterations (ss. 256-311)
Division 5 — Arrangements

S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, s. 291

s 291. Role of court in arrangements

Currency

291.Role of court in arrangements
291(1) If an arrangement is proposed, the court may make an order respecting that arrangement under subsection (2)

(a) on its own motion,

(b) on the application of the company, or

(c) on the application, made on notice to the company, of

(i) a shareholder of the company,

(ii) a creditor of the company, or

(iii) a person who is a member of the class of persons with whom the arrangement is proposed.

291(2) The court may, in respect of a proposed arrangement, make any order it considers appropriate, including any of the following orders:

(a) an order determining the notice to be given to any interested person, or dispensing with notice to any person, in relation to any application to court under this Division;

(b) an order requiring the company to do one or both of the following in the manner and with the notice the court directs:

(i) call, hold and conduct one or more meetings of the persons the court considers appropriate;

(ii) hold a separate vote of the persons the court considers appropriate;

(c) an order permitting shareholders to dissent under Division 2 of Part 8 or in any other manner the court may direct;

(d) an order appointing a lawyer, at the expense of the company, to represent the interests of some or all of the shareholders;

(e) an order directing that an arrangement proposed with the creditors or a class of creditors of the company be referred to the shareholders of the company in the manner and for the approval the court considers appropriate.

291(3) As part of any order made in respect of a company under subsection (2)(c) of this section, the court may direct the company to provide, in the manner specified by the order, a copy of the entered order to all or specified shareholders.

291(4) Without limiting subsections (1) to (3) but despite any other provision of this Act, on an application to court for approval of the arrangement,

(a) if the arrangement has been adopted under section 289 and, if required, approved by the shareholders in accordance with an order made under subsection (2)(e) of this section, the court may make an order approving the arrangement on the terms presented or substantially on those terms or may refuse to approve that arrangement,

(b) if, under the arrangement, money, securities or other property, rights or interests, or liabilities, of the company are to be transferred to another corporation, the court may make

(i) an order providing for the allotment or appropriation by the receiving corporation of any shares or other securities that, under the arrangement, are to be allotted or appropriated to or for any person,

(ii) an order providing for the continuation by or against the receiving corporation of any legal proceedings pending by or against the transferring company, or

(iii) an order providing for the dissolution of the transferring company, and

(c) the court may make any incidental, consequential and supplemental orders necessary to ensure that the arrangement is fully and effectively carried out.

291(5) If an order of the court made under this section provides for the transfer of money, securities or other property, rights or interests, or liabilities, of the company,

(a) the money, securities or other property, rights or interests are deemed to be transferred to and to vest in the receiving corporation, or the liabilities are deemed to be transferred to and become the liabilities of the receiving corporation, when the applicable provisions of the order take effect, and

(b) any particular money, securities or other property, rights or interests that are, by the arrangement, to be freed from any charge are freed from that charge if the order so directs.

Amendment History
2003, c. 70, s. 58; 2007, c. 7, s. 25

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B.C. Statutes
Business Corporations Act
Part 9 — Company Alterations (ss. 256-311)
Division 5 — Arrangements

S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, s. 294

s 294. Obligations on company if articles altered

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294.Obligations on company if articles altered
294(1) This section applies if an arrangement is approved by a court order under section 291 and a provision of the arrangement will, on taking effect, alter the company's articles or otherwise affect the company so that information contained in its articles is incorrect or incomplete.

294(2) In the circumstances referred to in subsection (1) of this section, if the company is a pre-existing company that has not complied with section 370 or 436, the company must, promptly after the making of the order and before complying with section 292, comply with section 370 or 436, as the case may be.

294(3) Promptly after the making of an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section and, in the case of a company to which subsection (2) applies, after compliance by the company with subsection (2), the company must alter its articles in accordance with the order by depositing a copy of the entered order at the company's records office.

294(4) Section 259(4) to (6) applies to an alteration to the articles referred to in subsection (3) of this section, including, without limiting this, to a change of name or an adoption or change of any translation of name, and, for that purpose, a reference in section 259(4) to (6) to a resolution is deemed to be a reference to the court order obtained under section 291.

Amendment History
2003, c. 70, s. 59

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